Management of Police Misconduct Investigations

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Abstract

The notion of procedural justice implies that effective oversight of police can foster public trust, which police require to fulfill their mission. But what happens when oversight systems fail? We argue that if deficient oversight erodes public trust, it can produce a feedback effect which further harms oversight, as perceived past illegitimacy may reduce civilians' willingness to report future police misconduct. To investigate this theory, we leverage rare access to police misconduct investigation files in three of the five largest U.S. police departments. Analyzing over twenty-five thousand allegations, we establish several stylized facts that suggest oversight systems in major agencies are deficient. Investigators impose vague labeling systems that downplay the severity of alleged offenses in public data; terminate investigations if civilians do not follow elaborate and prolonged processes; and virtually never impose serious discipline *even when civilian complaints are verified.* Using surveys fielded in the same jurisdictions, we then test the impact of informing civilians of features of their city's oversight systems. We find aggregate statistics conveying the rates of sustained allegations and subsequent discipline depress trust in police and [effect on hypothetical willingness to file], while detailed narratives showing how complaints were investigated produce relatively more positive assessments. Our findings shed light on the often-shrouded inner workings of oversight systems, and illustrate how different variants of transparency can lead to divergent assessments of police legitimacy. Our paper also underscores how institutional design and public perceptions can function in tandem to determine the efficacy of bureaucratic oversight. [update if latest result shows possible to improve perceptions when discipline imposed.]

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1 Introduction

Fundamentally, police rely on civilians to conduct their duties effectively. For police to fulfill their mission, civilians must report crimes, act as informants and witnesses in investigations and trials, comply with police directives during police-civilian encounters, and practice law-abiding behavior in their everyday lives. In addition, procedural justice scholars have demonstrated that the level of cooperation police can expect to receive from civilians is often determined by the extent to which civilians perceive that police exercise their authority fairly (Tyler, 2003; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Augustyn, 2016; Canales, 2018). But a history of excessive violence and misconduct toward marginalized segments of society since the inception of the United States policing system (Ogletree et al., 1995; Yale, 1996; Ritchie and Mogul, 2007; Butler, 2018; Ralph, 2020), and recent highly-publicized instances of unjustified police violence, have made trust in law enforcement anemic (Crabtree, 2020; Jones, 2020; Ortiz, 2020; Jones, 2021). What's more, there are few avenues of recourse for those who experience unjustified police violence or police misconduct; attempts at litigation or prosecution are costly and often unsuccessful, and many victims do not have the resources to pursue these options (Cheh, 1996; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Lumsden, 2017). Filing a complaint about police misconduct is therefore one of the few channels civilians can readily use to seek accountability for harms (Ba, 2020; Torrible, 2018).

Efforts to oversee police and hold them accountable for misconduct enjoy strong public support (Pew, 2020; Adams et al., 2022), and most jurisdictions have established internal affairs or civilian oversight units tasked with investigating civilian complaints against police and dispensing discipline when misconduct is discovered. But somewhat paradoxically, these oversight systems—in part established to improve public perceptions of law enforcement—are often shrouded in secrecy. Many jurisdictions do not readily share data on their misconduct investigations. Those that do, including major agencies like the New York Police Department (NYPD), post only coarse metadata, masking the details of alleged misconduct and the steps taken to investigate it. And even a cursory look at public-facing data shows that complaint investigations can sometimes take years before being adjudicated, despite mandates to complete probes in a timely manner, with little explanation for delays.

In this paper, we argue deficiencies in police oversight systems can undermine efforts to combat police misconduct not only by directly affecting officers' incentives to abstain from misconduct, but through a feedback process mediated by public perceptions of oversight systems themselves. As studies of principal agent theory and bureaucratic management have long held (Goldstein, 1967; Wilson, 1968; Miller, 2005),

failing to closely monitor agents and impose discipline when necessary can foster misconduct by directly encouraging agents to defy commanders and flout constraints on their exercise of power. While central, this institutional perspective overlooks the role of civilian attitudes in the efficacy of oversight. Simply put, if civilians come to believe that oversight systems are mere "window dressing" (Landau, 1994; Prenzler et al., 2010), they may be much less likely to expend the effort necessary to report misconduct in the first place, further undermining oversight efforts.

To investigate this theory, we marshal an array of administrative data sources and targeted survey experiments to describe how misconduct investigations are conducted and how knowledge of their inner workings affects public perceptions. To establish the prevalence and structure of systems for investigating police misconduct, we first conduct an inventory of oversight systems in the largest U.S. police agencies, allowing us to fill gaps and correct errors in the most prominent existing data sets on police oversight systems (cite).[1] We find that 97 of the largest 100 jurisdictions advertise a process for reviewing civilian complaints, and that 69 involve civilians in the oversight process. Of those 69, 46 civilian oversight bodies can conduct independent investigations, while 59 can receive complaints but not investigate.

Having established the landscape of misconduct investigation systems, we conduct in-depth reviews of the investigative process in three of the five largest U.S. police agencies: the NYPD, the Chicago Police Department (CPD), and the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). Specifically, we analyze five years of complaint process data from these three cities, tracing complaints from inception to adjudication, and evaluate: whether investigations adhere to the prescribed process and regulations; what proportion of complaints are sustained (and if they are not, why not); how many complaints end in penalties; and any patterns in the types of complaints that are sustained and penalized. In addition to metadata on investigated complaints, we also manually reviewed over 9,000 detailed non-public narratives of police misconduct investigations in Philadelphia to understand how inquiries are conducted and the specific obstacles to verifying civilian allegations and imposing discipline.

This analysis uncovered several empirical regularities. In addition to recovering extremely low sustain and discipline rates for alleged misconduct (Hickman, 2006; Liederbach et al., 2007; Terrill and Ingram, 2016; Ba and Rivera, 2020; Hendricks, 2021), we also show that investigations sometimes take more than a year to complete (Waters and Brown, 2000; Terrill and Ingram, 2016)–despite rules mandating more speedy adjudication–and that public-facing data on complaints often do not accurately represent

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[1]Detail the errors we corrected in the prominent existing data.

the nature of alleged misconduct. For example, in Philadelphia, 36% of complaints publicly classified as "departmental violations" are in fact serious charges of constitutional violations like improper search or arrest, theft, mishandling evidence, or failure to report police actions. A close reading of investigative files also shows that many investigations are terminated if civilians fail at any point to participate in the lengthy, multi-stage process that commences once they file a complaint. In some cases, the departmental responses we document are patently deficient according to leading theories of accountability, showing, for example, no record of any discipline being imposed even when officers' misconduct is verified. In other cases, oversight exists in a difficult grey area: discipline is imposed, but its severity is arguably insufficient given the nature of the verified misconduct.

Given the subjectivity that is inherent when evaluating the sufficiency of agency responses to abusive policing behaviors, we turn to original surveys of the individuals whose beliefs about the adequacy of police oversight is arguably most important in a democratic system: the civilians residing in these same three jurisdictions.Specifically, we conduct a series of surveys in these cities to: i) measure opinions on the appropriateness of various forms of discipline given types of misconduct; ii) test how these perceptions of accountability systems are affected by the provision of knowledge about complaint investigations; and iii) test whether structural changes to accountability systems might serve to improve trust in police among the public. A unique aspect of these surveys is that they incorporate real information from misconduct investigations documented in the administrative data we analyze in these same jurisdictions, including the non-public details of how investigations were conducted. In other words, our surveys investigate the following question in various ways: "what would happen if the public were privy to the inner workings of the normally-shrouded process of complaint investigations?"

Across these surveys, we find that i) public preferences concerning the appropriateness of discipline for various types of police misconduct is severely out of step with the discipline actually imposed; ii) the provision of metadata on the outcomes of complaint investigations lowers trust in police and accountability systems, especially relative to the provision of detailed information on how complaint investigations are conducted; and iii) [results from experiment in final survey, including willingness to file.]

Taken together, these analyses have several implications for knowledge of how oversight of police currently functions, as well as possible avenues for reform. First using administrative data, we show extremely low rates of discipline imposed even when misconduct can be verified. Using surveys that draw on these results, we show accountability systems for police misconduct are, in practice, much too

lenient for the public's preferences, and that learning of this lenience depresses trust in police. Finally, we show that hypothetical systems which imposed discipline for misconduct at higher rates, as well as increased transparency about the inner workings of complaint investigations, could help to repair trust in law enforcement. [add line once willingness to file results are in]

Our findings add important nuance to longstanding debates over how to hold police accountable for misconduct, and the utility of increased transparency in accountability processes. Rather than an unconditional boon for public perceptions, the impact of transparency initiatives hinges on the nature of what civilians learn in the process. If oversight systems appear to be ineffective or unfairly managed, transparency lowers public trust, and the hypothetical willingness of civilians to avail themselves of complaint systems is eroded. On the other hand, when civilians learn the lengths investigators sometimes go to when probing civilian complaints, or are told officers are actually punished for misconduct, perceptions can markedly improve [verify with latest results].

This paper proceeds as follows. We begin by outlining a simple theory of how oversight systems function, explicitly incorporating the role of public opinion and how it poses the potential for feedback effects. We then describe the data we bring to bear to test the implications of several facets of this theory. Next, we descriptively analyze five years of complaint process data from New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia—with a deep dive in Philadelphia, where we had access to the most granular data. Finally, we turn to an exploration of civilian perceptions of police and police misconduct using city-wide surveys in New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia to assess civilians' current attitudes toward police and evaluate whether providing civilians with information about police misconduct investigations in their city affects those perceptions.

2   The Feedback Effects of Deficient Oversight

The difficulties of effective oversight in police agencies have received decades of attention from scholars across an array of disciplines (Brehm and Gates, 1999; Goldstein, 1967; Wilson, 1968). While the management of public sector bureaucrats is thought to be challenging in general, the structure of police agencies and the nature of police work itself make police accountability especially difficult to achieve. At its heart, the problem of police oversight is a principal-agent problem: officers often have divergent preferences from commanders—and the elected politicians who oversee their agencies—over how they

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Figure 1: **Model of Police Oversight.** This diagram displays a simple model of one iteration of police oversight. Red portions are the components empirically investigated in this study. Macro and micro-level administrative data are used to evaluate the quality of police oversight at time t. Survey experiments in the same jurisdictions are used to evaluate the effects of oversight quality on public perceptions, and the ways in which those updated perceptions may influence future oversight at time $t + 1$.

Oversight Quality$_t$ $\longrightarrow$ Police Behavior $\longrightarrow$ Oversight Quality$_{t+1}$

Public Perceptions

do their jobs; they face "task idiosyncrasies" (Brehm and Gates, 1999, p. XXX) that make it difficult to write a comprehensive rule book dictating all the scenarios they may face during a shift; they are endowed with inordinate amounts of discretion due to the myriad situations they must face; and they often work out of sight from supervisors. These factors produce a high amount of leeway for officers to act as they please, with a relatively low likelihood of facing any consequences for abusive behaviors.

This is not to say that patrol officers are beyond control. Just as the nature of principal agent problems have been extensively studied, so too have potential solutions (Miller, 2005), and as data on police oversight and behavior have become increasingly available, scholars have generated evidence that monitoring combined with the credible threat of sanctions for undesirable behavior can rapidly and substantially alter officer behavior (e.g. Mummolo, 2018).

While essential, we argue this institutional account of police accountability is incomplete. To be sure, officer behavior is shaped by the fundamental nature of their work and the structures police agencies put in place to assure compliance with command directives. But another major factor in curbing undesirable police behavior centers on what the public observes of an agency's oversight efforts, which in turn can affect their willingness to participate in systems that rely on civilian cooperation to ensure the quality police services. In other words, not only do we believe institutional design and public perceptions affect police performance, as much prior work has noted, we also argue that these inputs interact in ways that can reinforce both positive and negative aspects of oversight systems, affecting police behavior at future periods through a process of feedback.

A simplified version of our theory of how public perceptions mediate the process of police oversight is illustrated in the causal model depicted in Figure 1. In brief, we theorize that the quality of police oversight at time t—implicitly a function of the observability of officers, and the structures put in place

by an agency to monitor and discipline officers as needed—affects not only subsequent police behavior but also public perceptions. In other words, the public observes the efforts of police agencies to hold officers accountable for misconduct, perhaps both directly and indirectly. In the former case, civilians may learn of an oversight effort being implemented by a municipality, such as the creation of a civilian complaint review board, or a transparency imitative such as the public release of data on misconduct investigations. Civilians also get to observe officer behavior following an oversight effort, providing a signal of whether oversight has been effective.

It is at this point that public perceptions may feed back into the oversight process. Specifically, once the public forms an impression of the quality of an agency's efforts to hold police accountable, they use this information to decide whether to participate in systems that are critical to future oversight, often at considerable personal costs in terms of the time necessary to navigate the often labyrinthine processes for reporting misconduct in some jurisdictions. In the event civilians perceive that agencies are engaging in a sincere and competent effort to discipline officers for misconduct, they will be theoretically more inclined to report misconduct in the future, directly affecting the quality of oversight at time $t + 1$. However, if civilians learn that oversight efforts have been poor, or mere "window dressing," they may be disincentivized to participate in such systems, as the time and expense required to do so would yield little benefit. The single iteration of this process depicted in Figure 1 then repeats, potentially exacerbating the strengths (weaknesses) of oversight systems over time, and producing police behavior increasingly in (out of) step with public preferences.

In what follows, we describe several data sources and research designs aimed at testing specific components of the theory outlined above. The aspects of the theory we empirically examine are highlighted in red in Figure 1. In some cases, we are able to experimentally test causal arguments embedded in this theory. In other cases, we provide descriptive statistics that shed light on observable implications of this theory, e.g., the quality of oversight in various locations. Throughout, we are careful to clarify which of these types of evidence is being provided in each case.

3 Data and Research Design

3.1 The National Landscape of Oversight

To investigate the quality of oversight of police misconduct (the first node in Figure 1), we begin by reporting the landscape of oversight systems in major U.S. police agencies, which we researched by cross-referencing several public data sources and through manual examination of organizational structures (see Appendix 7.1 for details, including details on corrections we have made to public-facing datasets on oversight systems). This high-level descriptive examination allows us to properly contextualize the micro-level investigation that follows.[2]

This examination revealed considerable heterogeneity in the structure and powers of police oversight agencies. We find that amongst the 100 largest policing agencies, 69 have civilian oversight organizations that meet our definition.[3] Of these 69 civilian oversight organizations: 59 can receive complaints; 46 can conduct independent investigations; 42 can exercise subpoena power; 40 can recommend discipline; and 5 can actually impose discipline.[4]

In other words, of the oversight systems present in the 100 largest jurisdictions, which account for more than one third of local police officers, only 5 possess the ability to discipline officers for misconduct– a feature that classic theories of principal-agent problems would predict fosters moral hazard among officers (Miller, 2005). This constitutes prima facie evidence that the quality of oversight systems is deficient in the vast majority of places we examine.

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[2]Our sample includes only police oversight organizations that are civilian-led or play a role in processing complaints. This excludes police-led units aimed at addressing complaints and civilian-led organizations that provide general advice or police-community relations work but do not play a role in processing complaints. The types of organizations remaining under our definition include Office of Inspector General, Civilian Complaint Review Board, Police Accountability Board, Independent Police Auditor, and Board of Police Commissioners. The data we present in this paper provide a snapshot of current oversight organizations and their prescribed powers; they do not address organizational antecedents.

[3]Four others – the Alameda County Sheriffs Department, Jersey City Police Department, Norfolk Police Department, and Richmond Police Department – have recently passed laws or ordinances to establish civilian oversight that meets our definition, but the organizations have not yet been fully implemented.

[4]The 5 agencies where civilian oversight organizations can actually impose discipline are: (1) Rochester City Police Department, (2) Cleveland Police Department, (3) Milwaukee Police Department, (4) Detroit Police Department, (5) Saint Louis County Police Department. Their civilian oversight organizations are, respectively: (1) Police Accountability Board, (2) Office of Professional Standards, (3) Fire and Police Commission, (4) Board of Police Commissioners (5) Board of Police Commissioners.

3.2 Case-Level Data on Misconduct Investigations

To gain further insight into the quality of police oversight systems, we next turn to detailed case-level data from Chicago, New York and Philadelphia. Specifically, we investigate: i) the process for investigating civilian complaints, including the obstacles to adjudicating civilian claims; ii) how often verified claims lead to discipline against officers; and iii) the distribution and severity of imposed discipline. [Something about how the composition of this sample compares to features we discover in the national landscape analysis.]

Across agencies, civilian complaint processes typically break down into five distinct phases: (1) Police-Civilian Encounter, (2) Complaint Filed, (3) Cursory Review and Categorization, (4) Investigation and Finding, and (5) Charging and Discipline. We note that in many large jurisdictions, responsibility for administration of these processes is shared between police internal affairs and civilian oversight units. Appendix **??** notes which of the largest 100 police agencies have civilian oversight involved in their complaint process and what powers the civilian oversight unit has with respect to said process. Appendix 7.1 provides additional details about our sampling and coding methodology.

In New York City, our analysis covers 46,717 allegations from 13,683 civilian complaints filed against NYPD officers between 2015 and 2020, based on metadata made publicly available by the CCRB through the `Data Transparency Initiative` and disciplinary data provided by the CCRB through an open records request.[5] We follow these allegations from the point when they are initially received to their final disposition.

In Chicago, our analysis covers 62,067 allegations of misconduct from 30,097 civilian complaints filed against CPD officers between 2015 and 2020, based on investigative data made publicly available by COPA on the `Chicago Data Portal`, investigative and disciplinary data provided by CPD through an open records request, and disciplinary memos made publicly available by the Chicago Police Board.[6] We follow these allegations from the point when they are initially received to their final disposition.

In Philadelphia, our analysis covers 10,953 allegations from 4,032 civilian complaints filed against PPD officers between 2015 and 2020, based on public data shared by PPD through `OpenData Philly` and investigatory memos and disciplinary outcomes obtained by PAC through a data-sharing agreement

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[5]On an annual basis, this equates to an average of 7,441 allegations in 2,280 complaints per year, or an average of roughly 0.2 allegations in 0.1 complaints per officer per year.

[6]On an annual basis, this equates to an average of 10,342 civilian allegations in 5,015 complaints per year, or 0.9 allegations in 0.4 complaints per officer per year.

with PPD.[7] We follow these allegations from the point when they are initially received to their final disposition. [add something on special access we were granted]

Using this micro-level data, we are able to trace misconduct complaints from inception to adjudication, characterize the reasons investigations fail to proceed, and analyze rates of discipline. Of particular interest is the frequency and nature of discipline imposed in cases where civilian complaints can be verified—a most-likely case for observing that an oversight system is functioning properly. In what follows, we detail the results from New York, Chicago and Philadelphia, in turn, and establish several stylized facts about the process and outcomes of misconduct investigations in these major agencies. In turn, these results directly inform the design of our survey experiments conducted with civilians in the same jurisdictions.

3.3 Surveys on Civilian Attitudes Toward Oversight

When the level of discipline for misconduct is nonzero, determining the appropriateness of responses by oversight organizations is more subjective. To address this, we next turn to survey data collected in the same jurisdictions to measure the degree to which civilians' preferences over how misconduct should be dealt with corresponds to actual decisions by oversight agencies. In addition, through a series of experiments, we are able to evaluate the effect of knowledge of how oversight is conducted on public perceptions. We are also able to get some insight as to the effect of these perceptions on subsequent oversight, by testing how receiving knowledge of oversight processes and outcomes affects self reported willingness to engage with such systems in the future. The relationships we explore are highlighted in red in Figure 1.

Specifically, we deployed pre-registered surveys in the same three jurisdictions where we were able to secure detailed records on misconduct investigations: New York City, Chicago and Philadelphia.[8] In New York City and Chicago, we recruited samples of 1771 and 1023 participants, respectively, via the online survey vendor Qualtrics. In Philadelphia, where we have the most detailed records of misconduct investigations, we recruited 2087 online respondents though Qualtrics, as well as an additional 273 respondents through direct mail invitations, in order to test whether the mode of recruitment elicited markedly different sample characteristics.

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[7]On an annual basis, this equates to an average of 1,825 allegations in 672 complaints per year, or 0.3 allegations in 0.1 complaints per officer per year.

[8]See Appendix 7.8 for pre-analysis plan.

While some details of these surveys vary by jurisdiction and experimental condition, they share the same overarching structure. After a standard battery of demographic questions, respondents are asked about their confidence in their city police and other public institutions, their perception of how fairly their city police treat civilians of different races, how likely they would be to call their city police for help in three different scenarios, and what they think a fair penalty would be for a police officer in their city found guilty of three different types of offenses. All respondents are then shown a transparency treatment summarizing real complaint process data in their jurisdiction. Following this information treatment, all respondents are asked again about their perceptions of and confidence in police and other public institutions, and what they think a fair penalty would be for a police officer in their city found guilty of misconduct.[9] Respondents are then randomized to a series of mini experiments manipulating features of the complaint process (e.g., interview location, expected duration of investigation) and asked about their likelihood of filing a complaint under each condition in the event of experiencing misconduct. Finally, all respondents are asked if they intend to file a complaint against a police officer in their city in the near future.[10]

Our primary objective in these experiments is to test whether exposure to the details of complaint investigations alters perceptions of police, oversight systems, and government. We did not have strong expectations as to the direction of these effects. On the one hand, transparency in the process might engender trust among civilians, since a process allowing details to be shared with the public might be considered less vulnerable to corruption. On the other hand, if the details shared with respondents convey an ineffective system, opinions of government institutions may worsen after exposure. We report the results of these survey experiments in the following section.

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[9]The experiment was constructed such that respondents were randomly assigned to either a "trust" condition or a "penalty" condition. Those in the "trust" condition were asked questions about trust in police, then shown a transparency intervention with accurate statistics about civilian complaints against police in their city, then asked the same questions about trust in police again. Similarly, those in the "penalty" condition were asked a question about fair penalties for police misconduct, then shown a transparency intervention with real information about civilian complaints against police in Philadelphia, then asked the same question about fair penalties for police misconduct again. The statistics shown included the average number of complaints filed per day in their city; the three most common complaint types and the proportion of overall complaints they represent; the number of complaints sustained or not; and the number of complaints resulting in warnings and suspensions. This design enabled separate estimates of how the aggregate-statistics transparency intervention affected trust and opinions about fair penalties for police misconduct, respectively. Respondents assigned to the "trust" condition were eventually asked the question about fair penalties for police misconduct, and respondents assigned to the "penalty" condition were eventually asked the questions about trust in police.

[10]See Appendix 7.9 for full survey text.

4 Analysis of Case-Level Data on Misconduct Investigations

4.0.1 New York City

Figure 2 displays the flow of allegations made by civilians between 2015 and 2020 through the investigatory and disciplinary process in New York City. The majority of allegations filed are for abuse of authority (58%), followed by force (27%) and discourtesy (13%). We find that about 9.9% of allegations are sustained. Among these sustained allegations, 33.9% have no record of any discipline at all; 57.2% have a warning or training; 7.3% involve costly penalties in the form of suspension or docked vacation; and 1.6% result in resignation or retirement of officers. When officers are suspended or docked vacation time, the vast majority of these penalties (68.1%) are short periods of 10 days or fewer.

Figure 2: Civilian complaint investigatory process (2015–2020).

4.0.2 Chicago

Figure 3 displays the flow of allegations made by civilians between 2015 and 2020 through the investigatory and disciplinary process. The majority of allegations filed are for operational/personnel violations (31%), followed by improper search (20%) and excessive force (11%). We find that xx.

Figure 3: Civilian complaint investigatory process (2015–2020).

4.0.3 Philadelphia

Figure 4 displays the flow of allegations made by civilians between 2015 and 2020 through the investigatory and disciplinary process. The majority of allegations filed are for lack of service (18%), followed by physical abuse (12%) and verbal abuse (11%). We find that about 14% of allegations are sustained. Among these sustained allegations, about three-quarters result in officers receiving only training and counseling (10% of all allegations). The remaining sustained allegations (3%) proceed to the PBI stage.

Figure 4: Civilian complaint investigatory process (2015–2020).

By the end of the PBI process, less than 2% of allegations filed with IAD result in a guilty verdict. The most severe recorded penalty at the PBI stage in the data we analyze is a suspension of 30 days. [11]

Figure 5 displays the flow of allegations through the process broken out by type of complaint, and shows that the proportion of allegations sustained and disciplined varies dramatically with the type of allegation. For example, in the entire 2015–2020 period examined, not a single civil rights allegation is sustained or results in discipline by PPD, nor are hardly any physical or sexual abuse allegations sustained (1.4%). On the other hand, a relatively substantial portion of departmental violation allegations are

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[11]It should be noted that our analysis does not account for penalties incurred by officers through channels other than civilian complaints. In instances of particularly severe misconduct, officers may be fired outright during the course of an investigation, without going through a disciplinary process, or may face criminal charges brought by other city agencies or lawsuits brought by civilians. See, e.g., McCoy (2022): "The accused police are Ryan Pownall, arrested in the death of David Jones, 30, and Edsaul Mendoza, arrested in the death of Thomas Siderio, 12. Ruch, Pownall, and Mendoza were all dismissed by the Police Department after the fatal shootings." To provide a sense of the scale of such alternatives, Appendix 7.2 notes the number of officers dismissed from PPD for each year of our analysis

Figure 5: Civilian complaint investigatory process by allegation category (2015–2020).

sustained (29.3%), as are lack of service allegations (10.5%).

4.1 Detailed Process Analysis for Philadelphia, 2017

To characterize the civilian complaint process in more detail, we closely examine IAD memos detailing investigations into civilian complaints in 2017. We choose to examine the year 2017 because while we have memos for a portion of complaints over the whole 2015-2020 period, we have memos for almost every complaint filed in 2017, giving us the greatest coverage and the lowest risk of any analytical errors resulting from missing data.

Data from OpenDataPhilly indicate that 651 complaint investigations containing 1,708 allegations of misconduct were recorded in 2017. We examine IAD investigation memos for 639 (98%) of these 651 cases (corresponding to roughly 1,600 allegations). We exclude from our analysis cases that were either rejected by IAD (i.e. no investigation occurred because the complaint did not meet criteria for investigation) or were later withdrawn by the complainant. The resulting data for 2017 contain 557 IAD cases pertaining to 1,485 allegations. These 557 cases form the basis of our in-depth review of civilian complaints from 2017, but, as we indicate below, the number of observations varies across analyses due to missing data on some variables.

Below, we discuss several patterns that emerge from this analysis.

4.1.1 Low Sustain Rates

As demonstrated in Section 4.0.3, 83% of the allegations filed in Philadelphia between 2015 and 2020 are investigated but not sustained. Similarly, in 2017, 83% of the allegations filed are investigated but not sustained. From a close read of IAD investigative memos, we find that allegations are commonly not sustained because: (1) the accused officer denies wrongdoing, (2) investigators give more weight to officer accounts than to civilian accounts, and (3) investigators cannot corroborate the civilian's claims. While these could possibly be immovable features of complaint investigations (e.g., perhaps it is always difficult to find corroborating evidence, perhaps civilians are genuinely less credible witnesses in most cases), the complete lack of sustained allegations in some categories is striking. For example, during the five years we examine, not a single allegation of civil rights violations (which includes discriminatory action and racial profiling) is sustained. However, PPD is currently operating under a consent decree

arising from Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, which alleges racial bias in stops by PPD. Thus, it is highly unlikely that all of the civil rights complaints filed in a one-year or five-year period could be invalid.

4.1.2 Lengthy Investigations

By Executive Orders #07-11 and #05-17, IAD complaint investigations must be completed in 75 days (for investigations initiated prior to October 2017) or in 90 days (for investigations initiated subsequently). However, that time limit is often violated. We analyze civilian complaints filed in 2017 and calculate the average and maximum length of time it takes to complete each stage of the investigatory process for every complaint in which relevant dates were provided in the investigatory memo. The results are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Length between Stages of Complaint Review in 2017

	IA filing → IA Assignment	IA Assignment → IA Report	IA Report → PBI Charge	PBI Charge → PBI Hearing	Total
Average No. of Days	9	181	70	197	463
Maximum No. of Days	373	1118	258	376	637
No. of Allegations	1443	1436	34	35	34
No. of Cases	537	536	17	17	17

We find that in 2017, IAD takes an average of 9 days to assign an investigator after a civilian files a complaint, though it can take as long as 373 days. Once assigned a case, IAD investigators take an average of 181 days to complete investigation reports; the longest investigation takes 1,118 days. This means that the average IAD investigation into a civilian complaint takes roughly 6 months from when it is first filed to when IAD reaches a conclusion about whether the alleged misconduct did in fact occur and constitute a violation of law or policy. This average investigation length is twice as long as the legally mandated maximum time limit.

Once the IAD investigation is complete, the sustained findings continue to the PBI stage. We find that the charging unit takes an average of 70 days (but up to 258 days) to issue PBI charges based on the investigative findings after IAD files its report. The PBI then takes an average of 197 days (at most 376 days) to hold a hearing after charges are filed. This means that complaints that are sustained and make it all the way to the PBI hearing stage take an average of 463 days (at most 637 days) to do so. In other words, for allegations that do merit disciplinary action, civilians typically wait well over a year for resolution.

4.1.3 Inconsistency and Lack of Clarity in Allegation Categories

PPD's current system for classifying complaints often obscures the nature and severity of alleged misconduct. In data posted publicly by PPD, 35% of allegations between 2015–2020 were labeled as "Departmental Violations."[12] While this label seems to suggest the complaint is about minor procedural errors, a close read of 2017 IAD investigatory memos reveals that many correspond to allegations of serious misconduct. Of all complaints publicly classified as departmental violations in 2017, 36% are in fact allegations of constitutional violations such as improper stops, searches, and arrests, and 18% are allegations of property crimes including theft.

Furthermore, the same kinds of behavior can be classified differently in a way that makes it difficult to track allegations that are substantively comparable, and we could not detect clear rules for the categorical distinction. For example, allegations of violence are sometimes classified as criminal assault, sometimes classified as physical abuse, and sometimes classified as a "Departmental Violation" (DV) for improper or excessive use of force. Similarly, we see allegations involving rude, improper, or aggressive language variously categorized as verbal abuse, unprofessional conduct, or harassment.

As a way of better understanding what these ambiguous categories actually represent, and as an illustration of what an alternative categorization scheme might look like, we re-categorized all of the 2017 departmental violation allegations according to the substance of the behavior described. We find these categories to be much more informative as to the actual nature of the allegation.

4.2 Police Board of Inquiry (PBI)

When allegations are sustained by IAD, they are either routed to "Training and Counseling" or to the Police Board of Inquiry (PBI) for formal charging and potential disciplinary action.

We find that even when allegations are sustained, meaning that IAD finds credible evidence of misconduct during the investigation phase, most allegations (76%) result only in training and counseling.[13]

We analyze patterns in charging and disciplinary penalties contained in PBI memos and find that out of all allegations between 2015 and 2020, fewer than 0.5% result in any recorded penalty beyond a reprimand. Among these, 84% are suspensions for less than a week. The average suspension is 4.2 days,

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[12]In 2017, DVs represent a slightly larger share, 38% of allegations.

[13]We note that PPD provided our team access to the training and counseling memos that are created in the event of this outcome, but they include no data as to the type or substance of training which would allow us to provide further analysis on this point.

Table 2: "Departmental Violations" categories, based on detailed reading of 2017 IA investigations.

Category	Number	percent of Dept. Violations	percent of Allegations Sustained
Constitutional	207	36	4
Omission	118	21	74
Property	101	18	16
Procedure	58	10	36
Investigation/Evidence	16	3	62
Personal Conduct	16	3	75
Confidentiality	13	2	69
Violence	13	2	46
Abuse of Authority	9	2	33
Reporting/Falsification	8	1	100
Treatment in custody	8	1	25
Verbal	3	1	67

and the maximum recorded penalty issued by PBI is a 30-day suspension. We find a few reasons for these feeble penalties.

Firstly, in a majority of cases heard at PBI (51%), the three voting members rule "not guilty" based at least in part on a determination that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim, despite the fact that IAD has already determined that the evidence meets the burden of proof and has sustained the allegation at the investigation phase. We find that over half of these "not guilty" rulings are based on inconsistently applied evidentiary standards that do not adhere to PBI's own guidelines. The correct standard of evidence for deciding cases at PBI, according to PBI board member training materials, is "preponderance of the evidence"—meaning that the claim is more likely than not to be true (Michvech, 2020). However, a thorough review of the board's reasoning shows that board members do not consistently apply the correct "preponderance of the evidence" standard. In one case, a PBI member stated, "Based on the evidence that was put forth and Officer W—'s testimony, there is *reasonable doubt* (emphasis added) as to if they lied to Lt. E— of IAD when he interviewed them." Another stated, "Lastly, the video of the incident showed the incident happening very rapidly and could not *definitively show* (emphasis added) whether the strike was intentional or not." These alternative, more stringent standards diverge from PBI's own stated rules.

In addition, 9% of the time, the board rules "not guilty" because they determine that the issue was incorrectly charged, often due to avoidable errors, and despite evidence for a different, correct charge. Examples of avoidable charging errors contributing to dismissal include citing the wrong section of the

Motor Vehicle Code or mistakenly charging the wrong officer.

Forty-four percent of the time, PBI rules "not guilty" at least in part because they determine the officer's behavior to be acceptable and/or reasonable–again, despite the fact that IAD has already sustained the allegation at the investigation phase.

It should be noted that some of the cases dismissed through "not guilty" rulings or downgraded through incorrect charging or light penalties involve sustained acts of severe misconduct that would routinely be charged as felonies if committed by everyday civilians. For example, in the case referenced during our discussion of incorrectly applied evidentiary standards at PBI (IAD #16-0455, PBI #17-0373), an officer struck a civilian in the mouth with a gun during an arrest – an event which was caught on security camera video. IAD found sufficient evidence to support the allegation of physical abuse. The sustained case was sent to PBI, where the officer was charged with excessive use of force. However, the PBI board members' decision to rule "not guilty" because they were unsure whether the action was intentional resulted in no penalty at all for the accused officer. In another incident (IAD #15-0286, PBI #15-0894), both IAD and PBI determined that an officer intentionally struck an unarmed civilian with an unmarked police vehicle, knocking him off his bike and injuring him. Rather than being charged for excessive force or a comparable offense, the officer ultimately pleaded guilty to a "motor vehicle violation" and received a reprimand.

4.3   Philadelphia Internals

In additional to traditional civilian complaints, PPD also has a separate complaint channel called "Internals". Complaints categorized into this channel are not included in public complaint data or in the complaint investigation memos PPD provided to the researchers for the analysis discussed thus far, and typically include complaints initiated by police personnel or by a family member of police personnel. Given that these complaints are entirely shielded from public view, it is possible that this channel could be used by PPD to avoid exposing more serious incidents of misconduct to scrutiny. PPD therefore agreed to allow the research team to examine a sample of investigatory memos for internal complaints.

To construct a sample for review, PPD provided the research team with a spreadsheet of every internal complaint filed between January 1, 2015 and October 31, 2020—a total of 1349 complaints—along with the complaint type classification and investigation status (e.g., open, pending, referred, inactive). We take a sample of 150 cases from this list; 135 are randomly sampled, and 15 (3 from each category)

are selected from the categories where we would expect to find the most severe misconduct complaints: criminal, domestic, drugs, physical abuse, and sexual abuse.[14] Investigation memos are only kept in hard copy at the IAD office, so we spent 3 days in the IAD office reading the memos for these 150 cases and hand-coding relevant variables to be used for subsequent analysis.

We find that the internal complaint pool contains a significantly higher rate of very severe complaint types than the external civilian complaint pool; 38.1% of internals involve serious charges of physical abuse (4.7%), domestic violence (9.7%), sexual misconduct (5.4%), drugs (0.7%), or other criminal behavior (17.8%). In contrast, only 17.0% of non-internal complaints involved these types of complaints; only physical abuse was more common in non-internals (13.2%), with the remaining being far less prevalent: domestic violence (0.7%), sexual misconduct (0.5%), drugs (0.1%), or other criminal behavior (2.6%). However, we also find that the sustain rate for internal complaints is much higher than for external civilian complaints; 57.6% of internal complaints are sustained, while only 16.2% of external civilian complaints are sustained. This corroborates our concern that Internals contain more serious forms of misconduct, but also shows that PPD tends to treat them more seriously.

We further note that while the internal complaint pool contains a higher rate of very severe complaint types, some serious complaint types are equally or less prevalent among internal complaints than among external civilian complaints; this includes civil rights violations (0.6% internal, 1.6% external), verbal abuse(2.9% internal, 14.3% external), harassment(0.9% internal, (2.5%) external), unprofessional conduct(2.2% internal, 5.6% external), and lack of service(5.6% internal, 20.6% external).

Notably, departmental violations comprise a large portion of both internal and external complaint pools (48.3% internal, 38.2% external), but the composition of the types of departmental violations differs greatly between the two pools. The most common types of departmental violations in the internal complaint pool are Violating Body-Worn Camera Policies (19.6%), Generic (10.6%), Improper Search/Strip Search (8.6%), Social Media and Networking (8.4%), and Failure to Conduct Thorough/Complete/Proper Investigation (7.5%). In contrast, the most common types of departmental violations in the external complaint pool are Mishandling Private Property (Damaged, Missing, Improperly Taken into Custody) (15.5%), Failure to Report/Accurately Report (14.8%), Improper Stop (13.6%), Improper Search/Strip Search (11.5%), and Improper Entry (6.2%).

XXX need to sum up what these three analyses say about the baseline quality of oversight per the

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[14]See Appendix 7.3 for a more detailed review of our sampling methodology.

5 Does Increased Transparency Affect Civilian Perceptions of Police?

5.1 Results

Appendix 7.4, Appendix 7.5, and Appendix 7.6 provide detailed accounts of the demographic composition of our survey sample ("sample"), the demographic composition of city residents ("city"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the police department between 2015 and 2020 ("complainants") for New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, respectively. All results are reported primarily for the survey sample, but for reference we also include results reweighted to match city demographics and reweighted to match complainant demographics in Appendix 7.10 and Appendix 7.11 (New York City), Appendix 7.12 and Appendix 7.13 (Chicago), and Appendix 7.14 and Appendix 7.15 (Philadelphia).

We asked respondents three questions regarding trust in police. In the first question, they were asked to report how much confidence they have in a series of government institutions—including their city police, their city courts, the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. military—on a four-point scale ranging from "none" to "a lot." In the second, they were asked to report whether they think police in their city treat Black people the same, better than, or worse than White people. In the third, they were asked to report how likely they would be to call the police for assistance in various scenarios—if they were a victim of a crime, if they witnessed a crime, or if they saw someone experiencing a mental health crisis—on a four-point scale ranging from "very unlikely" to "very likely." The tables below display average responses for all three trust questions, which represent baseline values before any information interventions or experiments.

In all three cities, we found that the average response value for trust in police falls between 2 (a little) and 3 (some) on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. With a few exceptions, we note that this rating is statistically indistinguishable from trust in other institutions like city courts, the city mayor, and the U.S. Congress.

Regarding perceived bias in treatment of civilians by police, 55% of the New York City sample believe that police officers in New York City treat Black people worse than White people, 69% of the Chicago

Table 3: **New York City: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.685
Trust Courts	2.872
Trust Mayor	2.695
Trust Military	3.176
Trust Police	2.790
Officer Racism	0.554
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.298
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.164
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.788

Table 4: **Chicago: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.346
Trust Courts	2.399
Trust Mayor	2.232
Trust Military	2.940
Trust Police	2.481
Officer Racism	0.691
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.339
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.043
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.745

Table 5: **Philadelphia: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.265
Trust Courts	2.396
Trust Mayor	2.253
Trust Military	2.989
Trust Police	2.486
Officer Racism	0.657
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.252
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.944
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.676

Table 6: **National: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.020
Trust Courts	2.556
Trust Mayor	2.450
Trust Military	2.763
Trust Police	2.478
Officer Racism	0.472
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.432
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.084
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.305

Table 7: **New York City: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.**
Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates
the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Abuse of Authority	3.720
Discourtesy	2.923
Force	4.233

Table 8: **Chicago: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair
punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the
most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Excessive Force	4.189
Improper Search	3.422
Operational/Personnel Violation	3.181

sample believe this of their city police officers, and 66% of the Philadelphia sample believe this of theirs.

When asked if they would call the police if they were hypothetically a victim of a crime, respondents
in all three cities reported average responses between 3 (likely) and 4 (very likely). The average likelihood
of calling the police for help hovers just around 3 (likely) when respondents are asked to consider whether
they would call the police if they witnessed a crime, and drops to between 2 (unlikely) and 3 (likely) when
respondents are asked to consider whether they would call the police if they saw someone experiencing a
mental health crisis. This suggests that respondents are most likely to call the police in the case of being
personally harmed, and generally will still call the police in such a scenario, irrespective of the lackluster
reported trust in police. The reported likelihood of calling the police is significantly larger in hypothetical
personal victimization, compared to reported likelihood when witnessing a crime or witnessing someone
experiencing a mental health crisis.

We asked respondents one question about their view of fair penalties for three of the most commonly
reported kinds of police misconduct in their respective city (New York City: abuse of authority, discour-
tesy, and force; Chicago: excessive force, improper search, operational/personnel violations; Philadel-
phia: lack of service, physical abuse, verbal abuse).

While the terminology used to categorize police misconduct and the most commonly reported kinds

Table 9: **Philadelphia: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.**
Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Lack of Service	3.301
Physical Abuse	4.336
Verbal Abuse	2.590

Table 10: **National: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Lack of Service	2.806
Physical Abuse	4.560
Verbal Abuse	2.722

of misconduct vary between cities, we found that across all three cities respondents believe misconduct associated with improper use of force (called "Force" in New York City, "Excessive Force" in Chicago, and "Physical Abuse" in Philadelphia) should be punished most severely, with average responses ranging between 4 (Fired) and 5 (Criminal Charges). This gap is statistically significant when comparing physical abuse to each of the other two types of misconduct examined for each city.

In New York City, found that respondents believe Abuse of Authority should be punished next most severely – with average responses ranging between 3 (Suspended without Pay) and 4 (Fired) – and believe Discourtesy should be punished least severely – with average responses ranging between 2 (Counseling/Warning) and 3 (Suspended without Pay). In Chicago, we found respondents believe Improper Search should be punished next most severely, followed by Operational/Personnel Violation – with average responses for both types of misconduct ranging between 3 (Suspended without Pay) and 4 (Fired). In Philadelphia, we found that respondents believe Lack of Service should be punished next most severely – with average responses ranging between 3 (Suspended without Pay) and 4 (Fired) – and believe Verbal Abuse should be punished least severely – with responses ranging between 2 (Counseling/Warning) and 3 (Suspended without Pay). These results represent descriptive rank-ordered preferences, but were not subjected to any additional tests for statistical significance.

Table 11: **New York City: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.721	2.736	0.015	0.508
Trust Courts	2.900	2.852	-0.048	0.06
Trust Mayor	2.699	2.680	-0.019	0.405
Trust Military	3.239	3.193	-0.046	0.051
Trust Police	2.855	2.724	-0.131**	0
Officer Racism	0.536	0.545	0.010	0.298

Table 12: **New York City: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.304	3.318	0.013	0.635
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.227	3.202	-0.025	0.35
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.796	2.823	0.027	0.35

We tested the effect of providing respondents with accurate information about the process for civilian complaints against police in their city on respondent trust and on respondent views about fair penalties for police misconduct. Specifically, we estimated the effect of providing aggregate statistical summaries relating to the complaint process—(1) the frequency and composition of misconduct allegations, (2) the rate at which allegations are sustained, and (3) the rate at which officers are disciplined for sustained misconduct—on these outcomes.

The tables below report average respondents' answers to these questions before and after seeing the intervention, as well as the pre-post difference between the two.

We found that treatment effects varied considerably between cities.

In New York City, we found that respondents reported decreased trust in police and preferences for less severe penalties for abuse of authority than they did prior to the treatment. In Chicago, we found that respondents reported decreased trust in the mayor and preferences for more severe penalties for excessive

Table 13: **New York City: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Abuse of Authority	3.723	3.612	-0.112**	0.007
Fair Punish Discourtesy	2.795	2.843	0.048	0.187
Fair Punish Force	4.054	4.064	0.010	0.799

Table 14: **Chicago: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.346	2.304	-0.043	0.088
Trust Courts	2.399	2.379	-0.019	0.43
Trust Mayor	2.232	2.173	-0.058*	0.019
Trust Military	2.940	2.901	-0.039	0.084
Trust Police	2.481	2.428	-0.053	0.051
Officer Racism	0.691	0.681	-0.010	0.354

Table 15: **Chicago: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.339	3.304	-0.035	0.199
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.043	3.072	0.029	0.295
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.745	2.761	0.016	0.581

Table 16: **Chicago: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Excessive Force	4.189	4.279	0.090*	0.016
Fair Punish Improper Search	3.422	3.475	0.053	0.203
Fair Punish Operational/Personnel Violation	3.181	3.324	0.143**	0.001

Table 17: **Philadelphia: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.322	2.249	-0.073**	0.008
Trust Courts	2.433	2.341	-0.092**	0.002
Trust Mayor	2.278	2.216	-0.061*	0.019
Trust Military	2.967	2.934	-0.033	0.158
Trust Police	2.471	2.313	-0.158**	0
Officer Racism	0.654	0.671	0.016	0.145

Table 18: **Philadelphia: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.266	3.186	-0.080**	0.005
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.934	2.899	-0.035	0.183
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.612	2.602	-0.009	0.722

Table 19: **Philadelphia: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Verbal Abuse	2.717	2.796	0.079*	0.047
Fair Punish Physical Abuse	4.518	4.564	0.046	0.149
Fair Punish Lack of Service	3.082	3.106	0.024	0.546

Table 20: **National: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.020	2.002	-0.018	0.128
Trust Courts	2.556	2.460	-0.096**	0
Trust Mayor	2.450	2.406	-0.044**	0.008
Trust Military	2.763	2.737	-0.026	0.08
Trust Police	2.478	2.331	-0.147**	0
Officer Racism	0.472	0.498	0.026**	0.002

Table 21: **National: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.432	3.390	-0.042*	0.014
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.084	3.076	-0.008	0.618
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.305	2.289	-0.016	0.359

Table 22: **National: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Lack of Service	2.806	2.865	0.058*	0.042
Fair Punish Physical Abuse	4.560	4.639	0.079**	0
Fair Punish Verbal Abuse	2.722	2.829	0.107**	0

Table 23: **New York City: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: force, abuse of authority, and discourtesy. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether force is statistically significantly different than either abuse of authority or discourtesy. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Force	3.579	-
Abuse of Authority	3.317**	0.000
Discourtesy	2.863**	0.000

force and operational/personnel violation than they did prior to the treatment. In Philadelphia, we found that respondents reported decreased trust in Congress, courts, the mayor and police, reported decreases willingness to call the police for help in the event of being a victim of a crime, and reported preferences for more severe penalties for verbal abuse than they did prior to the treatment. All of these results are statistically significant.

We asked respondents about their likelihood of filing a complaint against police in the event of experiencing three of the most commonly reported types of police misconduct. Results are shown in the tables below.

We found that across all three cities, respondents report the highest likelihood of filing a complaint when hypothetically experiencing unjustified use of force, compared to each of the other forms of misconduct; these differences were statistically significant.

In New York City, respondents reported the next greatest likelihood of filing a complaint for abuse of authority, followed by discourtesy. In Chicago, respondents reported the next greatest likelihood of filing a complaint for improper search, followed by operational/personnel violation. In Philadelphia,

Table 24: **Chicago: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: excessive force, improper search, and operational/personnel violation. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether excessive force is statistically significantly different than either improper search or operational/personnel violation. * p<.05, ** p<.01.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Excessive Force	3.571	-
Improper Search	3.279**	0.000
Operational/Personnel Violation	3.127**	0.000

Table 25: **Philadelphia: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, lack of service, and verbal abuse. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either lack of service or verbal abuse. * p<.05, ** p<.01.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Physical Abuse	3.630	-
Lack Service	3.011**	0.000
Verbal Abuse	2.792**	0.000

Table 26: **National: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, improper search, and operational violation. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either improper search or operational violation. * $p < $.05, ** $p < $.01.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Physical Abuse	3.772	-
Lack Service	2.756**	0.000
Verbal Abuse	2.806**	0.000

Table 27: **New York City: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.870	-	-
	At Home	0.936	0.066**	0.003
	Nearby Police Station	0.900	0.030	0.227
	Online	0.841	-0.029	0.272
	CCRB Office	0.869	-0.001	0.981
Interview With Who	Alone	0.704	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.867	0.163**	0.000
	Non-Police Employee	0.905	0.201**	0.000
	Civilian Employee	0.859	0.155**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.920	0.216**	0.000
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.458	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.735	0.277**	0.000
	Over 1 Year	3.345	-0.114	0.090

respondents reported the next greatest likelihood of filing a complaint for lack of service, followed by verbal abuse. For all three cities, this rank ordering of complaint-filing likelihood for various types of misconduct mirrors the expressed ranked-order preferences for the severity of discipline imposed on officers found to have committed said misconduct.

We also conducted three additional experiments asking respondents about their preferences for participating in the process for civilian complaints against police, in which they were randomly assigned to consider one option for each question. Questions were asked about willingness to appear at various locations for misconduct-investigation interviews, willingness to be interviewed alone or accompanied by various other individuals, and willingness to file a complaint based on the amount of time expected before the investigation and discipline process would conclude.

Across all three cities, we found a statistically significant preference to be interviewed at home, rather than at an Internal Affairs office.

Across all three cities, respondents reported a statistically significant increase in willingness to attend an interview when accompanied by others, compared to having to attend interviews alone. In other words, having company increased willingness to attend an interview. We did not find statistically significant

Table 28: **Chicago: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.761	-	-
	At Home	0.876	0.114**	0.003
	Nearby Police Station	0.860	0.099**	0.009
	Online	0.837	0.075	0.052
	COPA Office	0.776	0.015	0.717
Interview With Who	Alone	0.550	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.722	0.172**	0.000
	Non-Police Employee	0.822	0.272**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.889	0.340**	0.000
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.559	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.656	0.097	0.233
	Over 1 Year	3.310	-0.249**	0.003

Table 29: **Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.826	-	-
	At Home	0.906	0.080**	0.000
	Nearby Police Station	0.894	0.068**	0.003
	Online	0.822	-0.004	0.888
	PAC Office	0.799	-0.027	0.287
Interview With Who	Alone	0.569	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.792	0.223**	0.000
	Non-Police Employee	0.866	0.297**	0.000
	Civilian Employee	0.820	0.251**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.896	0.327**	0.000
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.158	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.346	0.189**	0.000
	Over 1 Year	3.010	-0.148**	0.007

Table 30: **National: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p < \$.05$, ** $p < \$.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.831	-	-
	At Home	0.892	0.061	0.073
	Nearby Police Station	0.863	0.032	0.368
	Online	0.741	-0.090*	0.027
Interview With Who	Alone	0.652	-	-
	Non-Police Employee	0.856	0.204**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.912	0.261**	0.000
Interview Time	6-12 Months	3.233	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.688	0.455**	0.000
	Over 1 Year	3.234	0.001	0.994

differences in willingness depending on who, specifically, the person accompanying them might be.

Relative to the current average investigation time of 6-12 months, we also found that respondents in New York City reported greater willingness to file a complaint in the event of experiencing police misconduct if they knew the investigation and disciplinary process would take less than 6 months, respondents in Chicago reported reduced willingness to file a complaint in the event of experiencing police misconduct if they knew the investigation and disciplinary process would take over 1 year, and respondents in Philadelphia reported both greater willingness to file a complaint if they knew the investigation and disciplinary process would take less than 6 months and reduced willingness to file a complaint if they knew the investigation and disciplinary process would take over 1 year.

Finally, we asked respondents one question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a police officer in their city in the near future. They were able to select either (1) no, because they hadn't had a complaint-worthy experience; (2) no, because they had a complaint-worthy experience but didn't want to file a complaint; or (3) yes, because they had a complaint-worthy experience and wanted to file a complaint about it.

In all three cities, we found that the majority of respondents (67% in New York City, 74% in Chicago, and 84% in Philadelphia) reported they had not had any complaint-worthy experiences with police.

For the minority of respondents who did report having had a complaint-worthy experience with police

Table 31: **New York City: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a New York Police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	1189 (67.14%)
No, but have had an experience	239 (13.50%)
Yes	343 (19.37%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	118 (88.72%)	169 (71.91%)	142 (76.34%)	38 (79.17%)	722 (61.76%)
No, but have had an experience	13 (9.77%)	35 (14.89%)	28 (15.05%)	4 (8.33%)	159 (13.60%)
Yes	2 (1.50%)	31 (13.19%)	16 (8.60%)	6 (12.50%)	288 (24.64%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	20 (76.92%)	252 (82.89%)	486 (71.58%)	431 (56.56%)
No, but have had an experience	2 (7.69%)	36 (11.84%)	82 (12.08%)	119 (15.62%)
Yes	4 (15.38%)	16 (5.26%)	111 (16.35%)	212 (27.82%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

Table 32: **Chicago: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Chicago Police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	756 (73.90%)
No, but have had an experience	139 (13.59%)
Yes	128 (12.51%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	27 (77.14%)	240 (68.97%)	136 (78.61%)	26 (70.27%)	327 (76.05%)
Yes	1 (2.86%)	52 (14.94%)	8 (4.62%)	5 (13.51%)	62 (14.42%)
No, but have had an experience	7 (20.00%)	56 (16.09%)	29 (16.76%)	6 (16.22%)	41 (9.53%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	15 (53.57%)	260 (75.14%)	341 (75.95%)	140 (70.00%)
No, but have had an experience	12 (42.86%)	49 (14.16%)	58 (12.92%)	20 (10.00%)
Yes	1 (3.57%)	37 (10.69%)	50 (11.14%)	40 (20.00%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

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Table 33: **Philadelphia: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	1976 (83.73%)
No, but have had an experience	273 (11.57%)
Yes	111 (4.70%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	99 (89.19%)	591 (80.74%)	185 (80.43%)	110 (82.09%)	991 (85.95%)
No, but have had an experience	5 (4.50%)	103 (14.07%)	33 (14.35%)	21 (15.67%)	111 (9.63%)
Yes	7 (6.31%)	38 (5.19%)	12 (5.22%)	3 (2.24%)	51 (4.42%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	65 (79.27%)	835 (83.42%)	766 (84.27%)	310 (84.24%)
No, but have had an experience	14 (17.07%)	132 (13.19%)	93 (10.23%)	34 (9.24%)
Yes	3 (3.66%)	34 (3.40%)	50 (5.50%)	24 (6.52%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

Table 34: **National: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	889 (89.44%)
No, but have had an experience	86 (8.65%)
Yes	19 (1.91%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	73 (80.22%)	55 (80.88%)	85 (87.63%)	30 (81.08%)	646 (92.15%)
No, but have had an experience	13 (14.29%)	10 (14.71%)	11 (11.34%)	6 (16.22%)	46 (6.56%)
Yes	5 (5.49%)	3 (4.41%)	1 (1.03%)	1 (2.70%)	9 (1.28%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	6 (NA%)	306 (90.00%)	453 (89.35%)	124 (88.57%)
No, but have had an experience	1 (NA%)	29 (8.53%)	46 (9.07%)	10 (7.14%)
Yes	NA (NA%)	5 (1.47%)	8 (1.58%)	6 (4.29%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

(33% in New York City, 26% in Chicago, and 16% in Philadelphia) we offered an option to say more about their experience in an open-ended text response. See Appendix 7.17 for examples of each response type.

6 Discussion

Talk a bit about corruption lit, impact of transparency when reality is bad – not that transparency itself is bad, just that transparency allows people to see a status quo that is bad. There will typically be an initial penalty when introducing a transparency intervention, because people become aware of bad info they didn't know about before. Shouldn't let this lead us to a conclusion that transparency is bad.

Whether this system is functional depends on the goals. If it is to record civilian dissatisfaction, this system seems adequate. If the goal is to detect misconduct and respond with penalties to deter future bad behavior, the value of the system remains an open question.

Table 35: New York City: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a New York Police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
Yes	343 (58.93%)	104 (17.87%)	58 (9.97%)	49 (8.42%)	125 (21.48%)	7 (1.20%)
No, but have had an experience	239 (41.07%)	90 (15.46%)	65 (11.17%)	32 (5.50%)	30 (5.15%)	22 (3.78%)
Totals	582 (100.00%)	194 (33.33%)	123 (21.13%)	81 (13.92%)	155 (26.63%)	29 (4.98%)

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Table 36: Chicago: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Chicago Police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
No, but have had an experience	139 (52.06%)	38 (14.23%)	68 (25.47%)	13 (4.87%)	6 (2.25%)	14 (5.24%)
Yes	128 (47.94%)	14 (5.24%)	38 (14.23%)	21 (7.87%)	41 (15.36%)	14 (5.24%)
Totals	267 (100.00%)	52 (19.48%)	106 (39.70%)	34 (12.73%)	47 (17.60%)	28 (10.49%)

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Table 37: **Philadelphia: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.**

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
No, but have had an experience	273 (71.09%)	77 (20.05%)	116 (30.21%)	25 (6.51%)	17 (4.43%)	38 (9.90%)
Yes	111 (28.91%)	29 (7.55%)	32 (8.33%)	15 (3.91%)	26 (6.77%)	9 (2.34%)
Totals	384 (100.00%)	106 (27.60%)	148 (38.54%)	40 (10.42%)	43 (11.20%)	47 (12.24%)

Table 38: **National: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.**

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	No Response
No, but have had an experience	86 (81.90%)	31 (29.52%)	36 (34.29%)	5 (4.76%)	14 (13.33%)
Yes	19 (18.10%)	6 (5.71%)	6 (5.71%)	5 (4.76%)	2 (1.90%)
Totals	105 (100.00%)	37 (35.24%)	42 (40.00%)	10 (9.52%)	16 (15.24%)

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7 Appendix

7.1 Oversight Body Methodology

We identified police oversight organizations for the 100 largest policing agencies in the U.S.

To create our sample of the 100 largest policing agencies, we began with agencies contained in the DOJ (2017), then limited our sample to sheriff's departments and local or county police. We excluded state police and sheriff's departments that do not engage in law enforcement services. The remaining agencies were then ranked by their number of full-time sworn officers according DOJ (2011); the most complete record of agency size available. We define "largest" based on the number of officers whose primary duty is patrol, as these officers are the ones most likely to have contact with members of the public.

To identify civilian oversight organizations for the agencies in our sample, we started with a list of oversight organizations and accompanying data about their structure and powers provided by the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) in 2020. We then used data from DOJ (2020), which included a survey question, "Is there a civilian complaint review board or agency in your jurisdiction that reviews complaints against officers in your agency?" Finally, to adjudicate conflicts between NACOLE and LEMAS data, and to verify accuracy, we manually investigated the presence and powers of oversight agencies in each jurisdiction through web searches and detailed reviews of the legal documentation for each identified organization (e.g., municipal code, city charter, bylaws).

Our sample includes only police oversight organizations that are civilian-led and play a role in processing complaints. This excludes police-led units aimed at addressing complaints and civilian-led organizations that provide general advice or police-community relations work but do not play a role in processing complaints. The types of organizations remaining under our definition include Office of Inspector General, Civilian Complaint Review Board, Police Accountability Board, Independent Police Auditor, and Board of Police Commissioners.

In some jurisdictions, civilian oversight is split between more than one cooperating organization, with each organization carrying out specific activities related to the processing of complaints. For example, Washington, DC has an Office of Police Complaints and a Police Complaints Board; Houston has an Independent Police Oversight Board and an Office of Policing Reform and Accountability. In such cases, multiple organizations are listed for the jurisdiction and powers coded holistically for civilian oversight in

that jurisdiction; e.g., if one office receives and investigates complaints and another votes on the findings and recommends discipline, they are both listed under the oversight organization name and that jurisdiction is coded as having oversight that can receive, investigate, and recommend discipline for complaints.

We note that the existence of civilian oversight organizations and the powers granted to them tend to fluctuate over time, largely by virtue of political pressure. The data we present in this paper provide a snapshot of current oversight organizations and their prescribed powers; they do not address organizational antecedents.

7.2 Annual PPD Dismissals

Table 39: Annual PPD Dismissals

Year	Officers Dismissed
2015	17
2016	14
2017	17
2018	5
2019	24
2020	17

7.3 Internal Complaint Methodology

To construct a sample of Internal Complaints for review, PPD provided the research team with a spreadsheet of every internal complaint filed between January 1, 2015 and October 31, 2020—a total of 1349 complaints, along with the complaint type classification. We exclude complaint 19-1077 (which has 343 parts) because it is a high-profile special investigation into PPD officer Facebook use and has already been thoroughly examined and reported on publicly (PVP, 2017; Yancey-Bragg, 2019). We also exclude cases that are open, referred to other agencies, pending review, or inactive. This takes us down to 886 cases. This equates to an average of 173.0 internal complaints per year and 0.03 complaints per officer per year. Within these complaints are an estimated 441.4 allegations per year, which equates to roughly 0.07 allegations per patrol officer per year. The estimates for internal complaints are based on partially stratified sampling of 150 cases and manual review to count allegations within those; we then apply sampling weights to obtain the estimated number of allegations per internal complaint. We also note that we

exclude open, pending, referred, or inactive internals from this manual review, because we also want to examine outcomes, but we multiply the estimated number of allegations per internal by the annual number of internals (including open/pending/referred/inactive) to estimate the annual number of allegations in this channel.

7.4   New York City Demographics

The table below provides a detailed account of the demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of New York ("City"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the New York Police Department between 2015 and 2020 ("Complainants").

7.5   Chicago Demographics

The table below provides a detailed account of the demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of Chicago ("City"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the Chicago Police Department between 2015 and 2020 ("Complainants").

7.6   Philadelphia Demographics

The table below provides a detailed account of the demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of Philadelphia ("City"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the Philadelphia Police Department between 2015 and 2020 ("Complainants").

We reweight the survey sample using the following variables for the city: gender, race, age, and education, matching the true population margins for these values (non-italicized numbers). For complainants we reweight using gender, race, and age, using the disclosed demographics of past complainants (also non-italicized).

Italicized values are reweighted demographics. Given the margins matched on (listed in the previous paragraph), these values are the demographics for our weighted sample since we couldn't accurately reweight on these values. They are included for additional context.

Table 40: **The demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of New York City ("City"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the New York Police Department between 2015 and 2020 ("Complainants").**

	Survey	City	Complainants
Gender			
Female	46.87	53.18	26.10
Male	52.8	46.82	73.90
Other	0.34	-	-
Race			
White	66.01	32.1	12.56
Black/African American	13.27	21.83	56.28
Hispanic	10.5	29.07	24.11
Other/Multiple Races	2.71	2.99	3.95
Asian	7.51	14.01	3.1
Age			
18-29	18.07	23.23	39.87
30-44	53.87	25.88	35.08
45-64	20.5	30.69	21.81
65+	7.57	20.2	3.24
Education			
Less than a high school diploma	1.47	14.21	*3.56*
High school diploma or GED	17.17	40.69	*39.18*
College degree - AA, BA	38.34	29.89	*36.15*
Graduate degree - MA, MBA, JD, PhD	43.03	15.21	*21.11*
Income			
I did not earn income in 2019	5.53	*11.27*	*9.60*
$1 to $19,999	9.03	*19.89*	*17.85*
$20,000 to $39,999	10.22	*19.79*	*17.29*
$40,000 to $59,999	9.26	*11.66*	*12.62*
$60,000 to $79,999	9.99	*9.03*	*11.79*
$80,000 to $99,999	7.62	*5.31*	*5.80*
$100,000 to $149,999	25.3	*12.65*	*14.41*
$150,000 or more	23.04	*10.39*	*10.64*
Employment			
Working - paid employment or self-employed	75.72	*51.38 (63.5)*	*66.47*
Not working - retired or disabled	8.92	*23.25*	*9.44*
Not working - temporary layoff or looking for work	7.4	*14.01*	*14.67*
Not working - full-time student	4.86	*7.19*	*7.44*
Other	3.11	*4.17*	*1.99*
Political Party			
Democratic Party	78.54	*72.65 (77.0)*	*70.77*
Neither	11.97	*19.10*	*20.83*
Republican Party	9.49	*8.24 (23.0)*	*8.40*

Table 41: **The demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of Chicago City ("City"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the Chicago Police Department between 2015 and 2020 ("Complainants").**

	Survey	City	Complainants
Gender			
Female	57.87	51.87	25.82
Male	41.25	48.13	74.06
Other	0.88	-	0.13
Race			
White	42.03	33.28	10.26
Black/African American	34.04	29.19	74.39
Hispanic	16.91	28.79	14.22
Other/Multiple Races	3.62	2.18	0.37
Asian	3.42	6.56	0.76
Age			
18-29	30.21	26.38	
30-44	37.73	28.19	
45-64	24.24	28.79	
65+	7.82	16.65	
Age			
20-29	30.21		38.75
30-39	28.05		31.45
40-49	16.52		17.31
50+	25.22		12.49
Education			
Less than a high school diploma	2.74	11.81	*3.94*
High school diploma or GED	33.82	43.23	*38.46*
College degree - AA, BA	43.89	30	*45.11*
Graduate degree - MA, MBA, JD, PhD	19.55	14.97	*12.49*
Income			
I did not earn income in 2019	10.07	*12.15*	*11.42*
$1 to $19,999	14.96	*18.66*	*19.25*
$20,000 to $39,999	22.29	*24.79*	*23.22*
$40,000 to $59,999	17.6	*15.47*	*21.83*
$60,000 to $79,999	9.58	*8.27*	*7.81*
$80,000 to $99,999	8.11	*7.45*	*6.34*
$100,000 to $149,999	11.83	*8.50*	*6.32*
$150,000 or more	5.57	*4.71*	*3.82*
Employment			
Working - paid employment or self-employed	66.28	*55.47 (67.2)*	*64.32*
Not working - retired or disabled	11.73	*19.89*	*9.42*
Not working - temporary layoff or looking for work	9.87	*12.32*	*12.55*
Not working - full-time student	8.6	*8.10*	*9.98*
Other	3.52	*4.22*	*3.73*
Political Party			
Democratic Party	69.01	*65.14 (82)*	*67.76*
Neither	18.38	*21.71*	*22.48*
Republican Party	12.61	*13.14 (18)*	*9.76*

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Additionally, for comparison, the age 16+ participation in the labor force in Philadelphia is included in parentheses next to the city reweighted employment value. Likewise, for political party, values in parentheses are 2020 presidential election results.

7.7   Synthetic Demographics

Table 42: **The demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of Philadelphia ("City"), and the demographic composition of individuals who filed complaints against the Philadelphia Police Department between 2015 and 2020 ("Complainants").**

	Survey	City	Complainants
Gender			
Female	66.4	53.67	53.02
Male	32.63	46.33	46.98
Other	0.97	-	-
Race			
White	48.86	34.38	23.36
Black/African American	31.02	40.83	65.45
Hispanic	9.75	14.68	8
Other/Multiple Races	5.68	2.8	0.98
Asian	4.7	7.21	2.21
Age			
18-29	30.51	25.79	27.33
30-44	36.23	26.16	39.03
45-64	25.17	30.1	30.44
65+	8.09	17.95	3.19
Education			
Less than a high school diploma	3.47	13.78	*4.26*
High school diploma or GED	42.42	53.2	*48.14*
College degree - AA, BA	38.52	22.35	*36.7*
Graduate degree - MA, MBA, JD, PhD	15.59	10.67	*10.9*
Income			
I did not earn income in 2019	10.13	*13.04*	*8.86*
$1 to $19,999	18.05	*20.5*	*19.22*
$20,000 to $39,999	23.01	*24.83*	*24.7*
$40,000 to $59,999	18.98	*17.99*	*20.73*
$60,000 to $79,999	11.14	*9.55*	*12.2*
$80,000 to $99,999	8.09	*6.14*	*6.66*
$100,000 to $149,999	7.42	*5.34*	*5.72*
$150,000 or more	3.18	*2.62*	*1.92*
Employment			
Working - paid employment or self-employed	63.64	*52.40* (62.50)	*66.77*
Not working - retired or disabled	14.53	*24.75*	*11.8*
Not working - temporary layoff or looking for work	9.83	*10.38*	*10.28*
Not working - full-time student	7.97	*7.74*	*7.01*
Other	4.03	*4.73*	*4.13*
Political Party			
Democratic Party	68.52	*66.40* (81.4)	*71.11*
Neither	17.92	*19.94*	*19.31*
Republican Party	13.56	*13.66* (17.9)	*9.58*

Table 43: **National: The demographic composition of our survey sample ("Survey"), the demographic composition of the city of United States ("US").**

	Survey	US
Gender		
Female	42.25	50.84
Male	56.34	48.25
Other	1.41	0.91
Race		
White	70.52	60.70
Black/African American	6.84	12.31
Hispanic	9.76	18.01
Other/Multiple Races	3.72	3.35
Asian	9.15	5.62
Age		
18-29	23.74	21.35
30-44	41.75	23.70
45-64	28.57	33.71
65+	5.94	21.24
Education		
Less than a high school diploma	0.70	3.52
High school diploma or GED	34.21	14.61
College degree - AA, BA	51.01	68.49
Graduate degree - MA, MBA, JD, PhD	14.08	13.37
Income		
I did not earn income in 2019	8.55	*6.49*
$1 to $19,999	22.94	*20.48*
$20,000 to $39,999	23.24	*25.06*
$40,000 to $59,999	17.00	*18.69*
$60,000 to $79,999	12.27	*11.48*
$80,000 to $99,999	7.34	*7.23*
$100,000 to $149,999	6.44	*8.21*
$150,000 or more	2.21	*2.36*
Employment		
Working - paid employment or self-employed	70.32	*64.07*
Not working - retired or disabled	8.75	*16.07*
Not working - temporary layoff or looking for work	12.17	*12.63*
Not working - full-time student	5.03	*3.58*
Other	3.72	*3.65*
Political Party		
Democratic Party	57.85	*57.64*
Neither	19.92	*18.31*
Republican Party	22.23	*24.05*

7.8 Survey Pre-Analysis Plan

7.9 Survey Text

7.9.1 Attention Check

1. People are very busy these days, and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. We are testing whether people read survey questions. To show that you've read this much, please answer both "extremely interested" and "very interested."

  - Extremely interested

  - Very interested

  - Moderately interested

  - Slightly interested

  - Not interested at all

7.9.2 Trust in Police (New York City)

1. In general, how much confidence do you have in each of the following?

  - U.S. Congress

  - NYC courts

  - NYC mayor

  - U.S. Military

  - NYC police

2. When police officers interact with people in New York City, they generally:

  - Treat Black people **better** than White people

  - Treat Black people **the same** as White people

  - Treat Black people **worse**than White people

3. How likely would you be to call the police if the following things happened?

Figure 6: Original Pre-Analysis Plan

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY
Reforming Police Misconduct Investigations (#87377)

Created: 02/07/2022 09:10 PM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review.
A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
How much do Philadelphia residents trust the Philadelphia police? To what extent do they perceive them as treating people of different races fairly/the same? What penalties do they think police should face for misconduct?

How does providing information about actual misconduct investigations affect subsequent responses to each of the above? Are perceptions shifted more by statistical summaries or in-depth narratives?

How does providing information about how to file misconduct complaints affect respondents' self-reported intent to file complaints? How does presenting different options for features of the complaint process (manipulating interview location, duration of investigation, etc.) affect respondents' self-reported likelihood of filing complaints in the event of experiencing misconduct?

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
Trust in Police - measured by pre- and post-treatment survey questions on trust in police, perceived fairness of treatment by police, and appropriate penalties for misconduct. Assessed contemporaneously and in a follow-up wave six months later designed to measure long-term effects.

Complaint Filing - measured by survey questions on self-reported intent to file a complaint, self-reported actual filing in follow-up survey wave, and by using data-sharing partnerships to check respondent names against documented complainants.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
Participants will be assigned to receive either a complaint narrative treatment or a complaint statistics treatment.

Participants will also be assigned to receive information on how to file a complaint through the police department, information on how to file a complaint through the civilian-run police advisory commission, or no complaint filing information.

Finally, randomized question wordings will route respondents to conditions asking about their likelihood of filing a complaint under different options for interview location, accompaniment (or not) for an in-person interview, and duration of the ensuing investigation.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We will conduct a descriptive analysis to describe the demographics in our sample, and also compute average values of our dependent variables across subgroups of respondents defined by respondent characteristics such as age, race, income, and police district of residence.

We will compute average treatment effects in our experiments using OLS regression with robust standard errors. We will also compute heterogeneous treatment effects by race, police district, age, gender, political party affiliation, income bracket, and education.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
Only observations from respondents 18 or older who live in a Philadelphia zip code and pass the attention and comprehension checks built into the survey will be accepted.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.
We aim to enroll roughly 3200 unique participants between the 2 survey waves. We will collect about 3000 complete observations for wave 1. Those participants will then be resurveyed in wave 2, along with an additional 200 participants who did not participate in wave 1. The latter will serve as a pure control for the survey experiment.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
Nothing else to pre-register.

Figure 7: Updated Pre-Analysis Plan, Page 1

ASPREDICTED

Wharton
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Transparency in Police Misconduct Investigations (#103458)

Created: 07/27/2022 09:57 AM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review.
A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
How much do residents of Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia trust their city police? To what extent do they perceive them as treating people of different races fairly/the same? What penalties do they think police should face for misconduct?

How does providing information about actual misconduct investigations affect subsequent responses to the questions above?

How does presenting different options for features of the complaint process (manipulating interview location, duration of investigation, etc.) affect respondents' self-reported likelihood of filing complaints in the event of experiencing misconduct?

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
Trust in Police - measured by pre- and post-treatment survey questions on trust in police, perceived fairness of treatment by police, and appropriate penalties for misconduct.

Intent to File a Complaint - measured by survey questions on self-reported intent to file a complaint.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
The survey contains three experimental conditions (one complaint process treatment and two primary outcome conditions). All respondents receive the complaint process treatment - serving as their own control - and respondents are randomly assigned to one of two primary outcome conditions.

The outcome conditions assign respondents to a series of questions about either trust in police and government institutions (trust_primary outcome condition), or about attitudes towards penalties for officers found to have committed misconduct (penalty_primary condition). All respondents then see an information treatment conveying statistics about civilian complaints against police in their city and the outcomes of those investigations (complaint process treatment). Following this intervention, respondents are again asked the series of questions they were randomly assigned to see prior to the information intervention (either trust_primary or penalty_primary items), as well as the set of trust or penalty questions they were not assigned pre-intervention. The primary comparison of interest is the difference in responses to the pre- and- post-treatment question battery on either trust or penalties (whichever was repeated in a given condition).

At the end of the survey, respondents participate in 3 complaint filing mini-experiments asking about their likelihood of filing a complaint under different options for interview location, accompaniment (or not) for an in-person interview, and duration of the ensuing investigation.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We will conduct a descriptive analysis to describe the demographics in our sample, and also compute average values of our dependent variables across subgroups of respondents defined by respondent characteristics such as age, race, income, and police district of residence.

We will compute average treatment effects in our experiments using OLS regression with robust standard errors. We will also compute heterogeneous treatment effects by race, police district, age, gender, political party affiliation, income bracket, and education.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
Only observations from respondents 18 or older who are residents of the target city for each survey (Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia) and pass the attention and comprehension checks built into the survey will be accepted.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.
1000 responses from each of 3 cities (Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia) will be collected, for a total of 3,000.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
We submitted pre-registration (#87377) for an earlier phase of this project. At the time of the original pre-registration, we intended to focus only on

Philadelphia, recruiting survey participants through direct mail invitations. In addition to measuring self-reported intent to file a complaint during the initial survey, we intended to evaluate our secondary outcome variable - complaint filing - through a second survey wave administered six months after the first wave, and by collecting respondent names and email addresses during the initial survey so we could check names of respondents against names of actual complainants. This plan changed for several reasons.

First, after attempting to recruit a large sample of Philadelphia residents via direct mail invitations, we found that response rates were so low as to make it infeasible to successfully conduct the study with this recruitment method alone. We collected only 266 responses this way after sending 15,100 posted mail invitations. In response to the first issue, we switched to an online survey sample obtained through Qualtrics.

Second, while switching to a Qualtrics online sample solved our response rate issue, Qualtrics advised us that recontact rates for a second survey wave administered six months after the first wave would be very low and would be very expensive to collect. Qualtrics also advised us that we would be able to collect respondent names for only a fraction of the sample, significantly hindering our ability to check names of respondents against names of actual complainants. As such, we decided to strike the second survey wave and focus on self-reported intent to file a complaint as the secondary outcome variable.

Third, after writing survey Versions 1-3 and collecting complaint data in Philadelphia, we were curious to see whether the complaint process trends and survey findings we were uncovering would be similar in comparable jurisdictions. We decided to collect complaint data and write survey versions for New York and Chicago, in addition to Philadelphia.

Fourth, we decided to slightly change the survey design and field survey versions 5-7 to allow us to test a different hypothesis. In these versions, we evaluate the impact of providing a statistical complaint treatment vs. a control, whereas the initial survey allowed us to compare the effect of providing a statistical complaint treatment to the effect of providing a narrative complaint treatment. The newly designed version thus allows for a cleaner treatment effect measurement for three different cities.

We collected 3,034 responses under the original pre-registration. We plan to collect another 3,000 responses under this current pre-registration with the redesigned surveys.

Available at https://aspredicted.org/2MH_8GM

- You were a victim of a crime

- You saw someone commit a crime

- You saw someone having a mental health crisis

7.9.3 Trust in Police (Chicago)

1. In general, how much confidence do you have in each of the following?

   - U.S. Congress

   - Chicago courts

   - Chicago mayor

   - U.S. Military

   - Chicago police

2. When police officers interact with people in Chicago, they generally:

   - Treat Black people **better** than White people

   - Treat Black people **the same** as White people

   - Treat Black people **worse** than White people

3. How likely would you be to call the police if the following things happened?

   - You were a victim of a crime

   - You saw someone commit a crime

   - You saw someone having a mental health crisis

7.9.4 Trust in Police (Philadelphia)

1. In general, how much confidence do you have in each of the following?

   - U.S. Congress

   - Philadelphia courts

- Philadelphia mayor

- U.S. Military

- Philadelphia police

2. When police officers interact with people in Philadelphia, they generally:

   - Treat Black people **better** than White people

   - Treat Black people **the same** as White people

   - Treat Black people **worse**than White people

3. How likely would you be to call the police if the following things happened?

   - You were a victim of a crime

   - You saw someone commit a crime

   - You saw someone having a mental health crisis

7.9.5 Fair Penalties for Misconduct (New York City)

1. What do you think a fair punishment would be if a police officer was found to have done the following things? Options: Nothing, Counseling/Warning, Suspended without Pay, Fired, Criminal Charges.

   - Abuse of Authority (an officer uses their power to stop, search, threaten, or harass you when they shouldn't)

   - Discourtesy (an officer yells at you, curses at you, or treats you rudely)

   - Force (an officer takes physical action against you with their body, tools, or weapons when they shouldn't)

7.9.6 Fair Penalties for Misconduct (Chicago)

1. What do you think a fair punishment would be if a police officer was found to have done the following things? Options: Nothing, Counseling/Warning, Suspended without Pay, Fired, Criminal Charges.

- Excessive Force (an officer takes physical action against you with their body, tools, or weapons when they shouldn't)

- Improper Search (an officer uses their power to search you or your property when they shouldn't)

- Operational/Personnel Violations (an officer does something, or fails to do something, and it breaks known rules, policies, or procedures)

7.9.7 Fair Penalties for Misconduct (Philadelphia)

1. What do you think a fair punishment would be if a police officer was found to have done the following things? Options: Nothing, Counseling/Warning, Suspended without Pay, Fired, Criminal Charges.

   - Lack of Service (an officer does not help you when you ask for help)

   - Physical Abuse (an officer takes physical action against you with their body, tools, or weapons when they shouldn't)

   - Verbal Abuse (an officer yells at you, curses at you, or calls you names)

7.9.8 Statistics Transparency Intervention (New York City)

- New Yorkers accused police officers of about 21 instances of bad behavior each day between 2015 and 2020.

- About 58% were accusations of Abuse of Authority. About 27% were accusations of Force. About 13% were accusations of Discourtesy.

- For about 180 out of every 200 accusations, investigators could not tell if something serious had happened.

- That means, for about 20 out of every 200 accusations, they found that something serious had happened.

- For 7 out of these 20 accusations where they found something serious happened, there is no record of any punishment for the officer.

- For another 11 out of these 20 accusations, officers were given a warning.

- This means that at the end of the day, officers are suspended in 2 out of every 200 accusations.

7.9.9 Statistics Transparency Intervention (Chicago)

- Chicagoans accused police officers of about 28 instances of bad behavior each day between 2015 and 2020.

- About 31% were accusations of Operational/Personnel Violations. About 20% were accusations of Improper Search. About 11% were accusations of Excessive Force.

- For about 177 out of every 200 accusations, investigators could not tell if something serious had happened.

- That means, for about 23 out of every 200 accusations, they found that something serious had happened.

- For 2 out of these 23 accusations where they found something serious happened, there is no record of any punishment for the officer.

- For another 4 out of these 23 accusations, officers were given a warning.

- This means that at the end of the day, officers are suspended in 12 out of every 200 accusations and dismissed from their job in 5 out of every 200 accusations.

7.9.10 Statistics Transparency Intervention (Philadelphia)

- Philadelphians accused police officers of about 5 instances of bad behavior each day between 2015 and 2020.

- About 18% were accusations of Lack of Service. About 12% were accusations of Physical Abuse. About 11% were accusations of Verbal Abuse.

- For about 173 out of every 200 accusations, investigators could not tell if something serious had happened.

- That means, for about 27 out of every 200 accusations, they found that something serious had happened.

- For 4 out of these 27 accusations where they found something serious happened, there is no record of any punishment for the officer.

- For another 21 out of these 27 accusations, officers were given a warning.

- This means that at the end of the day, officers are suspended in 1 out of every 200 accusations.

7.9.11 Complaint Filing Preferences (New York City)

1. How likely would you be to file a complaint if the following things happened to you? Options: Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely

   - Abuse of Authority (an officer uses their power to stop, search, threaten, or harass you when they shouldn't)

   - Discourtesy (an officer yells at you, curses at you, or treats you rudely)

   - Force (an officer takes physical action against you with their body, tools, or weapons when they shouldn't)

2. If you filed a complaint, you would be asked to answer questions about it. Would you be willing to attend an interview about your complaint Options: through an online video chat, at the Civilian Complaint Review Board office (100 Church Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10007), at the Civilian Complaint Review Board office (100 Church Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10007), at the police station closest to where you live, if an investigator came to you (instead of you having to travel)

   - Yes

   - No

3. If you had to attend an in-person interview, would you be willing to go Options: alone, if you were accompanied by a friend or family member, if you were accompanied by a civilian member of the police department, if you were accompanied by a non-police city employee

- Yes

- No

4. How likely would you be to file a complaint if you knew that the investigation and penalty process might take Options: less than 6 months, 6 to 12 months, more than 1 year

    - Very Unlikely

    - Unlikely

    - It would not affect how likely I would be to file a complaint

    - Likely

    - Very Likely

7.9.12 Complaint Filing Preferences (Chicago)

1. How likely would you be to file a complaint if the following things happened to you? Options: Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely

    - Excessive Force (an officer takes physical action against you with their body, tools, or weapons when they shouldn't)

    - Improper Search (an officer uses their power to search you or your property when they shouldn't)

    - Operational/Personnel Violations (an officer does something, or fails to do something, and it breaks known rules, policies, or procedures)

2. If you filed a complaint, you would be asked to answer questions about it. Would you be willing to attend an interview about your complaint Options: through an online video chat, at the Civilian Office of Police Accountability office (1615 W. Chicago Avenue, 4th Floor, Chicago, IL 60622), at the Chicago Police Department's Internal Affairs office (3510 S. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL 60653), at the police station closest to where you live, if an investigator came to you (instead of you having to travel)

    - Yes

    - No

3. If you had to attend an in-person interview, would you be willing to go Options: alone, if you were accompanied by a friend or family member, if you were accompanied by a civilian member of the police department, if you were accompanied by a non-police city employee

- Yes

- No

4. How likely would you be to file a complaint if you knew that the investigation and penalty process might take Options: less than 6 months, 6 to 12 months, more than 1 year

- Very Unlikely

- Unlikely

- It would not affect how likely I would be to file a complaint

- Likely

- Very Likely

7.9.13 Complaint Filing Preferences (Philadelphia)

1. How likely would you be to file a complaint if the following things happened to you? Options: Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely

- Lack of Service (an officer does not help you when you ask for help)

- Physical Abuse (an officer takes physical action against you with their body, tools, or weapons when they shouldn't)

- Verbal Abuse (an officer yells at you, curses at you, or calls you names)

2. If you filed a complaint, you would be asked to answer questions about it. Would you be willing to attend an interview about your complaint Options: through an online video chat, at the Police Advisory Commission office (1515 Arch Street, 11th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102), at the Philadelphia Police Department's Internal Affairs office (7790 Dungan Road, Philadelphia, PA 19111), at the police station closest to where you live, if an investigator came to you (instead of you having to travel)

- Yes

- No

3. If you had to attend an in-person interview, would you be willing to go Options: alone, if you were accompanied by a friend or family member, if you were accompanied by a civilian member of the police department, if you were accompanied by a non-police city employee

   - Yes

   - No

4. How likely would you be to file a complaint if you knew that the investigation and penalty process might take Options: less than 6 months, 6 to 12 months, more than 1 year

   - Very Unlikely

   - Unlikely

   - It would not affect how likely I would be to file a complaint

   - Likely

   - Very Likely

7.9.14 Intent to File (New York City)

1. Do you intend to file a complaint against a New York City police officer in the near future?

   - Yes; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, and I want to

   - No; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, but I don't want to

   - No; I haven't had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about

7.9.15 Intent to File (Chicago)

1. Do you intend to file a complaint against a Chicago police officer in the near future?

   - Yes; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, and I want to

   - No; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, but I don't want to

   - No; I haven't had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about

7.9.16 Intent to File (Philadelphia)

1. Do you intend to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future?

   - Yes; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, and I want to

   - No; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, but I don't want to

   - No; I haven't had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about

If respondents selected either one of the two response options indicating that they had experienced a complaint-worthy incident ("Yes; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, and I want to" or "No; I've had an experience with police that I could file a complaint about, but I don't want to"), they were also asked an optional open-ended follow up question:

1. Would you like to tell us more about this experience?

Table 44: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.410
Trust Courts	2.627
Trust Mayor	2.451
Trust Military	2.969
Trust Police	2.568
Officer Racism	0.654
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.247
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.006
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.720

7.10 New York City Results Reweighted to City Demographics

Table 45: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Abuse of Authority	3.701
Discourtesy	2.823
Force	4.325

Table 46: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.317	2.367	0.050	0.163
Trust Courts	2.559	2.483	-0.076	0.119
Trust Mayor	2.341	2.292	-0.050	0.211
Trust Military	2.922	2.893	-0.030	0.509
Trust Police	2.540	2.406	-0.133**	0.006
Officer Racism	0.637	0.659	0.022	0.243

Table 47: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.269	3.260	-0.009	0.835
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.037	3.037	-0.000	0.998
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.730	2.682	-0.048	0.31

Table 48: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Abuse of Authority	3.608	3.434	-0.174*	0.036
Fair Punish Discourtesy	2.564	2.580	0.016	0.793
Fair Punish Force	4.133	4.066	-0.067	0.206

Table 49: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: The number and percent of respondents who wanted to know about complaint types, reasons why investigators might not be able to tell if the complaint was serious, and warning types.**

Want to Know More About...	Yes	No
Complaint Types	311 (75.85%)	99 (24.15%)
Not Tell if Serious	262 (63.90%)	148 (36.10%)
Warning Types	288 (70.42%)	121 (29.58%)

Table 50: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: force, discourtesy, and abuse of authority. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either verbal abuse or abuse of authority. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Force	3.585	-
Abuse of Authority	3.267**	0.000
Discourtesy	2.747**	0.000

Table 51: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, verbal abuse, and abuse of authority and among three different treatment groups.** People assigned to the PAC group were shown real instructions for how to file a complaint with the Police Advisory Commission; people in the IAD group were shown real instructions for how to file a complaint with New York City's Internal Affairs office; people in the "None" group were not shown any instructions for how to file a complaint. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint. Results also show, for each complaint type, whether being assigned in the PAC group or the IAD group leads to a statistically significant difference than being assigned to no groups. * $ p ¡ $.05, ** $ p ¡ $.01.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Physical Abuse	None	3.568	-	-
	CCRB	3.695	0.127	-
	IAB	3.639	0.071	-
Abuse of Authority	None	3.230	-	-
	CCRB	3.287	0.058**	0.000
	IAB	3.315	0.085**	0.000
Verbal Abuse	None	2.775	-	-
	CCRB	2.817	0.042**	0.000
	IAB	2.794	0.019**	0.000

Table 52: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * p<.05, ** p<.01.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.816	-	-
	At Home	0.932	0.116**	0.005
	Nearby Police Station	0.844	0.028	0.566
	Online	0.755	-0.061	0.234
	CCRB Office	0.824	0.008	0.869
Interview With Who	Alone	0.642	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.774	0.132*	0.024
	Non-Police Employee	0.816	0.174**	0.003
	Civilian Employee	0.824	0.182**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.878	0.235**	0.000
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.162	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.494	0.332**	0.002
	Over 1 Year	3.102	-0.060	0.554

Table 53: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a New York Police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	1416 (79.91%)
No, but have had an experience	189 (10.67%)
Yes	167 (9.42%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	217 (87.50%)	297 (76.74%)	409 (79.42%)	45 (84.91%)	449 (78.91%)
Yes	4 (1.61%)	41 (10.59%)	42 (8.16%)	4 (7.55%)	75 (13.18%)
No, but have had an experience	27 (10.89%)	49 (12.66%)	64 (12.43%)	4 (7.55%)	45 (7.91%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	100 (76.92%)	649 (83.42%)	462 (80.77%)	204 (70.10%)
No, but have had an experience	10 (7.69%)	87 (11.18%)	59 (10.31%)	33 (11.34%)
Yes	20 (15.38%)	42 (5.40%)	51 (8.92%)	54 (18.56%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

Table 54: New York City: Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a New York Police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
Yes	167 (47.04%)	61 (17.18%)	42 (11.83%)	14 (3.94%)	38 (10.70%)	13 (3.66%)
No, but have had an experience	189 (53.24%)	59 (16.62%)	61 (17.18%)	21 (5.92%)	10 (2.82%)	38 (10.70%)
Totals	355 (100.00%)	120 (33.80%)	102 (28.73%)	35 (9.86%)	48 (13.52%)	51 (14.37%)

Table 55: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.466
Trust Courts	2.524
Trust Mayor	2.516
Trust Military	2.986
Trust Police	2.380
Officer Racism	0.680
Crime Reporting, Victim	2.962
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.836
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.685

Table 56: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Discourtesy	2.918
Force	4.279

7.11   New York City Results Reweighted to Complainant Demographics

7.12   Chicago Results Reweighted to City Demographics

7.13   Chicago Results Reweighted to Complainant Demographics

7.14   Philadelphia Results Reweighted to City Demographics

Table 57: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.436	2.462	0.027	0.73
Trust Courts	2.598	2.565	-0.033	0.638
Trust Mayor	2.505	2.400	-0.105	0.115
Trust Military	3.084	3.067	-0.017	0.83
Trust Police	2.406	2.227	-0.178**	0.009
Officer Racism	0.638	0.663	0.025	0.204

Table 58: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.013	3.046	0.033	0.638
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.910	2.873	-0.037	0.693
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.600	2.486	-0.114*	0.045

Table 59: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Abuse of Authority	3.834	3.587	-0.247**	0.007
Fair Punish Discourtesy	2.626	2.649	0.022	0.823
Fair Punish Force	4.172	4.213	0.040	0.654

Table 60: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: The number and percent of respondents who wanted to know about complaint types, reasons why investigators might not be able to tell if the complaint was serious, and warning types**

Want to Know More About...	Yes	No
Complaint Types	325 (79.85%)	82 (20.15%)
Not Tell if Serious	272 (66.83%)	135 (33.17%)
Warning Types	281 (69.04%)	126 (30.96%)

Table 61: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: force, discourtesy, and abuse of authority. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either verbal abuse or abuse of authority. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Force	3.522	-
Abuse of Authority	3.243**	0.000
Discourtesy	2.758**	0.000

Table 62: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, verbal abuse, and abuse of authority and among three different treatment groups.** People assigned to the PAC group were shown real instructions for how to file a complaint with the Police Advisory Commission; people in the IAD group were shown real instructions for how to file a complaint with New York City's Internal Affairs office; people in the "None" group were not shown any instructions for how to file a complaint. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint. Results also show, for each complaint type, whether being assigned in the PAC group or the IAD group leads to a statistically significant difference than being assigned to no groups. * $ p ¡ $.05, ** $ p ¡ $.01.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Physical Abuse	None	3.417	-	-
	CCRB	3.629	0.212	-
	IAB	3.564	0.147	-
Abuse Authority	None	3.249	-	-
	CCRB	3.251	0.002**	0.000
	IAB	3.342	0.094**	0.000
Verbal Abuse	None	2.663	-	-
	CCRB	2.993	0.330**	0.000
	IAB	2.825	0.162**	0.000

Table 63: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * p<.05, ** p<.01.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.757	-	-
	At Home	0.916	0.158*	0.024
	Nearby Police Station	0.819	0.061	0.444
	Online	0.715	-0.043	0.593
	CCRB Office	0.818	0.060	0.427
Interview With Who	Alone	0.703	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.802	0.099	0.145
	Non-Police Employee	0.845	0.142*	0.028
	Civilian Employee	0.756	0.053	0.475
	Friend Or Family	0.832	0.129*	0.023
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.168	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.354	0.186	0.223
	Over 1 Year	3.101	-0.067	0.626

Table 64: **New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a New York Police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	1198 (67.65%)
No, but have had an experience	300 (16.94%)
Yes	273 (15.42%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	Whi
No, have not had an experience	48 (87.27%)	662 (66.40%)	312 (73.07%)	51 (71.83%)	126
No, but have had an experience	5 (9.09%)	180 (18.05%)	68 (15.93%)	14 (19.72%)	33 (
Yes	2 (3.64%)	155 (15.55%)	47 (11.01%)	6 (8.45%)	64 (

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduat
No, have not had an experience	44 (68.75%)	523 (75.36%)	430 (67.19%)	202 (5
No, but have had an experience	4 (6.25%)	118 (17.00%)	113 (17.66%)	65 (17
Yes	16 (25.00%)	53 (7.64%)	97 (15.16%)	108 (2

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

Table 65: New York City: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a New York Police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
Yes	273 (47.64%)	113 (19.72%)	48 (8.38%)	30 (5.24%)	51 (8.90%)	31 (5.41%)
No, but have had an experience	300 (52.36%)	102 (17.80%)	88 (15.36%)	29 (5.06%)	30 (5.24%)	50 (8.73%)
Totals	573 (100.00%)	215 (37.52%)	136 (23.73%)	59 (10.30%)	81 (14.14%)	81 (14.14%)

Table 66: **Philadelphia: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.**

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
No, but have had an experience	273 (71.09%)	77 (20.05%)	116 (30.21%)	25 (6.51%)	17 (4.43%)	38 (9.90%)
Yes	111 (28.91%)	29 (7.55%)	32 (8.33%)	15 (3.91%)	26 (6.77%)	9 (2.34%)
Totals	384 (100.00%)	106 (27.60%)	148 (38.54%)	40 (10.42%)	43 (11.20%)	47 (12.24%)

Table 67: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.264
Trust Courts	2.384
Trust Mayor	2.238
Trust Military	3.066
Trust Police	2.501
Officer Racism	0.644
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.214
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.964
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.815

Table 68: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Verbal Abuse	2.534
Physical Abuse	4.249
Lack of Service	3.230

Table 69: **Weighted to Reflect City: The number and percent of respondents who wanted to know about complaint types, reasons why investigators might not be able to tell if the complaint was serious, and warning types.**

Want to Know More About...	Yes	No
Complaint Types	500 (67.75%)	238 (32.25%)
Not Tell if Serious	463 (62.74%)	275 (37.26%)
Warning Types	480 (65.13%)	257 (34.87%)

Table 70: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.283	2.177	-0.106**	0.005
Trust Courts	2.388	2.253	-0.135**	0.005
Trust Mayor	2.299	2.225	-0.074*	0.019
Trust Military	3.012	2.981	-0.032	0.346
Trust Police	2.418	2.302	-0.116**	0.003
Officer Racism	0.652	0.653	0.001	0.867

Table 71: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.262	3.155	-0.107**	0.002
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.998	2.956	-0.042	0.215
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.779	2.755	-0.024	0.463

Table 72: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Verbal Abuse	2.669	2.797	0.128*	0.041
Fair Punish Physical Abuse	4.541	4.560	0.019	0.576
Fair Punish Lack of Service	3.067	3.012	-0.055	0.253

Table 73: **Weighted to Reflect City: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, verbal abuse, and lack of service. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either verbal abuse or lack of service. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Physical Abuse	3.606	-
Verbal Abuse	2.802**	0.000
Lack Service	3.032**	0.000

Table 74: **Weighted to Reflect City: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.834	-	-
	At Home	0.893	0.059*	0.048
	Nearby Police Station	0.896	0.062*	0.043
	Online	0.809	-0.025	0.473
	PAC Office	0.770	-0.064	0.085
Interview With Who	Alone	0.572	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.787	0.215**	0.000
	Non-Police Employee	0.855	0.282**	0.000
	Civilian Employee	0.829	0.257**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.882	0.309**	0.000
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.206	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.319	0.113	0.132
	Over 1 Year	2.977	-0.229**	0.003

Table 75: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	1974 (83.64%)
No, but have had an experience	284 (12.03%)
Yes	102 (4.32%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	151 (88.82%)	783 (81.22%)	272 (78.39%)	51 (77.27%)	717 (88.08%)
No, but have had an experience	12 (7.06%)	135 (14.00%)	53 (15.27%)	14 (21.21%)	70 (8.60%)
Yes	7 (4.12%)	46 (4.77%)	22 (6.34%)	1 (1.52%)	27 (3.32%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	254 (78.15%)	1059 (84.32%)	445 (84.28%)	216 (85.71%)
No, but have had an experience	56 (17.23%)	151 (12.02%)	55 (10.42%)	22 (8.73%)
Yes	15 (4.62%)	46 (3.66%)	28 (5.30%)	14 (5.56%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

Table 76: **Weighted to Reflect City: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.**

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
No, but have had an experience	284 (73.58%)	69 (17.88%)	131 (33.94%)	26 (6.74%)	21 (5.44%)	36 (9.33%)
Yes	102 (26.42%)	32 (8.29%)	29 (7.51%)	14 (3.63%)	20 (5.18%)	8 (2.07%)
Totals	386 (100.00%)	101 (26.17%)	160 (41.45%)	40 (10.36%)	41 (10.62%)	44 (11.40%)

7.15 Philadelphia Results Reweighted to Complainant Demographics

Table 77: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.217
Trust Courts	2.296
Trust Mayor	2.273
Trust Military	2.957
Trust Police	2.349
Officer Racism	0.725
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.106
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.828
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.722

Table 78: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Verbal Abuse	2.594
Physical Abuse	4.378
Lack of Service	3.299

Table 79: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: The number and percent of respondents who wanted to know about complaint types, reasons why investigators might not be able to tell if the complaint was serious, and warning types**

Want to Know More About...	Yes	No
Complaint Types	558 (72.28%)	214 (27.72%)
Not Tell if Serious	484 (62.69%)	288 (37.31%)
Warning Types	508 (65.89%)	263 (34.11%)

Table 80: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.259	2.174	-0.084*	0.039
Trust Courts	2.275	2.179	-0.096*	0.02
Trust Mayor	2.238	2.190	-0.048	0.176
Trust Military	2.936	2.903	-0.033	0.382
Trust Police	2.301	2.174	-0.127**	0.002
Officer Racism	0.739	0.746	0.006	0.536

Table 81: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.138	3.059	-0.079*	0.013
Crime Reporting, Witness	2.862	2.827	-0.035	0.333
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.672	2.671	-0.001	0.971

Table 82: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Verbal Abuse	2.694	2.801	0.107*	0.032
Fair Punish Physical Abuse	4.578	4.617	0.039	0.36
Fair Punish Lack of Service	3.089	3.080	-0.009	0.863

Table 83: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, verbal abuse, and lack of service. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either verbal abuse or lack of service. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Physical Abuse	3.589	-
Verbal Abuse	2.809**	0.000
Lack Service	3.016**	0.000

Table 84: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.836	-	-
	At Home	0.879	0.043	0.154
	Nearby Police Station	0.875	0.039	0.215
	Online	0.831	-0.005	0.874
	PAC Office	0.793	-0.043	0.197
Interview With Who	Alone	0.564	-	-
	Police Civilian Employee	0.789	0.225**	0.000
	Non-Police Employee	0.882	0.317**	0.000
	Civilian Employee	0.822	0.257**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.877	0.313**	0.000
Investigation Time	6-12 Months	3.140	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.385	0.246**	0.001
	Over 1 Year	3.103	-0.037	0.635

Table 85: **Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	1895 (80.30%)
No, but have had an experience	325 (13.77%)
Yes	140 (5.93%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	46 (88.46%)	1216 (78.71%)	152 (80.42%)	19 (79.17%)	462 (83.85%)
No, but have had an experience	3 (5.77%)	232 (15.02%)	28 (14.81%)	4 (16.67%)	58 (10.53%)
Yes	3 (5.77%)	97 (6.28%)	9 (4.76%)	1 (4.17%)	31 (5.63%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	75 (74.26%)	914 (80.46%)	694 (80.14%)	212 (82.49%)
No, but have had an experience	21 (20.79%)	164 (14.44%)	114 (13.16%)	26 (10.12%)
Yes	5 (4.95%)	58 (5.11%)	58 (6.70%)	19 (7.39%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

7.16 Synthetic Results Reweighted to US Demographics

Table 86: Weighted to Reflect Complainants: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Philadelphia police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	Gibberish	No Response
No, but have had an experience	325 (69.89%)	74 (15.91%)	153 (32.90%)	29 (6.24%)	22 (4.73%)	46 (9.89%)
Yes	140 (30.11%)	36 (7.74%)	51 (10.97%)	14 (3.01%)	29 (6.24%)	11 (2.37%)
Totals	465 (100.00%)	110 (23.66%)	204 (43.87%)	43 (9.25%)	51 (10.97%)	57 (12.26%)

Table 87: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations, whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people, and their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people. Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Mean
Trust Congress	2.058
Trust Courts	2.574
Trust Mayor	2.480
Trust Military	2.890
Trust Police	2.550
Officer Racism	0.465
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.461
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.137
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.412

Table 88: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Mean
Lack of Service	2.859
Physical Abuse	4.448
Verbal Abuse	2.722

Table 89: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to questions about trust in various organizations and whether they perceive police to treat Black people worse than White people.** Trust responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest trust and 4 indicates highest trust. Officer Racism responses are coded on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates police officers treating Black people better or equal to White people, and 1 indicates police officers treating Black people worse than White people.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Trust Congress	2.058	2.010	-0.049*	0.018
Trust Courts	2.574	2.476	-0.099**	0.001
Trust Mayor	2.480	2.434	-0.046	0.105
Trust Military	2.890	2.847	-0.043*	0.044
Trust Police	2.550	2.418	-0.132**	0
Officer Racism	0.465	0.491	0.026*	0.019

Table 90: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to questions about their likelihood of reporting incidents to the police.** Reporting responses are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of calling the police, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of calling the police.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Crime Reporting, Victim	3.461	3.443	-0.018	0.418
Crime Reporting, Witness	3.137	3.128	-0.009	0.683
Crime Reporting, Saw Mental Crisis	2.412	2.400	-0.012	0.6

Table 91: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to question about what is the fair penalty for police misconduct.** Fair punishment responses are coded on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lightest penalty and 5 indicates the most severe penalty.

Variable	Pre-Mean	Post-Mean	Difference	P-Value
Fair Punish Lack of Service	2.859	2.878	0.020	0.676
Fair Punish Physical Abuse	4.448	4.538	0.090**	0.004
Fair Punish Verbal Abuse	2.722	2.779	0.057	0.118

Table 92: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: The likelihood that a respondent would file a complaint by the three complaint categories: physical abuse, improper search, and operational violation. Results are coded on a 1-4 scale, where 1 indicates lowest likelihood of filing a complaint, and 4 indicates highest likelihood of filing a complaint.** Results also show whether physical abuse is statistically significantly different than either improper search or operational violation. * $p < \$.05$, ** $p < \$.01$.

Variable	Mean	P-Value
Physical Abuse	3.776	-
Lack Service	2.770**	0.000
Verbal Abuse	2.843**	0.000

Table 93: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Willingness to attend an interview, with randomization for interview place, who would accompany the complainant, and the time it takes for the investigation to occur.** Interview place and "with who" are binary variables with 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes"; interview time is a a five-point Likert scale from 1 = "very unlikely" and 5 = "very likely." Reference categories are the ones that most closely reflect actual policies. * $p < \$.05$, ** $p < \$.01$.

Variable	Condition	Mean	Difference	P-Value
Interview Place	Internal Affairs Office	0.867	-	-
	At Home	0.891	0.024	0.632
	Nearby Police Station	0.885	0.018	0.698
	Online	0.763	-0.104	0.063
Interview With Who	Alone	0.682	-	-
	Non-Police Employee	0.873	0.191**	0.000
	Friend Or Family	0.901	0.219**	0.000
Interview Time	6-12 Months	3.321	-	-
	Less Than 6 Months	3.652	0.331**	0.006
	Over 1 Year	3.274	-0.047	0.735

Table 94: **National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Police officer in the near future.** Results are shown combining all respondents, dividing respondents by self-reported race, and dividing respondents by self-reported educational attainment.

Response	Respondents
No, have not had an experience	899 (90.44%)
No, but have had an experience	77 (7.75%)
Yes	18 (1.81%)

(a) **All Respondents**

Intend to File a Complaint	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic	Other/Multiple Races	White
No, have not had an experience	44 (77.19%)	102 (82.93%)	161 (90.45%)	27 (81.82%)	566 (93.71%)
No, but have had an experience	10 (17.54%)	17 (13.82%)	14 (7.87%)	4 (12.12%)	33 (5.46%)
Yes	3 (5.26%)	4 (3.25%)	3 (1.69%)	2 (6.06%)	5 (0.83%)

(b) **Respondents Broken Down by Race**

Intend to File a Complaint	Less than a high school diploma	High school diploma or GED	College degree	Graduate degree
No, have not had an experience	30 (NA%)	128 (88.28%)	616 (90.59%)	125 (93.98%)
No, but have had an experience	5 (NA%)	16 (11.03%)	50 (7.35%)	6 (4.51%)
Yes	NA (NA%)	1 (0.69%)	14 (2.06%)	2 (1.50%)

(c) **Respondents Broken Down by Education**

Table 95: National: Weighted to Reflect US: Responses to question about whether they actually intended to file a complaint against a Police officer in the near future, dividing responses by the explanation they provided about the incident.

Intend to File a Complaint	Respondents with Complaint-Worthy Experiences	Coherent, Explained	Coherent, Did Not Explain	Ambiguous	No Response
No, but have had an experience	77 (81.05%)	34 (35.79%)	27 (28.42%)	3 (3.16%)	14 (14.74%)
Yes	18 (18.95%)	8 (8.42%)	4 (4.21%)	4 (4.21%)	1 (1.05%)
Totals	95 (100.00%)	42 (44.21%)	31 (32.63%)	7 (7.37%)	14 (14.74%)

7.17 Open Text Response Coding Examples

"Coherent Explained" indicates the person understood the question and provided a reasonably coherent account of their complaint. Examples are provided below.

1. "I was living in a group home in 2017, still 17 years old at the time. NYPD officers responded to a call that was made by a group home staff and they broke into the bathroom, dragged me out of the shower and onto the floor while I was naked and assaulted me in front of roommates, staff and a female officer when I didn't even refuse or get violent. I was arrested and had my case thrown out the exact day and later the group home supervisor even admitted that the proper protocol would have been to ask for an ambulance for an emotionally distressed person (EDP). I didn't know I could file a complaint for how they treated me and I wish I had." (NYC)

2. "I've been pulled over while driving without cause by police on more occasions than I can count. I've been profiled by police, treated differently because of my race, assumed to be a drug dealers girlfriend or up to no good just because of my skin color, etc. Rarely are police held accountable and instead the complainer is the one who is impacted which stifles willingness to report these incidents" (NYC)

3. "He thought I was doing something I wasn't and called me very harmful names, he even said "all mexicans do this"" (NYC)

4. "I was being followed home by someone when I was a teenager (15 years ago). I was living in a rough neighborhood. When I gave my coordinates the dispatcher laughed and hung up on me. I was being followed by an older man who was trying to lure me into his car. I tried to call the cops again and no answer. I never trusted them again." (CHI)

5. "My roommate was having a medical emergency and they showed up without asking and were rude, dismissive, and straight up dangerous too my roommate multiple times. I filed a formal complaint and am going through the process" (CHI)

6. "August 29 I was attacked by a man leaving me with a broken cheek bone and concussed. I immediately called 911 to file a report which took the two officers thirty minutes to arrive at my apartment

which is a five minute walk to their station. While speaking to the pair, they blamed me for allowing the altercation to happen. I provided CPD my attackers full name, birthday, and several photos. When I called to follow up on the case I was told it had been closed and all leads were exhausted in doing so. In their report, the officers stated that I could not provide any information about the attacker, not knowing his name or a description of what he looked like." (CHI)

7. "Oh definitely I would like to tell you guys. Literally I got robbed by undercover detective" (CHI)

8. "My S/O and I witnessed our best friend on a motorcycle get hit by a car failing to yield and he looked dead. The lady that hit him said she was going to pull over but drove away instead. When the police got there, they assumed that because our friend was on a motorcycle, it was 100% his fault. While our friends skull was cracked open and he was bleeding everywhere, the officers were making jokes. Finally an officer took my statement and another witness, but failed to file that report. The entire situation with the police officers was handled so inappropriately, it was disgusting." (PHL)

9. "When i was raped in 2018 i received so many degrading and inappropriate comments from officers i reported to. I was also barely helped and given no resources while i would wait for each step. They left me in a room with one plastic char for 4hrs before i could even get a rape kit done. The officers were rude and racist asking if i "liked black guys" and gross stuff like that. I had multiple officers roll their eyes at me and try to blame me for another person raping me. I do not trust police anymore. They are useless, rude and terrible." (PHL)

10. "I've been berated and assaulted by officers during a pedestrian stop for which they found no wrong doing on my part and pressed no charges." (PHL)

11. "I currently have a 5 year restraining order against a stalker/domestic abuser. I am the protected party. This person has broken the order so many times at this point. Sends me unsolicited mail making threats, looks through my windows, calls and leaves voicemails on my business phone. Harasses all of my family trying to isolate me. Has shown up to my residence with knifes and possibly a gun(this is what earned me the restraining order against them) I have called police and 911 so many times I have lost count. Each time the police take over an hour to show up and take my statement and evidence. I am given a case number and don't hear from detectives until 8 months later for incidents that happened months ago. The restraining order has never been enforced,

this person is basically in contempt of court of the judges orders. They continue to break the order because they have been allowed to by police and the sheriff in San Diego. The city attorney contacted me and said that they will not be taking the case to court because they do not have "enough evidence" I guess Ring camera footage/ phone records/ Voicemails/ Handwritten letters are not enough for them and they are only concerned with their statistics and winning cases. Police do not protect Domestic Violence victims in my city and do not move to charge abusers unless the victim has been murdered and there is media pressure (Maya Millete case in San Diego, she asked for help for months and is now missing/murdered by her husband, and they only brought charges against him because of the pressure from media." (SYN)

12. "Pulling out into traffic on 25 MPH speed road, I noticed a cop car coming down the street without flashing lights and no siren and didn't realize he was travelling at a very high speed (probably over 50-55 MPH. He came up so fast and I couldn't get out of his way. He gave me my first ticket in life (after drivng for about 30 years ticket free). He told me he was on a call and I impeded his progress to the call. In court I told the office that he had told me he was on a call, but he did not have his siren or flashing lights on. He told me that was not what he would tell the judge and stated and I quote" "who is the judge going to believe, you or me (the officer)? I pleaded no contest. But this situation always reminds me of how the cops think they are invincable to being wrong and that they should never be questioned about their actions. I know this seems petty, but I believe that it typifies the attitude of most cops these days." (SYN)

13. "I had police stop my friend and me while walking home to my place. We were within steps of my door and the police cuffed us without cause, started screaming at us, and searched our pockets. They took our wallets and stole our money, then threw our wallets in the street, uncuffed us, and drove off." (SYN)

"Coherent Did Not Explain" indicates the person gave a logical response, but without further details. Examples are provided below.

1. "I would like to keep this experience personal" (NYC)

2. "Incident occurred decades ago and my memories are clouded now" (NYC)

3. "It's something I don't like to speak about" (NYC)

4. "No" (PHL)

5. "Absolutely not. (That would 100% make any situation much worse)" (PHL)

6. "Cannot - I am a physician and it was in the context of a patient encounter" (PHL)

7. "No I just wouldn't want to mess with peoples life God will make everything up" (CHI)

8. "There is no use in filing a complaint about any of the various incidents where CPD has violated my rights. I know they will not be punished" (CHI)

9. "No, due to fear of retaliation." (CHI)

10. "Not really, I have a complaint, but I think it's not serious enough to complain this time." (SYN)

11. "It does no good to file complaints. The officers stand together guilty or not." (SYN)

12. "I would rather not. It's personal." (SYN)

"Ambiguous" indicates the person appeared not to understand the previous question – e.g., indicated they had not actually had a complaint-worthy experience, described an experience of criminal victimization rather than mistreatment by a police officer, or did not give enough information to tell what they meant. Examples are provided below.

1. "I selected the wrong answer choice - i have not had an experience that I would take action on, but if I did I would still be very unlikely to take action." (NYC)

2. "If i am being forced or threatened with a weapon without doing anything that is against the law. I will definitively speak out." (NYC)

3. "Well, it's a story to tell another day" (NYC)

4. "Judge dropped the case" (PHL)

5. "I have not had an experience" (PHL)

6. "I filed a complaint when my neighbors poisoned my dog" (PHL)

7. "My experience was violence related, Police was really very helpful." (CHI)

8. "Somebody threaten to shoot my house up so I got paper work on them" (CHI)

9. "I was a victim of a burglary" (CHI)

10. "I don't have a recent experience that I would file a complaint about" (SYN)

11. "I filed complaints of noise from my neighborhood." (SYN)

12. "police need to be held accountable, most the time they just protect their own which is bullshit" (SYN)

"Gibberish" indicates the person gave a response that totally didn't make sense with the question asked. Examples are provided below.

1. "But I have to get home and family are" (NYC)

2. "Regarding your request for the above mentioned" (NYC)

3. "I don do you want me a little bit of" (NYC)

4. "like it more good and so nice to try too" (PHL)

5. "Ok something" (PHL)

6. "I would want to do the most to give it a try and I like it." (PHL)

7. "It had a great posetive opinion reviwe." (CHI)

8. "It's awesome and good valuble" (CHI)

9. "Well also" (CHI)

10. Note: there were no gibberish responses in the synthetic survey

The concept of civilian oversight of police also enjoys strong public support (Pew, 2020; Adams et al., 2022), and researchers such as Clarke (2009) note that "...municipalities across the country have turned to civilian oversight because internal investigative units are often perceived as biased, ineffective, and

illegitimate." Even in jurisdictions that don't have civilian review boards, there is a widespread movement away from police departments "self-investigating."[15]

91% support "chang[ing] management practices, so officer abuses are punished" 92% support "chang[ing] management practices, so officers with multiple incidents of abuse of power are not allowed to serve" (McCarthy, 2022)

Civilian oversight was not reestablished in Philadelphia until 1994, with the creation of the Police Advisory Commission (PAC) (Vitoroulis, McEllhiney and Perez, 2021). This development was in keeping with national trends, as civilian oversight expanded more rapidly around the country in the 1990s and 2000s (Walker, 2007; Perino, 2004). Post-George Floyd, civilian oversight is undergoing another wave of expansion. In line with this trend, Philadelphia passed legislation in 2021 to replace the PAC with a stronger oversight organization called the Citizens Police Oversight Commission (CPOC), which has investigative powers not previously held by the PAC.

The effects of unjustified police violence also extend beyond the physical and psychological harm caused to victims and can affect the wider community to which victims belong. As "street-level bureaucrats" (Lipsky, 2010), police are one of the most visible faces of the state. When civilians lose trust in the police, the experience can affect both how they feel about the police and how they feel about the wider state. This can not only prevent them from calling the police for help, reporting crimes, or cooperating in investigations (Desmond, Papachristos and Kirk, 2016)[16], but can also result in decreased use of and engagement with other social services and civic institutions (Burch, 2013; Brayne, 2014; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Weaver, Prowse and Piston, 2019).

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[15]See, e.g., Damien (2020).

[16]This has its own attendant consequences and concerns. As Brunson and Weitzer (2011) notes, "...residents who fear or have lost confidence in the police operate within a parallel universe of street justice to handle problem situations." In short, decreased trust in police not only undermines the success of policing efforts, but can actually increase crime and decrease community safety when civilians feel unsafe calling police for help and resort to solving problems or protecting communities themselves.