A Dynamic Model of Speech for the Social Sciences

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Speech and dialogue are the heart of politics: nearly every political institution in the world involves verbal communication. Yet vast literatures on political communication focus almost exclusively on what words were spoken, entirely ignoring how they were delivered—auditory cues that convey emotion, signal positions, and establish reputation. We develop a model that opens this information to principled statistical inquiry: the model of audio and speech structure (MASS). Our approach models political speech as a stochastic process shaped by fixed and time-varying covariates, including the history of the conversation itself. In an application to Supreme Court oral arguments, we demonstrate how vocal tone signals crucial information—skepticism of legal arguments—that is indecipherable to text models. Results show that justices do not use questioning to strategically manipulate their peers but rather engage sincerely with the presented arguments. Our easy-to-use R package, communication, *implements the model and many more tools for audio analysis.*

What we say can sometimes ... be challenging for the sake of eliciting a response, sometimes it can be genuine doubt about what the position of a person might be, sometimes we're talking to each other and we're raising points through the questions that we want our colleagues to consider with us ... there's lots of reasons for what we're doing, but none of them are ever perfectly understood ... among the people who are listening.

—*Sotomayor (2019)*

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INTRODUCTION

Speech and dialogue are at the heart of politics. Candidates appeal to voters through rhetoric, legislators contest policy during floor debates, courts probe legal argumentation with questioning, and voters discuss all of these with friends and family. Indeed, nearly every political institution in the world, from small-town councils to the United Nations General Assembly, involves verbal communication. Yet quantitative political science has only just begun to analyze political speech—and when it does, analysts have done so with the tools of text analysis. While fruitful, these methods entirely ignore the way in which words are spoken.

This channel of communication, *vocal tone*, carries a wealth of unexploited information. In the next section, we explain how tone is used by listeners to assess speakers' types and mental states. When politicians express themselves skeptically, compassionately, or fervently, their speech conveys more than the mere words that are spoken. Among other information, tone conveys beliefs, preferences, and the intensity with which they are held—or at least, the impressions of these characteristics that the speaker hopes to leave on their audience. The role of voice in persuading others—be they colleagues, adversaries, or electorates—to do what they would not otherwise do has been known at least since Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*. Perhaps surprisingly, audio recordings are already widely available and have been used in literatures spanning political debates, campaign advertisements, campaign speech, legislative speech, television news, talk radio, and judicial deliberation. But almost universally, researchers have studied this data by extracting mere textual transcripts, then discarding the vast amount of untapped data that remains. In this paper, we introduce a new method that allows researchers to not only measure vocal tone in high-dimensional audio data but also study how it is used in political interactions.

Given the ubiquity of verbal communication in politics, why are models of speech only now being introduced? In this paper, we identify and resolve three challenges to the widespread analysis of speech audio. First, speech audio recordings do not naturally arrive in a format that is easy to analyze statistically. In "Audio as Data," we demonstrate how audio recordings of speech can be represented numerically, drawing on insights from signal processing and linguistics. Second, the theoretically interesting quantities signaled by human speech—which may range from basic emotions (e.g., anger) to abstract concepts (e.g., decisiveness), depending on substantive domain—are latent variables that are not directly observed in audio data but must be inferred. In "A Model of Conversation Dynamics," we address this by developing a semisupervised model for human speech, which infers latent tones of voice and provides a principled measure of uncertainty for the estimated patterns in their use. Third, speech is inherently context-dependent—theories suggest that candidates' vocal tone may vary depending on their position in the polls or the topic at hand—and dynamic, with back-and-forth interaction between speakers. In dialogues like political debates or media interviews, an interruption by one person may be met with a polite but firm response, whereas a different interjection could produce an angry retort. We refer to these and other temporal patterns in the choice of tone as the *flow of speech.* Interdependence is often treated as a nuisance or ignored entirely, but we show that speech flow is a valuable source of information about human interaction. By directly modeling this phenomenon, new substantive questions about dynamic interactions are opened to principled statistical inquiry.

In "Testing Theories of Supreme Court Deliberation," we demonstrate that speech tone and flow are substantively important by resolving an ongoing debate in the study of the Supreme Court. Judicial scholars have long disagreed over models of justice behavior in deliberation; some argue that justices are shrewd political actors who maneuver to influence the decisions of their peers, while others hold that justices cast sincere votes and engage in genuine expression according to their respective legal philosophies. We measure and extensively validate a key auditory quantity of interest that is unmeasurable with only the text of speech: skepticism, an individual's vocal expression of their judgment about an assertion or argument. Existing theories suggest diverging observable implications for the expected flow of questioning—when one justice should express skepticism and how other subsequent justices should respond in their own speech—which we use to construct previously infeasible empirical tests of judicial behavior. We find that estimated flow is highly consistent with a theory of genuine fact-finding, and it undermines the competing account of strategic manipulation. We then conclude by noting several open areas of research highlighted by this manuscript.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AUDIO

It is well-known that vocal tone plays an important role in human communication, beyond a speaker's choice of words. In this section, we review evidence that listeners extract considerable information from vocal tone, drawing on numerous studies in linguistics and psychology. We then identify a wide range of literatures in political science that currently study rich speech recordings using textual methods alone, ignoring the auditory component. Taken together, these points suggest that political science is currently missing a great deal by discarding the raw source audio. We briefly note a handful of the many possible applications in which our speech model can help test existing and new theories about political deliberation.

Audio Contains Exclusive Information

Tens of thousands of studies have decisively established the importance of nontextual cues in human speech.[1] Among other well-replicated results, they have shown that respondents' perceptions—including dehumanization of those with opposing political views (Schroeder and Epley 2016)—differ dramatically when exposed to audio recordings of speech, as opposed to transcripts alone. Countless experiments in linguistics and psychology have explored specific auditory mechanisms through which a speaker's voice shapes the information gleaned by listeners on numerous dimensions. Speech audio has been shown to convey information about speakers' static type (e.g., power), as well as their time-varying characteristics (e.g., emotional state). We briefly review this literature.

Signals of a Speaker's Type

Much is inferred about a speaker simply from the general sound of their voice. Humans use vocal tone to draw conclusions about competence, education, and trustworthiness, among many other attributes (Anderson et al. 2014; Zuckerman and Driver 1989). In the political domain, both observational and experimental research has shown that voters' preferences are affected by the sound of a candidate's voice (Gregory and Gallagher 2002; Klofstad 2016; Klofstad, Anderson, and Peters 2012; Podesva et al. 2015; Surawski and Ossoff 2006; Tigue et al. 2012). This effect is mediated, at least in part, by the belief that certain speaking styles are associated with strong, dominant leaders who are more likely to prevail in conflict (Klofstad, Anderson, and Nowicki 2015; Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad 2015). These patterns appear to generalize well across a range of political roles (Anderson and Klofstad 2012), building on well-established findings in psychology that nontextual elements of human conversation shift perceptions of speakers' social power (Carney, Hall, and LeBeau 2005; Hodges-Simeon, Gaulin, and Puts 2010;

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[1] A Google Scholar search for "paralinguistic" returned over 68,000 results in 2020.

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Scherer, London, and Wolf 1973), credibility, persuasiveness (Apple, Streeter, and Krauss 1979; Burgoon, Birk, and Pfau 1990; Hamilton and Stewart 1993), and intelligence (Brown, Strong, and Rencher 1974; Schroeder and Epley 2015; Smith et al. 1975). These results suggest that the way in which individuals speak reveals, at a minimum, how they wish to be perceived by their audiences. For example, Touati (1993) found that a politician's pitch contour was more variable before an election and monotonic after, suggesting a pre-election desire to signal attributes like competence that are associated with this vocal tone.

In political science, research on debates has shown that the way politicians express themselves matters. Hinck and Hinck (2002, 236) argue that audiences scrutinize rhetoric for "politeness strategies" that are used to "measure a candidate's good will and judgment regarding his image, his opponent's, and the values he aspires to represent for the community." Evidence from real-time voter reactions suggests that overly aggressive attacks can lead to immediate drops in ratings (McKinney, Kaid, and Robertson 2001). The instantaneous effect of utterances depends on factors like audience composition (Boydstun et al. 2014), implying politicians may benefit by presenting themselves differently depending on context. In this vein, scholars such as Benoit, Blaney, and Pier (1998) have advanced contextualized theories of rhetoric indicating when candidates should attack, defend, or self-acclaim across a campaign—not only in debates but also in speeches and advertisements; Brader (2006) provides evidence that politicians selectively target emotional appeals based on context-specific expected benefits. Still others have posited that conversational flow plays a particularly important role in voter evaluations. Discussing debates, town halls, and talk show appearances, Beck (1996) asserts that to be perceived as presidential, "candidates must project themselves as able to cope and excel in spite of conflict over issues and despite their opponents' attempts to define them," and that success "hinges on their interactional skills, not just their ability to look a certain way or say particular things." Nor does the role of rhetoric diminish after election: a broad literature on "going public" (Kernell, 2006) explores how presidents increasingly make televised appeals directly to the public. However, work on political rhetoric has largely relied on qualitative methods or labor-intensive human coding due to the difficulty of empirical analysis—a gap that our method directly addresses.

Signals of a Speaker's Current State

Speech signals much more than "presidentialness" or other time-invariant characteristics. Temporal variation in vocal tone can also indicate the mental state —such as emotions or impressions (Banse and Scherer 1996; Johnstone and Scherer 2000; Kappas, Hess, and Scherer 1991; Scherer 1995; Scherer, Koivumaki, and Rosenthal 1972)—that a speaker currently wishes to convey. Some of this variation has subconscious biological origins. Certain emotional states produce

physiological effects such as mouth dryness, accelerated breathing, muscular tension, or tremors (Ohala 1981), which have audible effects on speech, though practiced speakers like actors and politicians can consciously emulate these unconscious effects.[2] Vocal mannerisms also convey a speaker's current impressions of a conversation, such as their level of certainty, understanding, agreement, and belief (Manusov and Trees 2002). These vocal cues form an important part of the dynamic interplay between speakers in a conversation (Leathers 1979).

In "Testing Theories of Supreme Court Deliberation," we build on this work by studying one particular time-varying speech tone justices' expressed skepticism. Skepticism is an important signal—perhaps genuine—of disagreement with or incredulity about assertions and legal arguments in the context of oral arguments. Patterns in the flow of conversation shed light on how justices deliberate, just as patterns of matter-of-fact questioning or righteous indignation in campaign debates and impeachment hearings can help reveal the nature of interactions in these political arenas. We show that different theoretical accounts of deliberation imply diverging temporal patterns in speech flow, allowing us to construct an empirical test for competing models of Supreme Court behavior.

Relatedly, speech audio can affect a listener's trust in the speaker (Schirmer et al. 2019; Zuckerman et al. 1979); specifically, the listener's suspicion that the speaker is lying (Manstead, Wagner, and MacDonald 1984; Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 1981). To our knowledge, no work has directly tested the effect of vocal tone on perceived deception by politicians. Given the importance of credibility in conflict (Fearon 1994; Guisinger and Smith 2002) and trust in elections (Hetherington 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000), this relationship warrants future investigation. However, research has firmly established that these time-varying signals play an important role elsewhere in politics. For example, Dietrich, Enos, and Sen (2019) demonstrated that the average pitch of Supreme Court justice questions is predictive of their subsequent votes, even after controlling for text, important legal covariates, and justice ideology (Martin and Quinn 2002). Similarly, the average pitch of a legislator's floor speech has also been used to proxy for issue commitment (Dietrich, Hayes, and O'Brien 2019) and can predict coverage on cable news (Dietrich, Schultz, and Jaquith 2018).

Political Science Already Studies Audio

Audio recordings of speech are thus indisputably a rich source of data. But how often are these recordings available in contexts of interest to political scientists? We now demonstrate that the answer is "quite often." In fact, a wide range of research has *already* studied audio recordings of political speech—but in virtually

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[2] Much research on emotion in speech relies on actors (Scherer 2003), a logical impossibility if emotional expression in speech was strictly subconscious.

every domain, researchers have done so by extracting transcripts, then discarding the remainder of their data.

In "A New Quantity of Interest in Judicial Behavior," we consider one such domain. Here, published research has focused almost exclusively on the text of oral arguments (Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013; Kaufman, Kraft, and Sen 2018; Ringsmuth, Bryan, and Johnson 2013).[3] For example, Black et al. (2011) examine how justices question parties in oral arguments, showing that text-based measures of affective questioning can signal voting decisions. In a direct comparison, we demonstrate that a comparable audio-based measure outperforms this prior work by three times, using its own evaluation task.

However, the Supreme Court is hardly the only context in which political scientists are already studying speech. Countless other studies have examined political debates (Bayley 2004; Benoit 2013; Conway et al. 2012; Fridkin et al. 2007; Hart and Jarvis 1997; Thomas, Pang, and Lee 2006), campaign advertisements (Carlson and Montgomery 2017; Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002), campaign speech (Bligh et al. 2010; Degani 2015; Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Olson et al. 2012; Schroedel et al. 2013), legislative speech (Herzog and Benoit 2015; Lauderdale and Herzog 2016; Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015; Quinn et al. 2010; Schwarz, Traber, and Benoit 2017; Slapin and Proksch 2008), television news (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Mermin 1997; Oegema and Kleinnijenhuis 2000; Rozenas and Stukal 2019; Sanders and Gavin 2004; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000; Young and Soroka 2012), talk radio (Conroy-Krutz and Moehler 2015; Hofstetter et al. 1999; Ross 2016; Sobieraj and Berry 2011), and political addresses (Cohen 1995; Ritter and Howell 2001; Rule, Cointet, and Bearman 2015; Young and Perkins 2005).

Each of these studies used text analysis to study a political context in which communication was *not* written and read as text, but rather was spoken and heard as audio. Given the relative youth of text analysis methods, it is perhaps surprising how often recorded speech is analyzed in this way. The mismatch between data and methods results in the inevitable loss of non-textual information, suggesting that richer models have the potential to contribute to research in each of these domains.

AUDIO AS DATA

The number of papers developing and applying methods for text analysis has increased rapidly in recent years (Wilkerson and Casas 2017), and workflows for preprocessing raw text are well developed (Benoit et al. 2018; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Lucas et al. 2015). However, little effort has been devoted to the analysis of other components of communication—like audio—"as data." In this section, we explain how unstructured

audio recordings of human speech can similarly be preprocessed into structured data in preparation for statistical analysis.

The primary unit of analysis in speech is the *utterance*: a continuous, single-speaker segment, typically concluding with a clear pause. The length of utterances are unequal but on the order of 10 seconds. Within each utterance, we split the recording into successive *moments*, or extremely short windows of time.[4] In each moment, the raw audio is then summarized with auditory features that are known to convey emotion and tone of voice, drawing on established literatures in psychology, phonetics, signal processing, and computer science (El Ayadi, Kamel, and Karray 2011; Ververidis and Kotropoulos 2006). Researchers can easily calculate these features with a single function in our accompanying R package, `communication`, which also implements other useful preprocessing steps.[5] We briefly describe audio featurization to provide intuition.[6]

Within each moment, the raw audio recording consists of a *waveform*, or univariate high-frequency time series of pressure measurements. We characterize this short recording with auditory features describing the sound perceived by listeners. Selected features are illustrated in Figure 1 by describing an audio source for which a feature is high or low. For example, some features are simple functions of the raw waveform. One feature is the "zero crossing rate" (ZCR), or simply how often the waveform crosses zero (neutral pressure). Sibilants (e.g., /s/, /z/) have a particularly high ZCR, whereas vowels have a low ZCR. Other auditory features, like "energy" (loudness), help distinguished /z/ (which is "voiced," i.e., involving vocal cord vibrations) from voiceless /s/.

Other features are based on the audio *spectrum*, computed via a Fourier transformation of the waveform. This captures (among other things) the contribution of the baritone or soprano ranges to overall loudness. Other undepicted features that can be computed from this representation include pitch (dominant frequency, or spectral peak) and Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs, describing overall shape). Because English words may be emphasized with higher sustained pitch or with sharp falling pitch, these features provide additional emotional information. For example, compare "We're *citing* that case?" to "We're citing *that* case!" Pitch is also higher when speakers are vocally tense, including when speakers are emotionally aroused. Online Appendix Section 2 documents all features used in analysis. In general, no single auditory feature distinguishes all sounds or vocal tones; to address this challenge, we develop a method that can exploit dozens or even hundreds of features in analyzing speech.

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[3] A notable exception is Dietrich, Enos, and Sen (2019), discussed above.

[4] We use windows that are 25 milliseconds in length, each overlapping the latter half of the previous moment (sometimes referred to as a "frame" or "window") to preserve information occurring at cutoffs.

[5] For instance, our package includes functionality for segmenting utterances or trimming interruptions.

[6] Online Appendix Section 5 briefly describes how `communication` improves on existing software.

FIGURE 1. Illustration of Selected Audio Features

Note: The left column identifies a class of audio summaries that are used to represent the raw audio data. Subsequent columns contain textual descriptions and graphical depictions of audio sources for which the relevant feature has relatively low and high values. For example, ZCR (zero-crossing rate) has a low value for the vowel /a/ and a high value for the consonant /s/. The ZCR and energy graphs depict pressure waveforms from machine-synthesized speech recordings; louder sounds are larger in amplitude and hissing sounds are higher in ZCR. Spectral graphs represent the Fourier transformation of the synthesized recordings; female voices are concentrated in higher frequency ranges. Pitch is an example of a feature that can be derived from the spectral peaks.

Advances over Existing Approaches

Outside of political science, a large and interdisciplinary body of research has sought to model or classify human speech. A common approach is to collapse each utterance into a vector of descriptive statistics (e.g., mean and standard deviation of pitch), which can be used in standard machine-learning classifiers (Dellaert, Polzin, and Waibel 1996; McGilloway et al. 2000). However, these reduced representations discard enormous amounts of auditory data. To avoid this loss of information, hidden Markov models are often used to model time-series speech. The discrete latent states in this model map well to actual human speech, which is often represented in terms of discrete phonemes, or minimal units of sound.[7]

The model of audio and speech structure (MASS) builds on these existing approaches in statistics and computer science in two main ways. First, computational constraints mean that typical analyses based on hidden Markov models (HMMs) are able to incorporate only a fraction of the features we incorporate. Nogueiras et al. (2001), for example, use just two features to represent a moment in time, while Kwon et al. (2003) use 13 features and Mower et al. (2009) use only the MFCC coefficients. Second, and more importantly, MASS is the first to directly model the flow of speech—that is, contextual and temporal patterns in vocal tone—in terms of the meaningful structural features encoded in conversation metadata.

The Substantive Importance of Speech Flow

Modeling the flow of speech permits principled empirical inquiry into a large and varied set of substantive questions about interaction between speakers. This enables the study of new questions and quantities of interest. For example, by modeling the *dynamics* of speech (i.e., change of flow in response to prior events), MASS allows researchers to ask and answer questions about how a line of argumentation affects downstream discourse. While these sorts of questions are common in theoretical models of sequential games (Dancey and Goren 2010; Ramirez 2009), they are rarely tested empirically. We suggest that this is due to the absence of a suitable empirical model, and "Testing Theories of Supreme Court Deliberation" demonstrates how MASS can answer questions of this sort.

A MODEL OF CONVERSATION DYNAMICS

We now develop a generative statistical model for the audio data that represents political speech. Below, we formally define the assumed generative model. After outlining the model, we next turn to estimation and inference, then discuss practical considerations in the modeling of speech.

The Model

Suppose we have a conversation with U sequential utterances, each of which arises from one of M modes of speech. (To keep the exposition clear, here we consider the simplified setting in which a single conversation

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[7] For example, the International Phonetic Alphabet identifies 107 discrete phonemes that are grouped into broader families like "fricatives" and "plosives."

FIGURE 2. Illustration of Generative Model

Note: The directed acyclic graph represents the relationships encoded in Equations 1–4. In utterance u, the speaker selects tone S_u based on "static" (i.e., externally given) time-varying covariates $W_u^{\text{stat.}}$ as well as "dynamic" conversational history covariates $W_u^{\text{dyn.}}$. (In the illustration, $W_u^{\text{dyn.}}$ depends only on the prior mode of speech, but more complex dynamic covariates can be constructed.) Based on the selected tone, the speaker composes an utterance by cycling through a sequence of sounds in successive moments, $R_{u,1}, R_{u,2}, \ldots$, to form the word "mass." Each sound generates the audio perceived by a listener according to its unique profile; $X_{u,t}$ is extracted from this audio.

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is analyzed. Online Appendix Section 1 presents the general multiconversation model, which is essentially identical.) Let $S_u \in \{1, \ldots, M\}$ denote the speech mode, or tone, of utterance $u \in \{1, \ldots, U\}$. Broadly, the model contains two levels. The "upper" level, defined in Equations 1–2, characterizes the flow of speech, or the choice of S_u. We assume that the conversation unfolds as a time-varying stochastic process in which S_u is chosen based on the conversational context at that moment, encoded in the vector W_u. In the "lower" level, we then outline a generative model for utterance u's auditory characteristics, X_u. Importantly, this generative model will differ depending on the tone of voice selected in the upper model, S_u. Equations 3–4 present the lower level more formally. The model is summarized graphically in Figure 2, and we refer readers there for a holistic view of how the various model components fit together.

We begin by modeling speech mode probabilities in each utterance as a multinomial logistic function of conversational context, W_u. Note that W_u may include functions of conversational history, such as aggregate anger expressed by previous speakers over the course of an argument—that is, $\sum_{u' < u} 1(S_{u'} = \text{anger})$—which might induce a sharp retort in utterance u. These follow

$$\Delta_{u,m} = \exp\left(W_u^\top \zeta_m\right) \Big/ \sum_{m'=1}^{M} \exp\left(W_u^\top \zeta_{m'}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad (1)$$

$$S_u \sim \text{Cat}(\Delta_u), \quad (2)$$

where $\Delta_u = [\Delta_{u,1}, \ldots, \Delta_{u,M}]$ and ζ_m is a mode-specific coefficient vector through which W_u affects the relative prevalence of mode m. The tone of utterance u, S_u, is one of the primary quantities of interest, along with the coefficients ζ_m that explain why certain tones are used more in particular contexts. However, generally speaking, tone is not directly observable to the analyst; the utterance's auditory characteristics, X_u, are the only

available information. (As we discuss in the following section, the analyst will begin estimation by obtaining a sample of utterances with human-labeled tone.)

Each X_u is a matrix describing the auditory characteristics of utterance u. In this matrix, the t-th row describes the audio at moment t in terms of D auditory features. Thus, the utterance audio is represented by a $T_u \times D$ feature matrix, where T_u is the length of the utterance; because utterances may be of differing lengths, X_u and $X_{u'}$ may have differing numbers of rows.

To model the audio, we then assume that the m-th mode of speech is associated with its own Gaussian HMM that produces the auditory features as follows. At moment t in utterance u, the speaker enunciates the sound $R_{u,t}$—that is, the latent state, which may represent phonemes or phoneme groups such as plosives or fricatives. In successive moments, the speaker alternates through these latent sounds according to

$$(R_{u,t} \mid S_u = m) \sim \text{Cat}\left(\Gamma_{R_{u,t-1},*}^m\right), \quad (3)$$

with $\Gamma_{k,*}^m$ denoting rows of the transition matrix, $[\Pr(R_{u,t} = 1 | R_{u,t-1} = k), \ldots, \Pr(R_{u,t} = K | R_{u,t-1} = k)]$. By modeling the usage patterns of different sounds in this way, we approximately capture the temporal structure that plays an important role in speech. (For example, most latent sounds are sustained for at least a few moments, and certain phonemes typically occur before the silence at the end of a word.) In turn, latent sound k is associated with its own auditory profile, which we operationalize as a multivariate Gaussian distribution with parameters $\mu^{m,k}$ and $\Sigma^{m,k}$. Finally, the raw audio heard at moment t of utterance u—the signal perceived by a listener—is drawn as

$$X_{u,t} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mu^{S_u, R_{u,t}}, \Sigma^{S_u, R_{u,t}}\right), \quad (4)$$

which completes the model. Thus, each mode of speech is represented with a rich and flexible HMM

TABLE 1. Observed and Unobserved Quantities

	Static metadata	Conversation history	Speech mode	Audio features
Primary corpus	$\boxed{W^{\text{stat.},\mathcal{C}}}$	$W^{\text{dyn.},\mathcal{C}}$	$S^{\mathcal{C}}$	$\boxed{X^{\mathcal{C}}}$
Training utterances	$W^{\text{stat.},\mathcal{T}}$	$W^{\text{dyn.},\mathcal{T}}$	$\boxed{S^{\mathcal{T}}}$	$\boxed{X^{\mathcal{T}}}$

Note: Data that are (un)available to the analyst are (un)boxed. Attributes of the primary corpus (training set) are indicated with $\mathcal{C}$ ($\mathcal{T}$) superscripts. Raw audio features, X, are observed for all utterances. The portion of the conversational context that relates to static metadata ($W^{\text{stat.}}$) is available for at least the primary corpus, but dynamic contextual variables that depend on the tone of prior utterances ($W^{\text{dyn.}}$) can only be estimated. In general, the tone of each utterance (S) is also unobserved, but the analyst possesses a small training set with human-labeled utterances.

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that nevertheless reflects much of the known structure of human speech. It is the differences in usage patterns and sound profiles—the Gaussian HMM parameters—that enable human listeners to distinguish one tone or speaker from another.

Estimation

We describe a procedure for estimating the model defined above, incorporating elements of both unsupervised and supervised learning. The researcher begins by determining the speech modes of interest, then identifying and labeling example utterances from each class. Within this training set—which might not be a subset of the primary corpus of interest—we consider each mode of speech in turn, using a fully unsupervised approach to learn the auditory profile and cadence of that speech mode. The results are applied to the full corpus to obtain "naïve" estimates of each utterance's tone, based only on the audio features and ignoring conversational context. We then fit a model for the flow of conversation, use this to refine the "contextualized" tone estimates, and repeat in an iterative procedure. The specifics of each step are discussed below and in Online Appendix Section 1, and the workflow is outlined more formally in Algorithm 1.

Table 1 summarizes the data available for the primary corpus and training set, respectively indicated with $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{T}$. The audio characteristics of each utterance, X, are observed for both the primary corpus and the training set. However, human-labeled tone of speech, S, is only known for the training set. We divide the conversational context into externally given but potentially time-varying "static metadata," $W^{\text{stat.}}$, and deterministic functions of conversational history that dynamically capture the prior tones of speech, $W^{\text{dyn.}}$. The former is known for the primary corpus but may be unavailable for the training set, depending on how it is constructed; the latter is not directly observed for either.

Our ultimate goal is to estimate the conversational flow parameters, ζ, and the auditory parameters of each tone, which we gather in $\Theta^m = (\mu^m, \Sigma^m, \Gamma^m)$ for compactness. In what follows, we also refer to the collection of all tone parameters as $\Theta = (\Theta^m)_{m \in \{1,\dots,M\}}$. Under the model described in Equations 1–2, the likelihood can be expressed as

$$\mathscr{L}(\zeta, \Theta \mid X^{\mathcal{T}}, S^{\mathcal{T}}, X^{\mathcal{C}}, W^{\text{stat.},\mathcal{C}})$$
$$= f(X^{\mathcal{C}} \mid \zeta, \Theta, W^{\text{stat.},\mathcal{C}}) \, f(X^{\mathcal{T}} \mid \Theta, S^{\mathcal{T}}), \qquad (5)$$

with one factor depending only on the primary corpus and another containing only the training set.

As a concession to computational constraints, we estimate the parameters in a stagewise fashion. The auditory parameters, Θ, are calculated by maximizing the partial likelihood, $f(X^{\mathcal{T}} \mid \Theta, S^{\mathcal{T}})$, corresponding to the training factor, rather than the full likelihood in Equation 5 (Wong 1986). The full likelihood is then maximized with respect to the conversational flow parameters ζ, conditional on Θ. The factorization and a detailed discussion of stagewise estimation are presented in Online Appendix Section 1.1.

In Online Appendix Section 1.2, we detail our procedure for estimating the auditory profile and cadence for each speech mode. First, training utterances are divided according to their tone labels. Because the partial likelihood can be neatly factorized further as $f(X^{\mathcal{T}} \mid \Theta, S^{\mathcal{T}}) = \prod_{m=1}^{M} \prod_{u \in \mathcal{T}} f(X_u \mid \Theta^m)^{\mathbf{1}(S_u = m)}$, $\widehat{\Theta}^m$ can be independently estimated for each speech mode with no further loss of information. For all training utterances of speech mode m, a regularized variant of the Baum–Welch algorithm, a standard estimation procedure for hidden Markov models, is used to obtain $\widehat{\Theta}^m$ for the corresponding mode. Each of the resulting M tone-specific models are then applied to each utterance u in the primary corpus to obtain the corrected emission probabilities $f(x_u \mid \widehat{\Theta}^m, S_u = m)^\rho$, which represents the probability that the utterance's audio was generated by speech mode m; this captures the extent to which the audio "sounds like" the relevant training examples. Naïve tone estimates can then be computed by combining these with the overall prevalence of each tone via Bayes' rule. The corrective factor, ρ, approximately accounts for unmodeled autocorrelation in the audio features and ensures that the naïve estimates are well calibrated (for details, see Online Appendix Section 1.3). This shared correction, along with the number of latent sounds and strength of regularization, are determined by likelihood-based cross validation (van der Laan, Dudoit, and Keles 2004) in the training set.

We now briefly describe an expectation-maximization algorithm for the conversation-flow parameters, ζ, reserving derivations and other details for Online Appendix Section 1.4.[8] An inspection of Equation 5 shows that this procedure will depend only on $f\left(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}} \mid \zeta, \Theta, \boldsymbol{W}^{\text{stat.},c}\right)$, since the remaining term does not involve ζ. We proceed by augmenting the observed data with the latent tones, $\boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$, and the conversation-history variables that depend on them, $\boldsymbol{W}^{\text{dyn.},\mathcal{C}}$. The augmented likelihood, $f\left(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{C}}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\text{dyn.},\mathcal{C}} \mid \zeta, \Theta, \boldsymbol{W}^{\text{stat.},\mathcal{C}}\right)$, is then iteratively optimized. However, the closed-form expectation of the augmented likelihood is intractable. We therefore replace the full E-step with a blockwise procedure that sweeps through the unobserved E-step variables sequentially.[9] Finally, the maximization step for ζ reduces to a weighted multinomial logistic regression in which $\mathbf{1}(S_u = m)$ is fit on $\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{W}_u|S_{u-1} = m']$ for every possible m and m', with weights corresponding to the probability of that transition.

Finally, we observe that the unmodeled autocorrelation discussed above renders model-based inference invalid. To address this issue, we estimate the variance of parameter estimates by bootstrapping utterances in the training set, ensuring that dependence between successive moments in an utterance do not undermine our results (Online Appendix Section 1.5 discusses potential issues in bootstrapping). The full estimation procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1. Other quantities of interest, such as those discussed in "Testing Theories of Supreme Court Deliberation," follow directly from the conversation-flow parameters, ζ, or the auditory parameters, Θ; inference on these quantities follows a similar bootstrap approach.

A NEW QUANTITY OF INTEREST IN JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

In this section, we introduce an original corpus of Supreme Court oral argument audio recordings scraped from the Oyez Project (Cornell 2015)[10] and develop a new quantity of theoretical interest: *judicial skepticism*. We first describe the data, then illustrate the concept of skepticism with a detailed case study. Finally, we extensively validate the model and compare it with related work analyzing the text of oral arguments alone. Importantly, we demonstrate that this substantive quantity is not measurable with existing methods. Text-based classifiers are on par with random guessing

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Data: Audio features $(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}}, \boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}})$, static metadata for primary corpus $(\boldsymbol{W}^{\text{stat.},\mathcal{C}})$
Result: Auditory parameters Θ, conversational flow parameters ζ
Procedure:
1. *Define problem.*
Analyst determines tones of interest and rubric for human coding. Human-coded tone labels are obtained for training set $(\boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{T}})$.
2. *Fit auditory parameters (Θ) by maximizing partial likelihood on training set ($\mathcal{T}$).*
for *speech mode m in $1, \ldots, M$* **do**
  Subset to training utterances labeled as tone m.
  while *not converged* **do**
    for *utterance u in $\mathcal{T}$ and moment t in $\{1, \ldots, T_u\}$* **do**
      for *sound k in $1, \ldots, K$* **do**
        Compute emission probability of sound (m, k) generating audio $(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t})$.
      end
    end
    Predict sound being pronounced at each moment $(R_{u,t})$.
    Update cadence (usage patterns of constituent sounds, $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m$).
    for *sound k in $1, \ldots, K$* **do**
      Update audio profile of sound k $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k})$.
    end
  end
end

3. *Fit conversational flow parameters (ζ) using primary corpus ($\mathcal{C}$), conditional on Θ.*
for *utterance u in $\mathcal{C}$* **do**
  for *speech mode m in $1, \ldots, M$* **do**
    Compute corrected emission probability of speech mode m generating utterance audio data $(\boldsymbol{X}_u)$, ignoring context.
  end
end
while *not converged* **do**
  Predict expected mode of speech for each utterance (S_u).
  Compute expected conversation context for each utterance $(\boldsymbol{W}_u)$.
  Update flow-of-speech parameters $(\boldsymbol{\zeta})$.
end

Algorithm 1: Stagewise Estimation Procedure. After defining the tones of interest and obtaining a labeled training set, the analyst conducts cross validation to set ancillary parameters such as the number of assumed sounds in each mode of speech (not depicted). After fixing the ancillary parameters, the cadence and auditory characteristics of each speech mode are estimated from the training set by an iterative expectation-maximization procedure. These speech parameters are then fixed, and the relationship between conversational context and flow of speech is estimated from the primary corpus. In the multiple-conversation case, the utterance loop in step 3 is nested within an outer loop over conversations. Statistical inference is conducted by resampling $\mathcal{T}$ and repeating steps 2–3 within the bootstrapped training set (not depicted) to obtain bootstrap-aggregated point estimates and bootstrap variance estimates for flow-of-speech parameters and other quantities of interest.

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[8] This estimation procedure builds on forward-backward algorithms; interested readers are referred to Online Appendix Section 1.2 or standard references such as Zucchini and MacDonald (2009).
[9] The use of this alternative procedure leads to a smaller improvement of the EM objective function than a full E-step. Nevertheless, algorithms using such partial E- or M-steps ultimately converge to a local maximum, just as traditional expectation-maximization procedures do (Neal and Hinton, 1998).
[10] Dietrich, Enos, and Sen (2019) independently collected the same audio data and conducted an analysis of vocal pitch.

(or worse, depending on the evaluation metric), whereas MASS performs nearly as well as human coders. A full analysis of deliberation in oral arguments—a theoretical analysis that is possible only with

a model for speech flow—is reserved for "Testing Theories of Supreme Court Deliberation."

Audio Data from Supreme Court Oral Arguments

We limit our analysis to the natural court that begins with the appointment of Justice Kagan and concludes with the passing of Justice Scalia, so that the composition of the Court remains constant for the entirety of the period we analyze. The Oyez data contains an accompanying textual transcript, speaker names for each utterance, and timestamps for utterance start and stop times. In addition, we inferred the target side (i.e., petitioner or respondent) of each justice's question based on the side of the most recently speaking lawyer. Additional case data were merged from the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2014).

Using Oyez timestamps, we segmented the full-argument audio into a series of single-speaker utterances.[11] As an additional preprocessing step, we drop utterances spoken by lawyers (each of whom usually appears in only a handful of cases) and Clarence Thomas (who spoke only twice in our corpus), focusing on the behavior of the eight recurrent speakers. We also drop procedural statements, along with utterances shorter than 2.5 seconds.[12] After trimming and dropping cases in which the ideological direction is unclear, the resulting audio corpus contains 266 arguments and 95 hours of audio, comprising nearly 42,000 utterances and over 27 million frames.

The Quantity of Interest: Judicial Skepticism

In this section and the next, we introduce and employ a new measure of substantive importance to the study of courts: *judicial skepticism*, an individual's vocal expression of their judgment about the argument at hand. Judicial skepticism is an important signal of disagreement with or incredulity about assertions and legal arguments, especially in the context of oral arguments.

To identify judicial skepticism in speech, we first randomly selected a training set of 200 utterances per justice to hand-classify as "skeptical" or "neutral" speech, allowing our assessments to reflect not only the vocal tone but also the textual content of the

utterance. Thus, we define 16 modes of speech—two tones for each of the eight speaking justices.[13] During classification, we dropped the handful of utterances (roughly 5%) in which crosstalk or other audio anomalies occurred or in rare instances where the speaker's identity was incorrectly recorded. The model is then estimated following Algorithm 1.

A Case Study of Judicial Skepticism

To illustrate the use of skepticism during the flow of oral arguments, we conducted a case study of *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus* v. *Alabama*, a racial gerrymandering case heard by the Supreme Court in 2014 that considered the legality of Alabama's 2012 redistricting efforts. The study is described in depth in Online Appendix Section 3; we briefly summarize it here and demonstrate the application of MASS to this case in Figure 3.

As background, the case arose when the Republican-led legislature redrew electoral districts in the face of declining urban population. In doing so, the legislature sought to pack Black voters into a small number of already heavily Democratic districts. The liberal Alabama Legislative Black Caucus argued that this practice violated the Voting Rights Act (VRA), a position ultimately supported by the Court's decision, whereas conservative defenders of the new map argued that Section 5 of the VRA in fact *forced* the legislature to draw Black-dominated districts.

Figure 3 depicts two exchanges in which justices spar over this legal claim about Section 5—that a state must hold or increase the numerical percentage of Black voters in a district to maintain minorities' "ability to elect their preferred candidates." In the first exchange, beginning with Justice Scalia's question, "Well, *I* thought the Section 5 obligation . . .," Justice Scalia advocates the conservative view when questioning the liberal advocate. Median Justice Kennedy, perhaps influenced by this line of questioning, pursues it further and transitions into skepticism on the technical point of whether the liberal reading of the VRA constitutes an indefensible "one-way ratchet" on minority percentages. Justice Breyer then comes to the defense of the liberal side, asking the friendly rhetorical question—ostensibly to the advocate—of whether Justice Kennedy's question was addressed by precedent. Later in the oral argument, these roles reverse. The figure depicts a subsequent exchange in which Justice Kennedy initiates a line of questioning, Justice Breyer attacks by skeptically saying to the conservative advocate, "I don't know what the defense is *possibly* going to be," and Justice Scalia comes to the rescue with a "softball" question.

These exchanges illustrate the sort of political interactions modeled by MASS. Panel 3.A depicts how skeptical and neutral speech are deployed throughout the discussion, and Panels 3.B.1–3 each highlight a justice's choice of tone (e.g., the decision to switch from neutrality to skepticism, which we model using covariates such as conversational history or the ideology of the side currently being questioned). Panels 3.C.1–2 examine two utterances in depth, showing a subset of the auditory features that MASS relies on to infer

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[11] Occasionally, segments are reported to have negative duration, due to errors in the original timestamps. In these cases, we drop the full "turn," or uninterrupted sequence of consecutive utterances by this speaker.

[12] We found that these extremely short utterances contained substantial amounts of crosstalk. However, they also include potentially informative interjections; future work may explore improved preprocessing techniques that do not require discarding this information.

[13] Because the transcripts attribute each utterance to a speaker, the model's decision is over whether the current statement by Anthony Kennedy was skeptical or neutral. That is, we do not conduct a joint speaker-recognition and tone-detection task. In the framework outlined in Equations 1–2, this is equivalent to introducing a covariate for the current speaker's identity, with a corresponding coefficient of $-\infty$ for the 14 speech modes that do not correspond to the current speaker.

FIGURE 3.   An Illustrative Example

Note: Panel A contains excerpts from *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus* v. *Alabama*, where Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer utilize neutral and skeptical tones in questioning. Call-outs highlight successive utterance pairs in which the speaker shifted from one mode to another (B.3), and continued in the same tone of voice (B.1 and B.2). Panels C.1 and C.2 illustrate the use of loudness (text size) and pitch (contours) within utterances: in the neutral mode of speech (C.1), speech varies less in pitch and loudness when compared with skeptical speech (C.2). Based on these and other features, MASS learns to categorize sounds into vowels (dark squares), consonants (light), and pauses (white). Call-outs D.1 and D.2 respectively identify sequential moments in which a "neutral" vowel is sustained (transition from the dark blue sound back to itself, indicating repeat) and the dark red "skeptical" vowel transitions to the light red consonant. Panel E shows the differing auditory characteristics of the "skeptical" vowel and consonant, which are perceived by the listener.

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speech tone. Each tone is modeled as a sequence of discrete sounds, like "vowel" or "silence"; their usage is shown in Panels 3.D.1–2, and their auditory content is in Panel 3.E.

Validating the Model

We conduct extensive validation of our model-based measure of judicial skepticism, confirming that MASS does in fact successfully estimate the quantity of interest. Due to space constraints, we summarize these efforts here; results are described in detail in Online Appendix Section 4.

First, we demonstrate that MASS recovers a measure that has high face validity. Online Appendix 4.1 presents randomly sampled utterances from the highest and lowest deciles of model-predicted skepticism. Those characterized by the model as skeptical include gentle mockery and doubtful questions, whereas model-predicted neutral utterances are factual statements and straightforward legal analysis.

Second, we examine content validity in Online Appendices 4.2–4.3. Our model detects skepticism based on linguistically and physiologically meaningful auditory features. In a model of Justice Kennedy's expressed skepticism, compared with neutral questioning, we find that his speech is louder, contains more pitch variation, and is characterized by higher vocal tension. We caution that MASS does not take textual signals of skepticism into account, an important limitation on content validity. (Joint models of audio and text remain an important direction for future work.) However, we demonstrate that in the case of judicial speech, there are extremely few textual signals that distinguish skepticism from typical questioning.

Third, in Online Appendix 4.4, we estimate a lower bound on the out-of-sample performance of MASS, using cross-validation results from the lower stage of the model, corresponding to Equations 3–4 and excluding Equations 1–2. We find that out-of-sample accuracy of the lower-level auditory classifier is 68%, versus the 52% that would be obtained by randomly permuting labels; numerous additional performance metrics are reported in the appendix.[14]

Fourth, we compare the performance of MASS with (1) human coders and (2) text-based classifiers. For the human comparison, we recruited native English speakers on a crowdworking site and evaluated their ability to recover ground-truth labels in legal argumentation. We found that when combining responses by majority vote, nonexpert listeners were able to detect 70% of judicial skepticism, outperforming MASS by a small margin. The performance of individual coders was lower, at 65%, suggesting that with a relatively small amount of domain-specific data, our model performs approximately as well as humans with a lifetime of experience in parsing non-domain-specific speech. For the textual comparison,

we applied an elastic net to utterance word counts. The resulting trained text models were entirely degenerate, predicting the more common label in virtually every case.

Finally, we probe the predictive validity of our measure with a comparison to Black et al. (2011), described in the next section.

Comparison with an Existing Measure

We conduct yet another validity test by contrasting our model with the approach of Black et al. (2011), who use a measure based on directed pleasant and unpleasant words—operationalized with the Dictionary of Affect in Language (DAL; Whissell 2009)—to predict justice voting. We replicate and contrast results with those from a comparable measure of directed skepticism.[15] Specifics are discussed in Online Appendix 4.5. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in directed unpleasant (pleasant) words is associated with a 2.8-percentage-point decrease (no difference) in the probability that a justice votes against a side. In comparison, a one-standard-deviation increase in directed skepticism, as estimated from auditory characteristics, is associated with a 7.9-percentage-point decrease in vote probability—nearly three times as large. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that unlike text-based results, these patterns are robust to the inclusion of both justice and case fixed effects.

Why is speech tone so much more predictive of voting patterns than the use of affective words? One reason may be that DAL uses a cross-domain measure of word pleasantness, ignoring the fact that words often take on different meanings in legal contexts. For example, the the 10 most common "unpleasant" words in our corpus include "argument" and "trial," whereas the five most common "pleasant" words include "read" and "justice." However, as we show in other text-audio comparisons, a more likely explanation is that word choice is a noisy, high-dimensional, and difficult-to-measure signal of expressed emotion, whereas auditory tone is relatively structured and consistent.

However, we note that MASS exploits only the auditory channel of speech. While we show in Online Appendix 4.4 that this provides a clearer signal of skepticism than text *in general*, there are nonetheless cases when expressions of disbelief are spoken flatly. In one example, Justice Ginsburg states matter-of-factly, "Well, that would be fine if the statute said what you claim it said." The utterance is clearly skeptical, yet our model predicts that it is 89% likely to be neutral speech due to its deadpan delivery. This counterexample highlights limitations in the use of any communication channel in isolation, suggesting that joint models of text and tone are a necessary direction for future work.

Next, we demonstrate the model with an application to speech in Supreme Court oral arguments, then conclude.

[14] Performance varies considerably depending on the auditory label of interest. As the comparison with nonexpert human coders shows, detecting judicial skepticism is a particularly difficult task.

[15] Our measure of directed skepticism is based on lower-level HMMs alone, since the complete model incorporates voting as a covariate.

FIGURE 4. Predicting Justice Votes with Directed Skepticism and Directed Affective Language

Note: Horizontal error bars represent point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from regressions of justice votes on directed pleasant words, directed unpleasant words, and our audio-based directed skepticism. Red circles correspond to a specification with no additional controls; blue triangles report results with speaker fixed effects only, black squares with speaker and case fixed effects.

TESTING THEORIES OF SUPREME COURT DELIBERATION

While some scholars believe that oral arguments are inconsequential in Supreme Court decision-making (Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth 1993), others argue that they play a crucial role in shaping the Court's ultimate position on a case (Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2010; Johnson 2001; Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs 2006; McGuire 1995; Shapiro 1984; Wasby, D'Amato, and Metrailer 1976). The justices themselves, however, are virtually unanimous on this point. Justice Powell stated, "The fact is, as every judge knows . . . the oral argument . . . does contribute significantly to the development of precedents" (Stern, Gressman, and Shapiro 1993, 571). Johnson and Goldman (2009) document numerous other direct quotes about the importance of oral arguments, including Justices Harlan, Hughes, Jackson, Brennan, White, Rehnquist, and others.

But there is little empirical evidence about *how* arguments matter. Courts scholars have advanced various accounts of the deliberative process, which can be roughly grouped into two broad theories. For concreteness, we discuss these theories and their associated mechanisms in the context of *Rapanos* v. *United States*, a narrowly decided environmental case about the Army Corps of Engineers' right to regulate pollution in wetlands, drawing extensively on legal analysis by Savage (2009).[16]

The first theory holds that justices are shrewd political actors who maneuver to influence the decisions of their peers in pursuit of a desired case outcome (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2010, 2013; Iaryczower and Shum 2012; Iaryczower, Shi, and Shum 2018; Shullman 2004). In this account, oral arguments represent an opportunity for justices to *strategically signal* to their colleagues, with lawyers and their legal arguments serving merely as convenient foils. Justice Breyer (1998, 56) says as much, noting, "We're always trying to persuade each other. But persuading each other is complicated . . . [one way] is to identify what you think of as the difficult problem in a case, and then pose a question that will reveal the difficulty in some way." Justice Sotomayor (2019) concurs, saying "sometimes we're talking to each other, and we're raising points through the questions that we want our colleagues to consider with us." These attempts at persuasion appear to be on display in *Rapanos* v. *United States*. From the very start of arguments, battle lines were drawn over the precise definition of a "watershed," which determined the Corps' jurisdiction. Justice Roberts, a well-known opponent of what he views as the agency's regulatory overreach, sought to undermine its position: "To *me* it . . . it suggests that even the *Corps* recognized that at *some* point you've got to say stop, because *logically* any drop of water *anywhere* is going to have *some* sort of connection through drainage."

Conversely, the liberal wing of the court attacked the Pacific Legal Foundation's (PLF, a conservative property-rights advocacy group) position that the federal government should not have jurisdiction over local pollution unless it can prove that a polluter's waste reached a navigable waterway. Justice Souter—whose support for greater environmental protection was previously made clear in *SWANCC* v. *United States*—ridicules this position, asking, "You mean... in *every case*, then . . . a scientist would have to analyze the *molecules* and . . . trace it to a specific discharge?"

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[16] The full argument is available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1034.

On its face, it seems plausible that these justices sought to sway Justice Kennedy on this pivotal issue. The point was of critical importance to Justice Kennedy, more so than any other justice.[17]

But were those questions intentionally deployed to shape the subsequent flow of conversation—and ultimately, voting? Or would Justices Roberts and Souter have taken the same stance even if the outcome of the case were not in question? A second, largely incompatible conception of the decision-making process considers justices as neutral arbiters, each casting a *sincere vote* according to rules determined by their respective legal philosophies (Black et al. 2011; Black, Schutte, and Johnson 2013; Johnson 2001). In this latter account, oral arguments primarily operate as opportunities for fact-finding, rather than persuasion. Justice Douglas summarized this position best, stating, "The purpose of a hearing is that the Court may learn what it does not know" (Galloway 1989). Justice Thomas (2013) famously goes a step further, saying, "I think it's unnecessary to deciding cases to ask that many questions, and I don't think it's helpful." And while justices may reveal their predispositions with a display of doubt, this theory suggests that it is merely an honest response to compelling or uncompelling legal reasoning, rather than an effort to manipulate. For example, Justice Scalia was unable to contain his skepticism after Justice Souter's attack, exclaiming, "Well, I . . . couldn't you simply *assume* that anything that is discharged into a tributary, ultimately, *goes where the tributary goes*? . . . You *really* think it has to trace the molecules?" His outburst, which undermined the position of the PLF (his preferred side), suggested a genuine response to a difficult-to-believe position rather than an attempt at persuasion.

These competing accounts are challenging to disentangle even under the best of circumstances. This difficulty has been compounded by widespread reliance on a narrowly limited representation of judicial speech: textual transcripts alone. Here, we demonstrate that the discarded audio channel contains information of enormous value to social scientists—and that by modeling the tone it conveys, MASS not only opens the door to new research questions but can also shed new light on existing puzzles. Specifically, we use MASS to analyze the structural determinants of expressed skepticism in oral arguments. Using justices' ideological leanings, their ultimate vote, and a measure of case contentiousness, we test the observable implications of two commonly espoused but conflicting narratives of the Supreme Court decision-making process: that justices are highly strategic actors jockeying for influence, on one hand (Black, Schutte, and Johnson 2013), or alternatively that they are neutral arbiters

who respond genuinely to compelling legal arguments (Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs 2006).

Differing theoretical accounts of deliberation suggest very different patterns in the usage of this tone. A model of *genuine voting* implies that when justices communicate their skepticism (to the extent that they make it known at all), it is largely as a natural reaction to poor argumentation. In other words, we should observe generically higher rates of skepticism when justices question lawyers for the side that they find less persuasive. This leads to an observable implication of the genuine-voting theoretical account: when a justice votes against a side, we should observe that this behavior is associated with increased skeptical questioning of the corresponding lawyers (Black et al. 2011; Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013).

A *strategic-signaling* model of deliberation, on the other hand, must account for the fact that many—indeed, nearly half—of all cases are decided unanimously. When all justices agree, no strategy is necessary. There is little to gain from posturing, including acted skepticism. To the extent that experienced justices are able to identify uncontroversial cases from preargument legal briefs and lower court decisions, this suggests a key observable implication of the strategic-signaling account: justices should exhibit greater skepticism toward their non-preferred side, *especially* in contentious cases. That is, in cases that are ultimately decided by a 5–4 margin, we should see justices use markedly more skepticism toward the side they vote against. Forward-looking justices should similarly reduce skepticism toward their own side to avoid damaging its chances in close calls.[18] To further adjudicate between these competing explanations, we turn to a dynamic test of oral arguments, in which the implications of each theory are even cleaner.

In general, justices who are ideologically close will exhibit greater similarity in preferences and judicial perspectives relative to those who are far apart. When justice *i* finds a line of legal reasoning to be objectionable (as manifested in an expression of skepticism), it is likely that their ideological neighbor *j* will find it objectionable as well. The two narratives then diverge in their predictions for *j*'s response. A *genuine* reaction would be to acknowledge the flaw in reasoning, perhaps following up with further skeptical probing regardless of *j*'s affinity for the lawyer under attack. In contrast, if *i* is ideologically distant from *j*, then *i*'s skepticism should not provoke much of a response from *j* due to the relative lack of shared views on hot-button issues. The *strategic* account, on the other hand, implies a very different flow of questioning. Suppose that *j* opposes the current lawyer. If *j* were a savvy justice, they should be on the lookout for weaknesses in the opposing side's arguments, seizing the chance to

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[17] At one point, he clarifies, "I think what the Court is asking you . . . is how to define 'significant nexus,'" to a navigable waterway. This point of contention is mentioned 29 times in Kennedy's separate concurrence—compared with 31 times in the opinion, Roberts' concurrence, and both dissents combined. Moreover, 19 of these mentions were in reference to Kennedy's position.

[18] We note that persuading justices to change their vote is not the only potential incentive in a strategic model of judicial questioning. For instance, justices may wish to shift the opinion's content even when expecting a unanimous decision, though this does not undermine the general logic of our test.

dogpile when an opportunity presents itself. Ideological distance from *i*—the preceding critic—should not restrain the shrewd operator much, if at all. (Indeed, a left-right combination may be a particularly effective blow against the current lawyer.)

The strategic narrative suggests a very different sequence of events when *j*'s *preferred* side comes under attack, however. When ideological neighbor *i* expresses skepticism, *j* has an incentive to smooth things over—despite *j*'s ideological inclination to agree with *i*'s points. Thus, the extent to which ideological proximity colors *j*'s response to prior skepticism is a useful point of differentiation. Specifically, we discretize ideology into "left" (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor) and "right" (Justices Alito, Roberts, and Scalia), setting Kennedy aside, given his unique position at the median. We then test whether a justice agrees with their *usual* allies—that is, expresses skepticism together—even when that skepticism is directed against their preferred side. If so, this suggests a genuine response; if not, it suggests that justices may be strategically pulling their punches to protect case-specific interests.

The observable implications described above utilize post-argument proxies for justice preferences (vote) and case divisiveness (margin of victory). A natural concern is that a justice's ultimate vote may be influenced by the course of questioning as well. In this case, persuasion may offer an alternative explanation for patterns in observed skepticism. If strategic justices are always successful in persuading their colleagues, the genuine-voting and strategic-signaling accounts become observationally similar in many cases. While we find this level of persuasiveness to be implausible in light of extensive qualitative work on the courts (Ringsmuth, Bryan, and Johnson 2013; Wolfson 2001), there is considerable room for future work to improve on our analysis. These improvements may include more rigorous formal modeling of strategic interaction in the deliberative process, collection of better pre-argument proxies for justice predisposition and case controversiality (e.g., circuit court votes; see also Online Appendix Section 4.6, which suggests that ideologically directed skepticism may reveal intensity of preferences by issue area), or analysis of natural experiments (e.g., exploiting justice retirements).

Finally, note that in interpreting model parameters and testing theories, we formulate all hypotheses in the following manner: Conditional on justice *i* speaking, is it more likely that they do so skeptically in one conversational context, as opposed to another?[19] The competing narratives described above suggest several observable implications for the structural determinants of justice tone—for example, how the side currently being questioned or the tone of the previous questioner translates into expressed skepticism.

Figure 5 presents results from two MASS specifications. First, we model transition probabilities (i.e., the probability that the next utterance is of justice-tone *m*) as $\exp\left(\boldsymbol{W}_u^T \zeta_m\right)/\sum_{m'=1}^{M} \exp\left(\boldsymbol{W}_u^T \zeta_{m'}\right)$, where the conversational context $\boldsymbol{W}$ includes the eventual case margin, the ultimate vote of the justice in question, an interaction, and a justice-tone intercept. We then average across justices according to their speech frequency to obtain an average effect. The results show that justices use skepticism against their nonpreferred side—either the petitioner or respondent, depending on whom they go on to vote against—at a significantly higher rate, as expected.

Contrary to theoretical predictions under strategic signaling, however, we find no indication that the gap between petitioner- and respondent-targeted skepticism depends on the margin of the case decision. That is, the difference in differences is far from significant. We do find that skepticism is generically higher *across the board* in close cases. These results are consistent with the account that Supreme Court justices are engaged in genuine fact finding, not a strategic attempt to manipulate their colleagues, and that they particularly seek to get answers right when the stakes are high.[20]

To probe further, we now turn to the dynamics of argumentation. In an expanded specification, we now incorporate additional binary indicators for whether the preceding speaker belonged to the liberal or conservative wing of the Court, as well as interactions between skepticism in the preceding utterance, ideology of the previous speaker, and vote. As described above, the *strategic* model of judicial signaling implies that after a peer—any peer—criticizes a justice's preferred side, the justice should withhold comment or defuse tensions with neutral commentary. By the same token, the savvy justice should follow up with a coup de grâce after a colleague finds fault in the disfavored side's reasoning. We find no evidence that this is true. Rather, our results are highly consistent with a model of *genuine expression* in which justices concede to the criticisms of ideologically proximate peers, regardless of their case-specific interests. That is, after a liberal (conservative) justice casts doubt on a lawyer's argument, other liberals (conservatives) on the Court are likely to follow suit even if that criticism undermines their favored side.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the last decade, computational social science made tremendous advances in the automated analysis of *what* speakers say. However, analysis of *how* those words were spoken has largely eluded principled inquiry. MASS addresses this limitation by providing a framework for statistical analysis of the nontextual components of speech. And by directly modeling patterns in communication, MASS allows analysts to address a host of elusive questions about its structure and temporal dynamics.

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[19] This formulation allows us to parcel out any shifts in speaker frequencies, which besides being difficult to theorize are also relatively uninteresting.

[20] As we note in detail above, we cannot entirely rule out the alternative explanation that some of these results are due to persuasion over the course of oral arguments.

FIGURE 5.   Simulated Quantities of Interest

Note: Each panel manipulates a single variable from a control value (second element of panel title) to a treatment value (first). Points (error bars) represent changes (95% bootstrap confidence intervals) in predicted skepticism. We average over all other nuisance covariates (e.g., the identity of the next speaker) of the scenario-specific change in outcome, weighting by the empirical frequencies of these covariates. The top panel shows that justices deploy skepticism more often toward their nonpreferred side. The second panel compares close votes with unanimous decisions, demonstrating that justices express more skepticism across the board in the former. However, justices do not attempt to target a particular side in close votes; rather, they simply ask more skeptical questions across the board. Finally, the bottom panel shows that justices mirror the tones of their ideological neighbors, who share similar legal philosophies, even when those neighbors are opposed to the justice's case-specific voting interests.

Our analysis demonstrates the importance of these patterns—*speech flow*—not only in audio data but also in the analysis of speech more broadly. While structural models of text that incorporate metadata are now in widespread use (Roberts et al. 2014), temporal dynamics have received far less attention. Yet speech—and especially conversation—is obviously temporally dependent. We consider MASS not as the final word on speech analysis but rather as a step toward statistical models that more fully capture the complex data-

generating process that gives rise to all elements of human speech.

This effort to respect the data-generating process underlies many of the design decisions in our model. For example, in representing speech with many time-varying features, MASS makes an enormous improvement over existing approaches that collapse communication down to simplistic summary statistics, such as average pitch. However, this extension is not without trade-offs, particularly in computational

complexity and the need for human expertise. The distinction may be analogous to that between sophisticated context- and semantics-aware text classifiers and straightforward dictionary-based methods that count word occurrences. The advantages of each are worth explicit consideration in future research.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000305542000101X.

Replication materials can be found on Dataverse at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8BTOHQ.

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Online Appendix:
A Dynamic Model of Speech
for the Social Sciences

Dean Knox [*]   Christopher Lucas [†]

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Contents

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1 Estimation

In this section, we introduce our estimation procedure.

1.1 Factorization of the Likelihood

The complete-data likelihood is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta} &\mid \boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{T}}, \boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\mathrm{stat.},\mathcal{C}}) \\
&= f(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}}, \boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}}, \mid \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{T}}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\mathrm{stat.},\mathcal{C}}) \\
&= f(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}} \mid \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{T}}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\mathrm{stat.},\mathcal{C}}, \boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}}) \, f(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}} \mid \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{T}}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\mathrm{stat.},\mathcal{C}})
\end{aligned}
$$

By sufficiency

$$
= f(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{C}} \mid \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\mathrm{stat.},\mathcal{C}}) \, f(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}} \mid \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{C}})
$$

which is Equation 5.

Our stagewise estimation procedure is primarily motivated by computational considerations. The partial-likelihood approach reduces computational complexity dramatically; simultaneously estimating $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ and $\boldsymbol{\Theta}$ on the full data would require repeated passes over $\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}}$, which is typically too large to hold in memory.

However, the stagewise approach has properties that make it attractive for other reasons as well. First, when the model is correctly specified, our approach remains unbiased with respect to the auditory parameters; in this case, the only sacrifice is in efficiency loss relative to joint maximization of the full likelihood. But in the presence of model misspecification—which almost certainly exists with complex phenomena like human speech, e.g., if true hu-

man speech contains more than M modes—the proposed approach can in fact outperform full maximum likelihood. More generally, semi-supervised approaches that exploit both labeled and unlabeled data often underperform those that only use the former (Masanori and Takeuchi, 2014). Intuitively, this is because unsupervised methods rarely recover the analyst's preferred labels, and semi-supervised techniques are typically dominated by the much larger unlabeled dataset.

Finally, we note that even with moderately sized training sets, the number of moments in $\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}}$ will be already be several orders of magnitude larger than the number of parameters, due to the high-frequency nature of audio data, so that $\boldsymbol{\Theta}$ is already reasonably well-estimated from the training utterances alone.

1.2   Estimation of Lower-Level Auditory Parameters

To estimate the parameters of the M lower-level models, which each represent the auditory characteristics of a particular speech mode, we employ a non-sequential training set of example utterances that are assumed to be drawn from the same distribution as the primary corpus (conditional on mode). In the main text, the audio features of the training set are denoted $\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{T}}$, and the corresponding tone labels are $\boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{T}}$. Here, we drop $\mathcal{T}$ for convenience and work exclusively within the training set.

Consider the subset with known mode $S_u = m$.[1] This group of utterances is assumed to be drawn from a single shared Gaussian HMM, the speech model for mode m. Below, we describe how lower-level parameters are estimated by standard HMM techniques. Interested readers are referred to Zucchini and MacDonald (2009) for further discussion.

We first write down the likelihood function for parameters of the m-th mode. For each utterance, at each moment t, the feature vector $\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t}$ could have been generated by any of the K sounds associated with emotion m, so there are K^{T_u} possible sequences of unobserved sounds by which the entire feature sequence $\boldsymbol{X}_u$ could have been generated. The u-th utterance's contribution to the observed-data likelihood is the joint probability of all observed features, found by summing over every possible sequence of sounds. This yields

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\mu}^m, &\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^m, \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m \mid \boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{S}) \\
&= \prod_{u=1}^{U} \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,1} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X}_{u,T_u} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,T_u} \mid \boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m)^{\mathbf{1}(S_u = m)} \\
&= \prod_{u=1}^{U} \left(\delta^{m\top} \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}) \left(\prod_{t=2}^{T_u} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t}) \right) \mathbf{1} \right)^{\mathbf{1}(S_u = m)},
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

where $\boldsymbol{\mu}^m = (\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k})_{k \in \{1,\ldots,K\}}$, $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^m = (\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k})_{k \in \{1,\ldots,K\}}$, δ^m is a $1 \times K$ vector containing the initial

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[1]In practice, because the perception of certain speech modes can be subjective (human coders may disagree or be uncertain), training set mode labels S_u may be a stochastic vector of length M, $\tilde{S}_u = [\Pr(S_u = 1), \ldots, \Pr(S_u = M)]$, rather than a M-valued categorical variable. In such cases the contribution of an utterance to the model for emotion m may be weighted by the m-th entry, e.g. corresponding to the proportion of human coders who classified the utterance as emotion m. After replacing $\mathbf{1}(S_u = m)$ with $\Pr(S_u = m)$, the procedure described in this appendix can be used without further modification.

distribution of sounds (assumed to be the stationary distribution, a unit row eigenvector of $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m$), the matrices $\boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t}) \equiv \mathrm{diag}\left(\phi_D(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t}|\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k})\right)$ are $K \times K$ diagonal matrices in which the (k,k)-th element is the (D-variate Gaussian) probability of $\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t}$ being generated by sound k, and $\boldsymbol{1}$ is a column vector of ones.

In practice, due to the high dimensionality of the audio features, we also regularize the $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$ terms to ensure invertibility by adding a small positive value (which may be thought of as a prior) to its diagonal. We recommend setting this regularization parameter, along with the number of sounds, by selecting values that maximize the training set's cross-validated naïve probabilities (i.e., based on mode prevalence and emission probabilities, ignoring context). This procedure asymptotically selects the closest approximation, in terms of the Kullback–Leibler divergence, to the true data-generating process among the candidate models considered (van der Laan, Dudoit, and Keles, 2004).

The parameters $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}$, $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k}$, and $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m$ can in principle be found by directly maximizing this likelihood. However, given the vast number of parameters to optimize over, we estimate using the Baum-Welch algorithm for expectation-maximization with hidden Markov models. In what follows, we describe this procedure as it relates to the estimation of the lower-level audio parameters. Baum-Welch involves maximizing the complete-data likelihood of Equation 2, which differs from equation 1 in that it also incorporates the probability of the

unobserved sounds.

$$\prod_{u=1}^{U} \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,1} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X}_{u,T_u} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,T_u}, R_{u,1} = r_{u,1}, \cdots, R_{u,T_u} = r_{u,T_u} \mid \boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,*}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,*}, \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^{m})^{\mathbf{1}(S_u=m)}$$

$$= \prod_{u=1}^{U} \left(\delta_{r_{u,1}}^{m} \ \phi_D(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}|\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,r_{u,1}}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,r_{u,1}}) \ \times \right.$$

$$\left. \prod_{t=2}^{T_u} \Pr(R_{u,t} = r_{u,t} \mid R_{u,t-1} = r_{u,t-1}) \ \phi_D(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t}|\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,r_{u,t}}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,r_{u,t}}) \right)^{\mathbf{1}(S_u=m)}$$

$$= \prod_{u=1}^{U} \left(\prod_{k=1}^{K} \left(\delta_{k}^{m} \ \phi_D(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}|\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k}) \right)^{\mathbf{1}(R_{u,1}=k)} \ \times \right.$$

$$\left. \prod_{t=2}^{T_u} \left(\prod_{k=1}^{K} \left(\prod_{k'=1}^{K} (\Gamma_{k,k'}^{m})^{\mathbf{1}\{R_{u,t}=k', R_{u,t-1}=k'\}} \ \phi_D(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t}|\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k})^{\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t}=k)} \right) \right) \right)^{\mathbf{1}(S_u=m)} ,$$

$$(2)$$

1.2.1 E step

This procedure relies heavily on the joint probability of (i) all feature vectors up until time t and (ii) the sound at t, given in equation 3. These probabilities are efficiently calculated for all t in a single recursive forward pass through the feature vectors.

$$\alpha_{u,t,k} = f(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,1} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X}_{u,t} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,t}, R_{u,t} = k)$$

$$\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{u,t} = [\alpha_{u,t,1}, \ldots, \alpha_{u,t,K}]$$

$$= \delta_u^\top \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}) \left(\prod_{t'=2}^{t} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m \boldsymbol{P}^m(x_{u,t'}) \right) \qquad (3)$$

It also relies on the conditional probability of (i) all feature vectors after t given (ii) the sound at t (equation 4). These are similarly calculated by backward recursion through the

utterance.

$$\beta_{u,t,k} = f(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t+1} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,t+1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X}_{u,T_u} = \boldsymbol{x}_{u,T_u} \mid R_{u,t} = k)$$

$$\boldsymbol{\beta}_{u,t} = [\beta_{u,t,1}, \ldots, \beta_{u,t,K}]^{\top}$$

$$= \left(\prod_{t'=t+1}^{T_u} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t'}) \right) \boldsymbol{1} \tag{4}$$

The E step involves substituting (i) the unobserved sound labels, $\boldsymbol{1}(R_{u,t} = k)$, and (ii) the unobserved sound transitions, $\boldsymbol{1}(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k)$, with their respective expected values, conditional on the observed training features $\boldsymbol{X}_u$ and the current estimates of $\boldsymbol{\Theta}^m = (\boldsymbol{\mu}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{m,k}, \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m)$.

For (i), combining equations 1, 3 and 4 immediately yields the expected sound label

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\boldsymbol{1}(R_{u,t} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, S_u = m, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}\right] \propto \tilde{\alpha}_{u,t,k}\,\tilde{\beta}_{u,t,k}, \tag{5}$$

where the tilde denotes the current approximation based on parameters from the previous M step; $\alpha_{u,t,k}$ and $\beta_{u,t,k}$ are the k-th elements of $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{u,t}$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{u,t}$ respectively; and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_u^m$ is the u-th training utterance's contribution to $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}^m$.

For (ii), after some manipulation, the expected sound transitions can be expressed as

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, S_u = m, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}]$$

$$= \Pr(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k, \boldsymbol{X}_u \mid \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}) \ / \ \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_u \mid \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}})$$

$$= \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X}_{u,t-1}, R_{u,t-1} = k \mid \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}) \ \Pr(R_{u,t} = k' \mid R_{u,t-1} = k, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}) \times$$

$$\Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t} \mid R_{u,t} = k') \ \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_{u,t+1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X}_{u,T_u} \mid R_{u,t} = k') \ / \ \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_u \mid \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}})$$

$$\propto \tilde{\alpha}_{u,t-1,k} \ \tilde{\Gamma}^m_{k,k'} \ \phi_D(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t} | \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{m,k}, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{m,k}) \ \beta_{u,t,k'}. \tag{6}$$

1.2.2 M Step

After substituting equations 5 and 6 into the complete-data likelihood (equation 2), the M step involves two straightforward calculations. First, the conditional maximum likelihood update of the transition matrix $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m$ follows from equation 6:

$$\tilde{\Gamma}^m_{k,k'} = \frac{\sum_{1=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \sum_{t=2}^{T_u} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}\right]}{\sum_{1=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \sum_{t=2}^{T_u} \sum_{k'=1}^{K} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}\right]} \tag{7}$$

Second, the optimal update of the k-th sound distribution parameters are found by fitting a Gaussian distribution to the feature vectors, with the weight of the t-th instant being given by the expected value of its k-th label.

$$\tilde{\Gamma}^m_{k,k'} = \frac{\sum_{u=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \sum_{t=2}^{T_u} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}\right]}{\sum_{u=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \sum_{t=2}^{T_u} \sum_{k'=1}^{K} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t} = k', R_{u,t-1} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Theta}}\right]} \tag{8}$$

$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{m,k} = \sum_{u=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \boldsymbol{X}_u^\top \boldsymbol{W}_u^{m,k} \tag{9}$$

$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{m,k} = \sum_{u=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \left(\boldsymbol{X}_u^\top \mathrm{diag}\left(\boldsymbol{W}_u^{m,k}\right) \boldsymbol{X}_u\right) - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{m,k} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{m,k\,\top} \tag{10}$$

where $\boldsymbol{W}_u^{m,k} \equiv \dfrac{\sum_{u=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \left[\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,1} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right], \cdots, \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,T_u} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right]\right]^\top}{\sum_{u=1}^{U} \mathbf{1}(S_u = m) \sum_{t=1}^{T_u} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}(R_{u,t} = k) \mid \boldsymbol{X}_u, \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right]}$

1.3 Unmodeled Autocorrelation

If the Gaussian HMM model of speech described in Equations 3–4 were correctly specified, then the tone of any new utterance could be classified with well-calibrated posterior probabilities based on its auditory characteristics (setting aside conversation context) by the simple application of Bayes' rule, $\Pr(S_u = m | \boldsymbol{X}_u, \boldsymbol{\Theta}) = \frac{\Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_u | S_u = m, \boldsymbol{\Theta}) \Pr(S_u = m)}{\sum_{m'=1}^{M} \Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_u | S_u = m', \boldsymbol{\Theta}) \Pr(S_u = m')}$, where $\Pr(\boldsymbol{X}_u | S_u = m, \boldsymbol{\Theta}) = \delta^{m\top} \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}) \left(\prod_{t=2}^{T_u} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t})\right) \mathbf{1}$ as in Appendix 1.2.

However, this speech model—like all simplified models of complex human behavior—is misspecified, with implications for its resulting predictions. In particular, our model assumes that the auditory features in successive moments are conditionally independent, given their respective sounds. This can be seen by noting that $\boldsymbol{X}_{u,1}$ and $\boldsymbol{X}_{u,2}$ are d-separated by $R_{u,1}$ and $R_{u,2}$ in Figure 2. In other words, the expected difference in audio between moment t and $t + 1$ should be no greater than the difference between t and $t + 10$, as long as a vowel is being spoken.

This assumption makes the model analytically tractable, much as the bag-of-words as-

sumption facilitates text analysis. Like the bag-of-words assumption, it is also clearly violated by actual human behavior. A speaker's vocal tract is physically incapable of changing much in a few milliseconds, but this autocorrelation in features goes unmodeled. Thus, the model mistakenly perceives the information content of an utterance to be T_u data points, when in fact it may be much less. The practical implication is that mode probabilities produced by the aforementioned approach will drift toward zero and one, leading to dramatic miscalibration. To address this issue, we use a corrective factor, $\left(\delta^{m\top} \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,1}) \left(\prod_{t=2}^{T_u} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^m \boldsymbol{P}^m(\boldsymbol{x}_{u,t}) \right) \mathbf{1} \right)^\rho$. This scales back the utterance's contribution to the log likelihood multiplicatively, reducing the utterance's "effective value" to ρT_u. The corrective factor is estimated from out-of-sample data by maximizing the total log corrected probabilities of the correct class.

1.4   Estimation of Upper-Level Conversation Parameters

We now describe our procedure for estimating the conversation flow parameters by maximizing the observed-data likelihood of Equation 5 with respect to $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$, which amounts to maximizing $f(\boldsymbol{X}^{\mathcal{C}} \mid \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\mathrm{stat.},\mathcal{C}})$. This is equivalent to estimating both the unobserved $\boldsymbol{S}^{\mathcal{C}}$ and parameters $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ by maximizing the expected complete-data log likelihood. (All analysis in this subsection is of the primary corpus, so we drop the $\mathcal{C}$ indicator for compactness.) For complete generality, we also introduce a conversation index $v \in \{1, \ldots, V\}$. The number of utterances in conversation v is denoted U_v; metadata, speech modes and audio features for utterance u in conversation v are respectively $\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}$, $S_{v,u}$ and $\boldsymbol{X}_{v,u}$.

First, the complete-data likelihood of the primary corpus is

$$\ln f(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{S} \mid \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{W}^{\text{stat.}})$$

$$= \ln \left(\prod_{v=1}^{V} \delta_{v, S_{v,1}} f(\boldsymbol{x}_{v,1} | S_{v,1} = s_1, \boldsymbol{\Theta}) \prod_{u=2}^{U_v} \Pr(S_{v,u} = s_{v,u} | S_{v,u-1} = s_{v,u-1}) f(\boldsymbol{x}_{v,u} | S_{v,u} = s_{v,u}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}) \right)$$

$$= \sum_{v=1}^{V} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \ln \delta_{v,m}^{\mathbf{1}(S_{v,1}=m)} + \sum_{v=1}^{V} \sum_{u=1}^{U_v} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \ln f(\boldsymbol{x}_{v,u} | S_{v,u} = m, \boldsymbol{\Theta}^m)^{\mathbf{1}(S_{v,1}=m)}$$

$$+ \sum_{v=1}^{V} \sum_{u=2}^{U_v} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{m'=1}^{M} \Delta_{v,u,m,m'}^{\mathbf{1}(S_{v,u-1}=m, S_{v,u}=m')}$$

$$= \sum_{v=1}^{V} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \mathbf{1}(S_{v,1} = m) \ln \delta_{v,m} + \sum_{v=1}^{V} \sum_{u=1}^{U_v} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \mathbf{1}(S_{v,1} = m) \ln f(\boldsymbol{x}_{v,u} | S_{v,u} = m, \boldsymbol{\Theta}^m)$$

$$+ \sum_{v=1}^{V} \sum_{u=2}^{U_v} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{m'=1}^{M} \mathbf{1}(S_{v,u-1} = m, S_{v,u} = m') \ln \frac{\exp\left(\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}(\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u})^{\top} \boldsymbol{\zeta}_m\right)}{\sum_{m'=1}^{M} \exp\left(\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}(\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u})^{\top} \boldsymbol{\zeta}_{m'}\right)},$$

where $\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}(\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u}) = [\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}^{\text{stat.}\top}, \boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}^{\text{dyn.}}(\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u})^{\top}]^{\top}$. $\boldsymbol{\delta}_v$ indicates the initial distribution of speech modes for conversation v.

Because the time-varying transition matrix, $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{v,u}$, is a multinomial logistic function of conversation context, $\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}$—which is itself a potentially complex function of unobserved prior speech modes—deriving the closed-form expectation of the complete-data likelihood is intractable. We therefore replace this expectation with the following blockwise procedure that sweeps through the unobserved variables sequentially.

1. The metadata $\boldsymbol{W}_{v,u}$ depends on conversation history, but the previous mode is un-observed. Therefore, for each utterance, we create a separate metadata vector for each possible prior mode. (This is computationally infeasible for longer-range sum-maries of conversation history e.g., aggregate anger expressed over the course of a debate, so we recommend a mean-field approximation for dynamic metadata based

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on utterances older than $u - 1$.) This step produces M possible metadata vectors, $\tilde{\boldsymbol{W}}_{v,u}(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u-1}], S_{u-1} = 1)$ through $\tilde{\boldsymbol{W}}_{v,u}(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u-1}], S_{u-1} = M)$.

2. Each possible metadata vector implies a vector of probabilities for the next utterance,

$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{\Delta}}_m = [\tilde{\Pr}(S_u = 1|S_{u-1} = m), \ldots, \tilde{\Pr}(S_u = M|S_{u-1} = m)] = \frac{\exp\left(\tilde{\boldsymbol{W}}_u(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u-1}], S_{u-1}=m)^\top \tilde{\boldsymbol{\zeta}}_m\right)}{\sum_{m'=1}^{M} \exp\left(\tilde{\boldsymbol{W}}_u(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{S}_{v,u'<u-1}], S_{u-1}=m)^\top \tilde{\boldsymbol{\zeta}}_{m'}\right)}.$$

Stack these into a transition matrix, $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\Delta}}$.

3. Compute $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{1}(S_{v,u} = m)]$ and $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{1}(S_{v,u-1} = m, S_{v,u} = m')]$, using a forward-backward algorithm that is essentially identical to Equations 5 and 6. We find that the use of the corrected emission probabilities, described in Appendix 1.3, is crucial in this step.

Again, tildes indicate the best guess for each variable at the current iteration. The maximization step for $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ then reduces to weighted constrained multinomial logistic regression in which all possible transitions are included, weighted by $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\boldsymbol{1}(S_{v,u-1} = m, S_{v,u} = m')]$. A constraint on the mode-specific intercepts ensures that the fitted probabilities agree with the known tone proportions; this is implemented by first computing the relaxed update for $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ in each iteration, then imposing the constraint. The estimated initial mode, $\boldsymbol{\delta}_v$ follows directly from the expected value of $[\boldsymbol{1}(S_{v,1} = m)]$. All in all, the use of this alternative procedure leads to a smaller improvement of the EM objective function than the full (infeasible) E-step would. Nevertheless, algorithms using such partial E- or M-steps ultimately converge to a local maximum, as does traditional expectation-maximization (Neal and Hinton, 1998).

1.5   Bootstrapping

Because each bootstrapped speech-mode model's parameters only enter the upper model through how well or poorly they explain a particular utterance's observed auditory features,

the upper model is unaffected by likelihood invariance issues such as the label-switching problem. However, to the extent that some bootstrapped model runs are trapped in local modes and do not attain the global optimum, resulting upper-level confidence intervals will be wider (that is, more conservative), reflecting both true uncertainty and the additional random variation in the selected local mode. This pitfall may be addressed by standard optimization procedures such as simulated-annealing EM or running multiple chains.

2   Audio Features

Table 1 lists the primary features we calculate for each utterance. In addition, we calculate interactions between and derivatives of these primary features.

Feature (#)	Description
energy (1)	sound intensity, in decibels: $\log_{10}\sqrt{x_t^2}$
ZCR (1)	zero-crossing rate of audio signal
autocorrelation (1)	$\text{Cor}(x_t, x_{t-1})$
TEO (1)	Teager energy operator: $\log_{10}\overline{x_t^2 - x_{t-1}x_{t+1}}$
F0 (2)	fundamental, or lowest, dominant frequency of speech signal (closely related to perceived pitch; tracked by two algorithms)
formants (6)	harmonic frequencies of speech signal, determined by shape of vocal tract (lowest three formants and their bandwidths)
MFCC (13)	Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (characterizing the shape of the frequency spectrum, after transforming and binning the spectrum to approximate human perception of sound intensity)

Table 1: **Audio features extracted for each moment.** Parenthesized values indicate the number of scalars extracted per moment. We also include interactions between (i) energy and zero-crossing rate, and (ii) Teager energy operator and fundamental frequency, for a total of 27 primary features. In addition, first and second finite differences are often informative. For example, vocal jitter and shimmer are respectively described by the first differences in F0 and energy.

3   Case Study of *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*

Here, we illustrate the model using excerpts from *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, a racial gerrymandering case heard by the Supreme Court in 2014.[2] While this example represents only a small portion from a single case, it demonstrates many of the conversation dynamics that motivate our model. We begin by discussing the legal question and positions of the justices, then walk through instances of information-seeking questions, skeptical attacks on the opposing side, and defensive interventions. We then show how MASS parameters map onto the primary theoretical quantities of interest.

As background, *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama* considered the legality of Alabama's 2012 redistricting efforts. The plan came after the 2010 census found substantial population decline in state legislative districts with a majority of black voters, necessitating the expansion of these districts' boundaries. (Reapportionment was required to comply with *Reynolds v. Sims*—yet another decision against the state of Alabama—which ruled overrepresentation of rural, predominantly white, voters in the Alabama state legislature unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause and the "one person, one vote" principle.) In response to these population shifts, the Republican-led legislature sought to pack black voters into a small number of already Democratic-dominated districts—for example, 14,500 people were added to State Senate District 26, of whom only 35 were non-black. Ultimately, the court ruled that the use of race as a "predominant" factor, even when only applied to a subset of districts rather than statewide, constituted

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[2]The full argument is available at `https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-895`, along with background on the case, the ruling, and dissents.

illegal racial gerrymandering.

In what follows, we consider legal jockeying in oral arguments over a contentious and highly consequential debate: Whether Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), prohibiting retrogression in minorities' "ability to elect their preferred candidates," meant that Alabama had to continually maintain or increase the numerical percentage of black voters in black-dominated districts. If so, the state's consideration of race would be "narrowly tailored" to meeting its VRA obligations, and thus legal.[3] We focus in particular on questioning by Justices Breyer and Scalia, who respectively wrote the majority and dissenting opinions, as well as by Justice Kennedy, who cast the pivotal vote.

Panel 1 in Figure 1 presents a condensed transcript of one instance when this issue arose during arguments by a liberal advocate representing the Alabama Democratic Conference. Early on, Justice Scalia takes the position that the state was legally bound to maintain or increase black percentages. His stance was far from novel, as it had already been dis-cussed extensively in briefs and lower-court decisions available to all justices. But Justice Scalia repeats the point nonetheless, questioning the liberal advocate not only skeptically,

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[3]The ruling concluded that the Republican legislature "relied heavily upon a mechanically numerical view as to what counts as forbidden retrogression... And the difference between that view and the more purpose-oriented view reflected in the statute's language can matter. Imagine a majority-minority district with a 70% black population... it would seem highly unlikely that... reduc[ing] the percentage of the black population from, say, 70% to 65% would have a significant impact on the black voters' ability to elect their preferred candidate. And, for that reason, it would be difficult to explain just why a plan that uses racial criteria predominately to maintain the black population at 70% is "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling state interest," namely the interest in preventing Section 5 retrogression.

but sarcastically—theatrically drawing out his words and even exclaiming "gee." The ploy appears to be effective. Justice Kennedy follows up on the topic, skeptically wondering why it was legal for Democrats to disperse black voters, but not for Republicans to concentrate them: a "one-way ratchet." Sensing a threat, Justice Breyer attempts to smooth things over with a matter-of-fact legal analysis of *Easley v. Cromartie*.[4] Again, the discussion hardly contained new information. In briefs by both the Alabama Black Legislative Caucus and the state of Alabama, 167 pages were devoted to analysis relating to *Easley v. Cromartie*. And more to the point, five of the nine justices had been serving on the Supreme Court when that very case was decided there in 2001.

In contrast, Panel 1 depicts an exchange—in the very same case—where the roles are reversed during questioning of the conservative advocate. Here, Justice Kennedy again seeks to clarify whether the legislature's consideration of race was a permissible attempt to comply with VRA obligations. Justice Breyer attacks, asserting that since Alabama's actions were indefensible under Section 5, "I don't know what the defense is *possibly* going to be." He seizes the opportunity to push a step further, suggesting that the Republican legislature has no case and should give up—prompting Justice Scalia to wade into the exchange defensively.

These excerpts provide a clear illustration of conversational flow: how one speaker's communication causes a subsequent speaker to communicate differently in response. In Justice Sotomayer's 2019 words, Justices Scalia and Breyer are "raising points through the questions that we want our colleagues to consider," then intervening in response to one

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[4] *Easley v. Cromartie* ruled that the burden of proof is on the complainant, who must show "legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative [non-racial] ways."

another. In this section, we show how MASS can detect systemic patterns in speech patterns like these, allowing analysts to move beyond isolated anecdotes and test theories about oral argumentation using justices' expressions of skepticism.

To demonstrate how the MASS is able to do this, in Figure 1 (duplicated here for convenience) we turn to a close examination of two prototypical utterances by Justice Breyer. We first discuss the sounds of which each utterance is composed, along with their auditory profiles. Consider Justice Breyer's skeptical mode of speech—the tone in which he rhetorically exclaims "Now if *that's* so, they don't have *Section 5* to rely on as a *defense*!" He communicates through a sequence of sounds that, simplistically, we might categorize into "vowel," "consonant," and "silence."[5] In Panel 1, we show that our generative model of skeptical speech mirrors this structure: Vowels (dark red) are sustained for a few moments (horizontally arrayed cells) before Justice Breyer transitions to consonants (light red strikethrough) and eventually pauses in silence (white) between words[6]. One such transition is depicted in Figure 1.D.2. Just as a human can recognize phonemes from their auditory characteristics, our model automatically learns to distinguish vowels (based on their higher autocorrelation, as encoded in $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\text{skeptical,vowel}}$) from consonants (high zero-crossing rate), as shown in Figure 1.

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[5]We note that sound labels, like topic labels in latent Dirichlet allocation text models, are subjective descriptions of component distributions in unsupervised learning models. However, human speech is highly structured. Across a wide range of applications, we consistently find that HMMs recover states that correspond closely to theoretically motivated phoneme groups.

[6]Because each moment describes just milliseconds of audio, glottal stops and short pauses between words are an observable component of speech.

A — ADDRESSING LIBERAL ADVOCATE

(Scalia) SKEPTICAL .... Well, I thought the Section 5 obligation, gee, it – it used to require that there that there be no regression in – in – in majority black districts.

(Scalia) SKEPTICAL .... So if a district went from 69 percent black to 55 percent black, you would be in trouble...

(Kennedy) NEUTRAL .... Suppose... Party A in 2001 takes minorities out of heavily minority districts and puts them into opportunity districts for political purposes...

(Kennedy) SKEPTICAL .... And I'm asking if Party B can then undo it for partisan purposes, because I sense that there's a one-way ratchet here...

(Breyer) NEUTRAL .... Doesn't Cromartie 2 say... the burden is on the one attacking the district

(Breyer) NEUTRAL .... Whether they are doing it by removing some African-Americans... or by putting more into it, it's the same issue...

(Breyer) NEUTRAL .... Then it's not a one-way ratchet. It is a two-way ratchet.

ADDRESSING CONSERVATIVE ADVOCATE

(Kennedy) NEUTRAL .... Well, Justice Kagan's question points up the fact that the defenders of this plan did not rely on the fact that it was a political gerrymander.

(Kennedy) NEUTRAL .... And, of course, they said it was the 2 percent call, but the basis was race in order to comply with Section 5...

(Breyer) NEUTRAL .... I suspect they will be able to prove that at least in some districts... the statement of the legislator here did prevail and did make a difference.

(Breyer) SKEPTICAL .... Now, if that's so, they don't have Section 5 to rely on as a defense. So I don't know what the defense is possibly going to be.

(Breyer) SKEPTICAL .... And since we can't even think what the defense is, why don't they just redo this plan over in the legislature and save everybody a lot of time and trouble?

(Scalia) NEUTRAL .... I thought it was a lot of trouble to redo a plan. Is it not a lot of trouble?

B.1 NEUTRAL SKEPTICAL

B.2 NEUTRAL SKEPTICAL

B.3 NEUTRAL SKEPTICAL

C.1 — it's not a one way uh ratchet

D.1

D.2

E — autocorrelation / zero-crossing rate

**C.2** — now if that's so they don't have section five to rely on as a defense

Figure 1: **An illustrative example.** Panel A contains an excerpt from Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, where Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer utilize neutral and skeptical tones in questioning. Call-outs highlight successive utterance-pairs in which the speaker shifted from one mode to another (B.3), and continued in the same tone of voice (B.1 and B.2). Panels C.1 and C.2 illustrate the use of loudness (text size) and pitch (contours) in a single utterance: in the neutral mode of speech (C.1), speech varies less in pitch and loudness when compared to skeptical speech (C.2). On the basis of these and other features, MASS learns to categorize sounds into vowels (dark squares), consonants (light), and pauses (white). Call-outs D.1 and D.2 respectively identify sequential moments in which a "neutral" vowel is sustained (transition from the dark blue sound back to itself, indicating repeat) and the dark red "skeptical" vowel transitions to the light red consonant. Panel E shows the differing auditory characteristics of the "skeptical" vowel and consonant, which are perceived by the listener.

Why does this matter? It is on the basis of these constituent sounds that MASS is able to discern differences between rhetorical styles. As Figure 1.A makes clear, MASS contains a parallel "neutral" model for Justice Breyer's speech alongside the "skeptical" model. While neutral speech also uses vowels and consonants, the auditory profiles of these sounds differ dramatically. Figure 1.C.2 (in which word size reflects decibel-scale energy) demonstrates Breyer's use of modulation for emphasis when advancing his argument ("if *that's* so...") and his soaring pitch when expressing incredulity and exasperation ("don't have... a *defense!*") Thus, $\mathbf{\Sigma}^{\text{skeptical,vowel}}$ captures higher variance in loudness and pitch when compared to neutral speech (Figure 1.C.1), where every word is delivered at near-constant volume and relatively flat pitch. Differences in average pitch—often a marker of emotional engagement—are represented in the $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ terms. Finally, shifts in cadence, like when Breyer briefly loses his train of thought before continuing "uh... ratchet", manifest in the $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}$ matrices.

These models of skeptical and neutral speech enable analysts to categorize hundreds or even thousands of hours of previously unheard speech. But learning to recognize skeptical speech is only the beginning for MASS. The most important questions in the analysis of political speech relate to its ebb and flow—when and why a speaker chooses to deploy a particular tone. After learning to distinguish tone in the lower stage (Equations 3–4), MASS moves on to model the entire Supreme Court's conversational flow by estimating the contextual determinants of speech tone (Equations 1–4). While scholars can easily listen to and compare a few short audio recordings, the amount of time required to digest an entire session's worth of argumentation—dozens of cases, each containing hundreds of utterances— rapidly grows infeasible. MASS makes it possible to identify broad patterns in the drivers of political speech, analyzing large-scale audio corpora while still incorporating human judg-

ment about tone and expressed emotion. In Section4.2, we develop a procedure for doing so; Algorithm 1 describes the steps in detail. Broadly speaking, the model learns to identify micro-level patterns, such as those described above, based on a moderately sized training set of human-provided examples. MASS then uses this knowledge to crudely categorize every utterance spoken. Finally, based on their sequence and contextual covariates, MASS identifies patterns in tone usage, then uses these patterns to iteratively refine its utterance predictions and the flow-of-speech parameters.

4 Validating the Model

4.1 Facial Validity of Predicted Skepticism

Before proceeding to more substantial results, we first demonstrate the face validity of MASS predictions in a qualitative examination of machine-generated utterance labels. Table 4.1 presents twenty randomly sampled example utterances that lie in the top decile of predicted skepticism and neutrality. Results suggest high face validity: utterances characterized by the model as skeptical include gentle mockery and doubtful questions, whereas model-predicted neutral utterances are factual statements and straightforward legal analysis.

Skeptical Speech	Neutral Speech
And that helps women.	Mr. Frederick?
It said the rationale is unconscionable.	And because it's a regulated industry, the regulator in your view is doing one of the worst jobs in history.
You think the answer to that is clearly no.	And – and the difference between the monitoring and what happened in the past is memories are fallible, computers aren't.
Isn't it arguably in part to protect consumers?	Then if the Polynesian boat is permanently in the museum, there's a lot of objective evidence of that, it would not be a vessel.
The reason that they want to appeal is they want to win.	What about the – this as I understand it, came up originally as arbitration under the – wasn't it under the collective bargaining contract?
But the lower court said it shouldn't be weighed against the State, period.	You're talking about a very narrow range of cases, because I take it your principal position is it – it would be unusual that the defendant needs to be competent in order for the lawyer effectively to represent him on habeas.
Well, that's simply because, as we said in Allegheny Pittsburgh, the basis for considering the equal protection claim is the rights that you're given under State law.	I mean, Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority, and she said the reference to regulatory authority of a State, which is a different reference, I agree, should be read to preserve, not preempt traditional prerogative for the State.
It did command a majority of the Court, it is authoritative decision, and there are obviously different views among different judges about the extent to which they are the same or not.	If you start talking about significant effect, without those last words, " deregulatory purpose " I suddenly worry about the following: That every city in the United States depends upon towing to regulate parking within the city.
And to go back to Justice Sotomayor's question, as long as it's rational in at least some instances directly to pick out those States, at least one or two of them, then doesn't the statute survive a facial challenge?	Suppose a jurisdiction has the policy of requiring every inmate who is arrested and is going to be held in custody to disrobe and take a shower and apply medication for the prevention of the spread of lice and is observed while this is taking place from some distance by a corrections officer, let's say 10 feet away.
You made him give it to him. So what's wrong with his saying, you go give it to somebody? Now, if it's too much trouble, the judge can say he can't make you go to a lot of trouble. If it's giving it to somebody who might really do everything he wants, we'll guard against that.	Well, Buckman – Buckman was arguably a little bit different, in that there's a concern expressed in that case that requiring allowing the State suit to go forward would cause manufacturers to basically inundate the agency with proposals and warning revisions, so that there would be so many things that the agency wouldn't even be able to process them, and they would become meaningless to the consumers.

4.2 Textual Characteristics of Expressed Skepticism

Results from Section 4.1, which suggest that humans such as the reader (presumably) can validate model-predicted skepticism using utterance text—in extreme cases, at the least—indicate that auditory channel carries emotional information that can be detected by MASS. But they also suggest that skepticism is partially conveyed through textual channels as well. Could tone be extracted directly from the text without the need for complex audio models? To assess whether the auditory channel in fact conveys new information or is merely duplicative, we attempted to predict expressed skepticism using utterance transcripts. For each utterance, word counts were computed after stemming, stopping, and pruning words that appeared in fewer than ten utterances. A cross-validated elastic net was then applied to the utterance-term matrix, producing a maximum accuracy of 59.8%. Moreover, the textual classifier was only able to achieve this accuracy by predicting the dominant class (neutral speech, 59.4% of labeled utterances) for virtually every observation. Additional measures of classification performance, including for within-speaker classification, are reported in Appendix 4.4.

Next, to rule out the possibility that the roughly 1,600 hand-labeled utterances were too small of a training corpus, we analyze the full corpus. To do so, we treat MASS fitted probabilities of skepticism (based on audio features and conversation context) as the outcome. We then employ a post-LASSO procedure in which a cross-validated LASSO-logistic model is estimated, then an unregularized logistic regression is fit on the selected terms (Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Wei, 2016).

The resulting coefficient estimates, plotted in Figure 2, demonstrate that there are ex-

Figure 2: **Textual Signals of Justice Skepticism.** Each panel depicts a regression of MASS-predicted skepticism on word counts. Within each justice's utterances, candidate terms that may predict skepticism (selected by logistic LASSO) are arrayed on the y-axis. For each term, points and horizontal error bars depict post-LASSO logistic regression estimates and confidence intervals. Thin light blue (thick dark red) error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals that (do not) overlap zero.

traordinarily few consistent textual indicators of expressed skepticism—the vast majority are statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels. In Figure 3, we arbitrarily discard speaker-terms with p-values exceeding 0.05, then investigate the remainder more closely.

For Justice Stephen Breyer, an expressive orator who is by far the most frequently speaking justice, less than 50 such terms exist. For illustrative purposes, we focus on Breyer's "broad," "indeed," and "marry," the three terms most heavily associated with his predicted skepticism. While these terms are not obviously associated with negative sentiments, a closer examination sheds light on Breyer's usage in his freewheeling and at times theatrical questioning:

Figure 3: **Strong Textual Signals of Justice Skepticism.** Each panel depicts a regression of MASS-predicted skepticism on word counts, within a justice's utterances. Words that predict skepticism are arrayed on the y-axis. Reported terms are the subset of post-LASSO terms with post-selection logistic regression confidence intervals (error bars) that do not overlap zero. Highly specific terms (i.e., used in fewer than five cases) are not depicted.

- BROAD (legal doctrine): "It's that second part, that the doctrine extends the doctrine to statutes that, while they may be clear, are far too broad, well beyond what any sensible prosecutor would even want to prosecute."

- INDEED (rhetorical device): "And indeed, you're complicating it even further for the reason that I really meant my question to be aimed at you, you know."

- MARRY (issue on which Breyer uses sarcasm heavily): "So if I marry two people in Washington D.C. and they happen to move to New York, you are saying that New York doesn't have to recognize that marriage because it doesn't comport with the marriage

of New York; is that your point?"

Conversely, Justice Breyer's neutral-leaning terms include technical terms ("prosecutor," "tort," and "argument") as well as the fairly innocuous ("thought" and "imagine"). While this particular justice's textual cues are plausible, however, his colleagues are far more difficult to read using word frequencies alone—perhaps because they signal their position in subtle ways, or perhaps because text is just a poor indicator of expressed emotion. For all other justices, we identify fewer than ten informative words through this procedure; moreover, their cumulative predictive power is virtually nonexistent.

4.3   Auditory Characteristics of Expressed Skepticism

The preceding results show that the textual channel is—at best—a noisy, idiosyncratic, or simply weak signal of a justice's expressed skepticism. What, then, distinguishes skeptical questioning from neutral speech? To demonstrate, we interpret MASS results by investigating the auditory characteristics of median justice Anthony Kennedy's speech. For Kennedy, we found that a moderately regularized speech model with $K = 3$ latent sounds minimized the total cross-validated likelihood of out-of-sample auditory features. Three well-separated sound classes can be consistently observed across model runs. We subjectively characterize these as "voiced speech" such as vowels, in which the vocal cords vibrate (high autocorrelation); "unvoiced speech," such as fricatives and sibilants, in which vocal cords are not used (moderate energy and zero-crossing rate); and "silence" (low energy). Using an alignment procedure described below, we identify the three sounds in each bootstrapped model. For illustrative purposes, we compare the auditory characteristics of voiced skeptical speech to

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voiced neutral speech. The top panel of Figure 4 shows that when speaking skeptically, Kennedy speaks more loudly and with higher average pitch, a consequence of tensed vocal cords. Moreover, his modulation of pitch—which rises during questions and falls sharply during emphatic statements—is markedly larger in skeptical speech, as indicated by its higher pitch variance. We do not, however, observe similar modulation in energy: Kennedy is simply louder across the board when expressing skepticism. Finally, in the bottom panel, we contrast Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor to demonstrate that these speech dynamics are not entirely unique to individual speakers. While speaker baselines do vary—Sotomayor speaks more softly on average, and her voice is roughly six semitones higher—both communicate their skepticism by elevating pitch and raising their voices, among other auditory cues.

Figure 4: **Auditory characteristics of neutral and skeptical speech.** In the top panel, each dark red × (light blue ○) represents a converged EM run for auditory parameters using a run-specific bootstrap draw of skeptical (neutral) training utterances for Justice Kennedy. Coordinates in a bivariate scatterplot are based on elements of $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\text{skeptical, voiced}}$ ($\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\text{neutral, voiced}}$) and the diagonal of $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{\text{skeptical, voiced}}$ ($\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{\text{neutral, voiced}}$). For example, the top right panel demonstrates that when speaking skeptically, Justice Kennedy's voice is markedly louder and exhibits more variation in pitch, relative to his neutral speech. The bottom panel compares the same parameters for Justice Sotomayor's skeptical (neutral) voiced speech, depicted with dark red △ (light blue □). While her voice is generally higher and quieter, on average, Sotomayor also communicates skepticism by elevating her pitch and speaking more loudly.

We now describe the technical details of the sound alignment procedure employed above. To identify sounds that consistently recur across the M speech modes and B trained bootstrap models, we employ an ad-hoc but effective alignment approach consisting of the following steps. First, we take the MBK separate $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ vectors, each representing the estimated average value of a sound for a particular bootstrap training set, and cluster these values using the k-means algorithm. The result of this procedure is MK distinct reference points in audio-feature space, which in the main-text example corresponded to the subjective categories "voiced speech/vowel", "unvoiced speech/consonant", and "silence." In each of the MB trained models, we then determine the optimal one-to-one assignment of the K (unlabeled) sounds to the K reference categories such that the cumulative Mahalanobis distance of each sound to its assigned reference point is minimized.

This procedure produces an approximation to the far more difficult task of assigning each sound to a category while minimizing the total within-category Mahalanobis distances under the constraint of no duplicate assignments. The latter task involves optimizing over K^{MB} permutations, whereas the former consists of only MB separate K-to-K matching problems using the procedure of Hansen and Klopfer (2006).

4.4   Audio, Text, and Human Classification Performance

To validate the out-of-sample performance of the model, we treat the lower-level HMMs as auditory classifiers. (True out-of-sample performance of the full model is difficult to evaluate, because of dependencies introduced when modeling context and conversation flow.) As in the full model, bootstrap aggregation (bagging) is used to improve stability. Out-of-bag

(OOB, see e.g. Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2001, 15.3.1) performance is computed as follows. First, for labeled utterance u, we take all of the speaker's bootstrap speech models in which the utterance was out-of-bag (i.e., the roughly $\frac{1}{e}$ bootstrap resamples in which u was not drawn). For each bootstrap draw, the likelihood of utterance u is computed under the trained neutral and skeptical models, then converted to predicted tone probabilities of u. Predicted probabilities are then averaged over models. Results reflect the performance of a classifier that uses $1 - \frac{1}{e} \approx 63\%$ of the full training set. Across all speakers, we find that 68% of utterances are correctly classified ($F_1 = 0.554$). Speaker-specific results and other measures of performance are reported in Figure 5, along with measures of text classifier performance discussed in Appendix 4.2.

To assess the difficulty of the task, we contrasted the performance of supervised audio and text classifiers with that of non-expert human coders. A total of 40 native English speakers were recruited on a crowdworking site and assigned to one of eight justices (five coders per justice). Coders listened to all training utterances for their assigned justice, attempting to recover ground-truth labels. Figure 5 reports results from this evaluation in two ways. First, non-expert predictions were aggregated by majority vote, producing a set of committee predictions that were 70% correct, on average. We then disaggregated non-expert coders and found that individuals were able to recover the ground-truth label in 65% of utterances. However, individuals often disagreed in their assessment of whether a particular utterance constituted skepticism, averaging a low Cronbach's alpha of 0.50 across justices. Speaker-specific results are reported in Figure 5.

Figure 5: **Out-of-sample performance.** Red circles (blue crosses) indicate the performance of models trained on audio (text). As a point of reference, we also report the performance of individual coders (orange square) and coder predictions aggregated by majority vote (green triangle). Justices initials on the horizontal axis indicate speaker-specific results, and leftmost values indicate pooled results. For each performance measure, horizontal black lines denote the value that would be obtained by randomly guessing according to the baseline proportion of each class. The top-left panel shows that for all speakers except Justice Scalia, text classifiers almost always predict the dominant class. (In fact, speaker-specific text classifiers for Justices Kennedy and Breyer predict skepticism for every single utterance, and those for Justices Ginsburg and Alito predict neutrality for each one. As a result, negative (positive) predictive value for the opposite class cannot be computed for these justices in the panels in the second row from the bottom.

4.5   Comparison to Black (2011)

We compute Black et al.'s 2011 two text-based measures of justice affect as follows. Words in the top decile of "pleasantness" in the most recent Dictionary of Affect in Language (DAL) are defined as "extremely pleasant." The proportion of extremely pleasant words is defined straightforwardly as the count of pleasant words uttered by a justice toward a side, divided by the number of total directed words. Finally, we compute the difference in proportions by taking the pleasantness proportion of speech directed at the liberal side, then subtracting the conservative-directed proportion; this forms the first textual measure of directed affect. Note that under this procedure, the difference in proportions is undefined (and hence dropped) when a justice makes no utterances toward a particular side. This procedure is repeated for "extremely unpleasant" words, or words in the bottom "pleasantness" decile of DAL, to form the second textual measure. The most common pleasant and unpleasant words in Supreme Court questioning, defined in this way, are reported in Table 2. Key divergences from Black et al. (2011) are that (1) we use the most recent DAL (Whissell, 2009), rather than the original (Whissell, 1989), and (2) we operationalize sides in terms of Supreme Court Database (SCDB, Spaeth et al., 2014) liberal/conservative classifications (as in our main analysis) instead of petitioner/respondent. The latter coding decision makes justice fixed effects in the following analysis more informative.

Next, we compute a directly analogous measure of directed skepticism. We average predicted skepticism probabilities of utterances directed at the liberal side, then subtract the average of conservative-directed utterances. In this procedure, we use only the lower-level audio classification results, rather than the contextualized predictions from the full

model, because the full model incorporates voting as a covariate (and its predictions would therefore have have leaked information about the intended test of validity). This forms our third measure of directed affect.

Finally, we create a binary outcome of each justice's vote. This variable takes on a 1 (0) if a justice voted for the liberal (conservative) side in a case. (Observations are dropped if a justice had no recorded vote in the SCDB or sides cannot be categorized by ideology.) The voting outcome is regressed on the three directed affect covariates defined above; our expectations are that directed pleasantness textual measure will correlate positively with the voting outcome, whereas the directed unpleasantness textual measure and the directed skepticism auditory measure will correlate negatively. Figure 6 (duplicated below for ease of reference) reports coefficients on directed-affect covariates from three linear probability model specifications: (1) a "baseline" with no controls; (2) justice fixed effects, which absorb general liberal or conservative leanings; and (3) justice fixed effects and case fixed effects, which additionally absorb deficiencies in one side's legal arguments. We regard (3) as a particularly stringent test. All results are reported with standard errors clustered on case.

Across all specifications, we consistently find that the "pleasantness" textual measure is not significantly correlated with voting, thus replicating one result from Black et al. (2011). We also replicate their finding that the "unpleasantness" textual measure is negatively associated with voting, as expected, although it loses statistical significance when including case fixed effects. However, directed skepticism, as measured in the audio, is a far stronger predictor of voting patterns: a one-standard-deviation increase in this measure is associated with a change in voting that is consistently three times larger than the corresponding increase for unpleasantness, and this finding is robust across all specifications considered.

Table 2: **Common pleasant (unpleasant) words in justice speech.** Uses of the top 20 most common words in the top (bottom) decile of word pleasantness, as defined by the Dictionary of Affect in Language, in Supreme Court justice speech. The proportional contribution of each word to the measure of direct affect is computed by dividing a word's count by the total number of pleasant (unpleasant) words used.

| Pleasant			Unpleasant		
Word	Count	Prop.	Words	Counts	Prop.
well	2912	0.11	not	7697	0.20
justice	1269	0.05	no	2630	0.07
like	1253	0.05	other	2307	0.06
us	845	0.03	mean	2144	0.06
read	648	0.02	argument	1295	0.03
talking	568	0.02	can't	1183	0.03
reasonable	559	0.02	problem	733	0.02
money	487	0.02	trial	529	0.01
agree	458	0.02	over	522	0.01
good	456	0.02	police	504	0.01
clear	451	0.02	without	504	0.01
yes	418	0.02	wrong	497	0.01
respect	387	0.01	against	473	0.01
view	385	0.01	nothing	466	0.01
correct	373	0.01	guess	406	0.01
interest	345	0.01	tax	394	0.01
sense	305	0.01	number	343	0.01
agreement	282	0.01	violation	284	0.01
company	280	0.01	unless	273	0.01
marriage	243	0.01	off	262	0.01

Figure 6: **Predicting justice votes with directed skepticism and directed affective language.** Horizontal errorbars represent point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from regressions of justice votes on directed pleasant words, directed unpleasant words, and our audio-based directed skepticism. Red circles correspond to a specification with no additional controls; blue triangles report results from a specification with speaker fixed effects; and black squares are from a specification with speaker and case fixed effects.

4.6 Predicted Skepticism by Justice, Issue, and Target

In this section, we present exploratory analyses of how each justice differentially expresses skepticism depending on the legal issue and the target side's ideology. Table 3 presents issue areas in which justices appear to be strongly ideological, based on patterns of directed skepticism.

We first compute average skepticism within groups of utterances, using predicted values obtained from dynamic specification described in Section . Groups are defined by unique combinations of justice, issue area, and ideology of the target side. The latter measures are based on Supreme Court Database classifications (Spaeth et al., 2014). (Note that the specification does not include issue area or justice-issue interactions. We regard these results as suggestive, and scholars interested in issue-specific speech patterns are encouraged to model this behavior explicitly to avoid inadvertently attenuating estimates.)

Within each justice-issue, we then compare the average level of skepticism in utterances directed toward the liberal and conservative sides; results are reported for justice-issues with a substantial difference. Consistent with their known ideological predispositions, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg consistently express greater skepticism toward the conservative side, and Justice Scalia expresses greater skepticism toward the liberal side. However, the issue areas in which we observe strong ideological disparities vary by justice and appear to track the intensity of justice preferences. For example, Scalia holds strong views on the right to free speech, and this position manifests in the eight-percentage-point higher use of skepticism toward liberal advocates on First Amendment cases, relative to conservative advocates. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg is seen as a strong defender of civil rights, and uses five per-

centage points more skepticism toward conservative advocates on this issue. (Table 3 also highlights major differences in justice baselines; the notoriously stone-faced Justice Ginsburg uses relatively little discernible skepticism in general, so that this gap represents a two-thirds increase.) Finally, the table shows that Kennedy—consistent with his position as median voter—can be more skeptical of either the conservative or liberal side, depending on issue area.

Table 3: **Directed Skepticism by Justice, Issue, and Target.** Each row presents summary statistics that aggregate justice utterances on cases in a particular issue area. The final columns indicate the average predicted skepticism in speech directed toward conservative parties, liberal parties, and the difference in means. Results are shown only for justice-issues in which the absolute difference in directed skepticism exceeds five percentage points.

Justice	Issue	Con.	Lib.	Diff.
SB	Economic Activity	0.56	0.50	-0.06
SB	First Amendment	0.49	0.38	-0.11
SB	Other	0.53	0.48	-0.05
RBG	Civil Rights	0.15	0.09	-0.05
RBG	Economic Activity	0.17	0.11	-0.06
RBG	Other	0.18	0.10	-0.08
AK	Criminal Procedure	0.55	0.62	0.07
AK	First Amendment	0.60	0.50	-0.10
AS	Economic Activity	0.46	0.51	0.05
AS	First Amendment	0.47	0.55	0.08

5 `communication` R Package

In this section, we briefly describe our accompanying `R` package, `communication` (Duarte et al., 2020). Because the package is continually maintained and continues to be extended, researchers interested in conducting analyses with MASS will be best served by the latest package documentation. Here, we note the high-level features of our accompanying package and describe innovations over existing software.

First and most importantly, `communication` includes an efficient `C++` implementation of MASS, the model that is the primary focus of this paper. To our knowledge, there is no other structural model available for the analysis of speech dynamics.

Second, `communication` implements a number of preprocessing steps that, while not the focus of this paper, are critical for any applied research using speech data. Among many other utilities, these include input/output functions compatible with common file formats; fast extraction of auditory features that are generally understood to distinguish abstract categories of human communication; objects for corpus and metadata management; and functions for segmentation and human labeling of utterances. Notably, these tools are made available in `R` for the first time, increasingly the lingua franca of computational social scientists.

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